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ABSTRACT 
 
My written thesis modifies George Romero’s zombie in an effort to exhume the 
critical potential of melancholia. The notion of melancholia as a dissenting condition 
has been rendered obsolete within contemporary culture. I equate the shift from 
melancholia to depression with the emergence of the postmodern climate that 
collapses radical opposition from the outside by assimilating dissent within its own 
operations. The subversive qualities of melancholia are superseded by the 
classification of depression as a dysfunctional inability to assimilate the logic of 
capitalist production. 
 
I initially formulate my own psychoanalytical term – undead melancholia – to 
describe the figure of the zombie. I then use the notion of sublimation to rewrite 
undead melancholia as a utopian phantasy of transgressive subjectivity in which life 
willingly acquiesces to an emancipatory marriage with death. This fiction of a radical 
new strain of zombie is understood as a melancholic phantasy of an oppositional 
critical strategy that has now been lost within contemporary homogeneity.  
 
I then discuss the zombie as an abject walking corpse that collapses Symbolic 
meaning altogether. This reading of the zombie undoes my own formulation of 
undead melancholia as a transgressive subject position, and re-articulates it as a haptic 
materiality beyond subjectivity instead. 
 
I finally propose a performance practice that might ape the materiality of undead 
melancholia by interrupting the formal and normalised protocols of contemporary 
culture. This performative melancholia, as a haptic antagonism, would refuse to 
consent absolutely to the status quo, asserting that the homogenous procedures 
determining contemporary cultural production are contingent negotiations rather than 
essential conditions.  
 
My recent performance practice involves staging unexpected musical interventions at 
various conferences, symposia, art events and exhibitions to which I have been 
invited as a guest speaker. This work confounds the professional protocols and the 
normalised codes of behaviour associated with these events. 
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PREFACE 
 
This preface is designed to frame and contextualise both the written and practical 
elements of my PhD project. It elucidates the development of the key methodological 
and thematic decisions I have made whilst working on the written element of my 
project, and locates these ideas in relation to the concerns and enquires being staged 
within my ongoing practice.   
 
My project was initially conceived as a response to two key scenes from George A. 
Romero’s zombie oeuvre. I discuss these scenes in detail throughout my thesis, so I 
will limit myself here to a brief description of their most important properties. In Day 
of the Dead1, the character Doctor Logan, during a macabre experiment on an undead 
corpse, exclaims that zombies are motivated by unrepressed instinct. I read this scene 
as an invitation to examine and interrogate the properties of the zombie figure using 
Freud’s theory of the instincts. So, at this early point in my research, I set out to 
analyse undeadliness through the lens of Freudian psychoanalysis.  
 
The second Romero scene that is crucial to my project takes place at the end of Land 
of the Dead2. A hoard of undead corpses, led by a seemingly self-aware and 
calculating zombie, has masticated the last surviving human conurbation. However, in 
the aftermath of the bloody chaos, the undead throng’s appetite for flesh appears to 
have waned; instead of pouncing upon the remaining human survivors, the zombies 
huddle together and wander off into the night as if in search of their own social order. 
They have started to deploy reason and cunning, to communicate, to use tools, to act 
collectively and to demonstrate affective responses to their own suffering; Romero 
suggests that the undead have evolved to become sentient, civilised beings.  
 
However, Romero never pursued this tantalising proposition in his subsequent zombie 
films, so I recognised an opportunity within my thesis to make good his omission. My 
key critical ambition at the beginning of my research was to initially account for and 
then develop this mutation of the zombie figure, using psychoanalysis as a 
hermeneutic tool. I intended to use this particular methodological approach in order to 
                                                
1 George A. Romero, Day of the Dead (United Distribution Film Company, 1985) 
2 George A. Romero, Land of the Dead (Universal Pictures, 2005) 
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write a fictitious evolution for the zombie – a task which Romero himself had 
seemingly abandoned.  
 
Whilst researching the term ‘instinct’, I discovered Herbert Marcuse’s account of 
sublimation, in which the released instinctual drives of Eros and Thanatos become the 
bedrock of a non-repressive civilisation. This reading radically reverses Freud’s claim 
that the instincts can only ever be hostile to the civil order. Crucially, Marcuse’s 
notion of sublimation enabled me to theorise an undead evolution in which the 
zombies’ erotic and destructive drives transform into sustaining and socially 
productive forces. A consultation of Marcuse thus facilitated my formulation of a new 
breed of civilised zombie that exists within a state of utopian communitarianism. I 
pursued this line of enquiry because Marcusian undeadliness is antithetical to the 
normative status of the zombie as a body bereft of social conditioning and 
consciousness. This constituted a claim for originality because I was pushing the 
conceit of zombie fiction into new territories. Again, this move is set up in my 
introduction and discussed in detail in Chapter Two. At this point I am just mapping 
out the development of my thinking within my project.   
 
So, in these early stages of research, I was using psychoanalytical theory to generate 
new narratives for undeadliness that would push zombie fiction beyond the limits that 
Romero had placed on his own invention. Because of the idealistic hues of my 
Marcusian zombie, I initially attempted to write my entire thesis in the style of a 
utopian novel, but containing my writing within a fictitious conceit constricted my 
ability to reflect critically and cogently upon my own thinking. My completed thesis 
still contains small segments of zombie fiction that constitute an attempt to 
complicate and expand the genre, but these are framed within a much larger self-
reflexive commentary. This approach allows me to unpack and interrogate my own 
zombie narratives without having to constantly sustain the fictitious conceit of 
undeadliness. Had I not chosen this strategy I would have been effectively asking the 
reader to do too much theoretical interpretation; instead, I decided to explicitly 
discuss and reflect upon my own claims in a manner that is consistent with rigorous 
PhD research.  
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But not only did I hope to extrapolate the content of undeadliness, I also intended to 
explore the conventions of zombie fiction formally within the practical component of 
my project. My art practice straddles storytelling, musical composition and live 
performance. I initially imagined that the developments to zombie fiction I was 
formulating within the written component of my project might migrate directly into 
my practice. For example, in Chapter Two, I propose a collision of music and humour 
within the zombie genre in response to Marcuse’s notion of orphic play. This led me 
to set about writing a darkly humorous and irreverent zombie musical. However, I 
quickly discovered that this approach was far too literal, and my practice suffered for 
being beholden to, and illustrative of, the theoretical work I was doing in the written 
element of my project. I realised that I needed to complicate the relationship between 
my written texts and my practice – to acknowledge that my project was practice-based 
research, rather than practice as indicative of research.  
 
A number of key developments then took place in my thinking as I expanded my 
psychoanalytical vocabulary. Freud understands melancholia as a refusal to accept 
loss – an internal protest against death that inhibits or blocks the process of mourning. 
Instead of gradually registering the lost object as an absence within life, melancholia 
preserves, and remains libidinally attach to, the shadow of that which has died. For 
the melancholic, loss remains present. This notion of death-in-the-midst-of-life/life-
in-the-midst-of-death seemed to be a particularly rich articulation of the weird and 
abject liminality of undeadliness.  
 
However, as I attempted to use theories of melancholia to think through undeadliness, 
an irresolvable tension emerged. I recognised a fundamental incompatibility between 
the fact that psychoanalytical theories maintain a biological and empirical distinction 
between life and death, whereas undeadliness is precisely a fictitious blurring of these 
mutually exclusive states. Psychoanalysis cannot contend with the conceit of the 
undead body. Any effort to set up the zombie figure as equivalent to, or as an 
embodiment of, melancholia was insufficient and unsatisfactory; it failed to 
productively and cogently contend with the moment at which psychoanalysis and 
zombie fiction refuse to tessellate – the moment at which the distinct categories of life 
and death are exceeded by the liminal proposition of undeadliness.      
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It became necessary to invent a new glossary of psychoanalytical terms in order to 
cope with the uniquely nebulous status of the zombie. But of course, my new 
psychoanalytical vocabulary was no longer describing a ‘real’ human condition; it 
was describing the entirely fictitious state of undeadliness. By responding to a fiction, 
my use of psychoanalysis itself became fictional. I thus recognised the emerging 
dominant term in my research – ‘undead melancholia’ – in which the conceit of the 
zombie collides with Freud and Marcuse, as a fictitious intervention into the language 
of psychoanalysis. My project had been based on the assumption that psychoanalysis 
would enable the modification of undead fiction. Now I was discovering that the 
zombie itself was effectively writing a new and fictitious dimension into 
psychoanalysis.  
 
This realisation allowed me to complicate the notions of ‘fiction’ and ‘narrative’ 
within my project. I started to treat the term ‘undead melancholia’ itself – a hybrid of 
psychoanalysis and the zombie – as a fiction. I realised I could construct a fictitious 
mash-up of theory and undeadliness in the main body of my thesis without needing to 
write within a hermetically sealed conceit. And instead of striving to locate my 
Marcusian zombie figure within a sequence of events that sustained a self-contained 
diegesis, I came to understand the element of narrative within my thesis as the way in 
which undead melancholia migrates through a range of discourses – a linear process 
that leads to a rewriting and re-conceptualisation of the term itself.  So, in order to 
accommodate the developing complexity of my research, I surrendered my efforts to 
devise a coherent storyline for my Marcusian zombie figure, and started narrating the 
development of the term ‘undead melancholia’ instead.  
 
And this is the methodological approach that now underpins my finished project; I 
examine how a range of texts both modify, and are modified by, a theoretical 
encounter with undead melancholia. The scope of undead melancholia itself mutates 
as a result of these collisions, to the point where it arrives at a constellation of ideas 
that is alien to the starting point of my thesis. So, instead of offering an exhaustive 
survey of the vicissitudes of psychoanalysis, language, digital materialism, 
contemporary politics and performance art, I explore what happens at the liminal 
frontiers of these discourses when they interface with and assimilate the hybrid fiction 
of undead melancholia. Rather than anchoring my enquiry in one particular discipline 
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or conceptual territory, I approach a range of discourses through the prism of undead 
melancholia, pulling them all into a realm of fiction that exceeds their common usage.  
 
This methodology of continually assembling and then dismantling meanings for the 
term ‘undead melancholia’ articulates the extent to which my thinking has evolved 
throughout the writing of this thesis. Each structure has its own coherence and 
integrity, but by changing the scope of my enquiry I destabilise the edifice at its 
foundations. I do not wish to hoodwink or frustrate the reader with a project that 
continually eats itself. Rather, I recognise these moments of collapse as points within 
a larger, sustained narrative. And the narrative I present is, finally, one of how my 
research has grown as an autonomous piece of work. Trying to develop one stable 
articulation of undead melancholia, like an ever-expanding theoretical snowball being 
pushed through a field of discourse, prohibited me from discussing all the revisions 
that my thinking went through. But by letting undead melancholia fail and start again 
– by breaking up the snowball and pushing off the remaining lump in a different 
direction – I have been able to plot my mutating research interests on an ever-
evolving trajectory. Each construction, though eventually abandoned, is a platform 
from which I launch my next foray; its eventual collapse marks the point at which I 
set off in a new direction.  
 
But my meandering account of undead melancholia is by no means an arbitrary or 
improvised narrative. It is plotted both in response to a series of insights and 
conceptual crises that I encountered throughout my research, and with an over-
arching ambition to eventually arrive at a discussion of contemporary art practice. I 
fully intended to calibrate my research with current debates surrounding the politics 
of cultural production – this is an important part of what is at stake in my project – but 
the challenge I set myself was to arrive at these ideas via a mobilisation of the term 
‘undead melancholia’. Again, I chose this methodology for my PhD because it 
constituted a more original, productive and nuanced approach than if I had carried out 
a broad survey of issues surrounding contemporaneity, politics and practice alone. I 
can now recognise that my research constitutes an attempt to narrate a conceptual 
journey from the zombie to contemporary practice via the semiotics and politics of 
melancholia… though I cannot claim to have started out with this intention.   
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So why does my narrative of undead melancholia cover such particular ground? After 
the initial merger of psychoanalysis and zombie fiction leads to the conception of 
undead melancholia in Chapter One, the next significant collision arrives at the 
climax of Chapter Two. By historicising Marcuse’s claims, I draw a parallel between 
my sublimated zombie’s status as a transgressive subject, and the modernism of the 
late 1950s. My utopian zombie figure becomes an anachronistic construct that cannot 
engage with contemporary discourses surrounding cultural production. Precisely 
because there is an acknowledged impossibility to the politics of the Marcusian 
zombie – its modernist vision of profound social change has been rendered futile by 
the authoritative homogeneity of postmodernity – there is an inherent conservatism to 
this manifestation of undead melancholia. It can only function as an articulation of an 
unobtainable political and aesthetic ideal, and so implicitly affirms the status quo 
instead of critically contesting it. 
 
So, in Chapter Three, I move away from an understanding of undead melancholia as a 
transgressive subjectivity – as an anachronistic spectre of a lost modernist moment – 
and try to conceive of it in terms that might trigger a more contemporary set of 
concerns. I start by using Kristeva’s semiotics and Laura Marks’ account of the haptic 
to reconstitute undead melancholia as the moment at which representative language 
collapses, exposing the indecipherable and affective materiality of form once its 
symbolic function has been eviscerated. This allows me to talk about the undead body 
as a Real object, beyond the parameters of subjectivity, that antagonises hegemonic 
meaning without being located oppositionally outside the status quo. I self-
consciously recognise this new territory for undead melancholia as a critical position 
that, unlike the modernist strain of my Marcusian zombie, simultaneously operates 
within, yet antagonises, the homogeneity of contemporaneity. 
 
The next problem I encounter is the fact that zombie fiction has become ubiquitous to 
the point where the vertiginous weirdness of the undead corpse has been assimilated 
within the normative language of mainstream commercial cinema. The very body 
that, in Romero’s early films, was a moment of Real nonsense – an abject materiality 
that defiled symbolic classification – has become an instantly recognised and 
categorisable figure. So although my reading of undead melancholia as a haptic 
antagonism updates the scope of my project overall, the term itself is no longer 
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applicable to the contemporary zombie precisely because undeadliness has become so 
oversaturated and familiar.  
 
In Chapter Four, I focus on particular and historical instances of undead fiction that 
escape the current ossification within the genre at large. A discussion of the haptic 
interruptions triggered by both the slapstick artifice of Romero’s early analogue work 
and the digital glitchiness of zombie fiction on YouTube, allows me to conceive of a 
spectator who revels in the formal and fragmented materiality of undeadliness, rather 
than the illusion of narrative coherence. This allows me to set up the final 
manifestation of undead melancholia within my thesis – a methodology for making 
contemporary practice that apes the formal rupturing of symbolic surfaces witnessed 
in certain zombie films. Undead melancholia no longer describes, or looks like, the 
zombie figure; it articulates a particular approach to making that flattens the illusion 
of seamless political normalisation with a glitch of affective weirdness. This 
foregrounding of materiality – learnt from watching zombie films – becomes a 
politically antagonistic art practice that refuses the symbolic consistency of the status 
quo. 
 
This moment in my thesis arrived after I re-examined the way I was treating my 
practice. Instead of instrumentalising my practice to illustrate my theoretical 
endeavours, as I did early on in my project, I allowed my practical work to have a 
higher degree of autonomy. I started to reconnect with the concerns embedded within 
my practice itself, instead of trying to impose fictional content upon my practice. I 
have always been interested in using performance to trigger live moments that exceed 
the social protocols and expectations of the situation I am working within. I recognise 
these moments as instances of affect and presence – washes of awkward humour and 
haptic emersion that swamp comprehension and symbolic coherence. I decided to 
theoretically engage with this particular feature of my practice in order to formulate a 
set of contemporary concerns within the written component of my project. So Chapter 
Four climaxes in an effort to think through and theorise a practical phenomenon; it is 
the point at which my writing speaks to, and is informed by, my practice. The 
theoretical methodology that I devise for making is thus a very particular response to 
my own practical research. I acknowledge that a similar approach to practice might be 
articulated with a very different set of theoretical terms. I am not trying to offer a 
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universal vocabulary or a new approach to practice per se; this methodology is a 
unique composition, specific to my research, through which the constituent 
components of my project speak to a common concern. If I were to draw a Venn 
diagramme of my writing and practice, they would overlap at the point at which I 
formulate undead melancholia as a speculative methodology for making. 
 
So the final assemblage of undead melancholia is a response to issues that play out 
within my practice – issues that I had hitherto not attempted to theorise formally. It is 
through this manoeuvre that I am able to understand my project as practice-based 
research; I eventually build a set of theoretical claims into and around the very 
procedures I have been investigating in my live performances.  
 
Furthermore, my discussion of undead melancholia as a haptic materiality has enabled 
me to expand my own critical self-reflexivity with regards to my practice. I can now 
recognise how I might productively test and antagonise the conventions of lyricism 
and vocal performance that I tend to rely on in my work. Instead of locating relatively 
conventional songs within an unexpected set of circumstances, I am currently 
enjoying a more playful, irreverent and de-stablising engagement with the process of 
songwriting itself. In particular, my thesis has encouraged me to explore how the 
spoken/sung word, ‘carried’ by the grain and texture of the voice, might be 
understood as a haptic material that flattens and fragments language into a series of 
sonic surfaces. This development of my thinking in relation to practice has ignited my 
interest in ‘sound poetry’ and a range of contemporary practitioners who wilfully 
meddle with phonetics in order to antagonise the semantic properties of the word. I 
see my future practice emerging out of these concerns.   
 
By the end of my thesis, my theoretical discussion starts to escape the terms that I 
have been using. I reach the elastic limit of undead melancholia at the point at which I 
acknowledge that the very materiality I am trying to conceptualise can be understood 
as the potentiality of life rather than the ever-evasive alterity of death. The liminality 
of undeadliness cannot hold on to the invigorated articulation of life that I set up in 
my conclusion. Similarly, the conservative streak of melancholia, founded as it is on a 
lost and irredeemable otherness that can eventually only bolster the operations of the 
status quo, cannot contend with a more radical notion of immersion and presence 
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within life itself. So ironically, but perhaps inevitably, undead melancholia – the term 
that survives countless assaults throughout my thesis – is eventually slain by the very 
discourse it spawns. It is finally undone by its own progeny; a fittingly Oedipal 
demise then for a term so beholden to Freudian vernacular. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Zombies; They’re Everywhere 
 
The walking zombie;3 the running zombie;4 the flesh-eating zombie;5 the brain-eating 
zombie;6 the thinking zombie;7 the talking zombie;8 the capitalist zombie;9 the 
communist zombie;10 the consumer zombie;11 the cannibal zombie;12 the queer 
zombie;13 the black zombie…14  
 
The zombie as post-apocalypse;15 as biohazard;16 as Holocaust;17 as Vietnam War;18 
as born-again Christian;19 as militarised state;20 as slave labour;21 as bio-weapon;22 as 
social critique;23 as S+M fetish;24 as domestic help;25 as gay melodrama;26 as flash 
mob;27 as international politics…28 
                                                
3 George A. Romero, Diary of the Dead (Dimension Films, 2007) 
4 Charlie Brooker, Dead Set (Zeppotron, 2008) 
5 George A. Romero, Survival of the Dead (E1 Entertainment, 2009) 
6 Dan O'Bannon, The Return of the Living Dead (Orion Pictures Corporation, 1985) 
7 George A. Romero, Land of the Dead (Universal Pictures, 2005) 
8 Ken Wiederhorn, Return of the Living Dead Part II (Lorimar Pictures, 1988) 
9 Ben Woodard, Zombie Economy (2007) in: Nought Thought, accessed 25/12/12 
(http://naughtthought.wordpress.com) 
10 Magnus Morkore Johannesen, Zombie Communism (2006) in: The Winterwind Papers, accessed 
23/10/12 (http://www.winterwind-productions.com/issue5/zcp.htm) 
11 George A. Romero, Dawn of the Dead (MKR Group Inc., 1978) 
12 Marino Girolami, Zombie Holocaust (Medusa Distribuzione, 1980) 
13 Bruce LaBruce, Otto; or, Up with Dead People (GMfilms, 2008) 
14 George A. Romero, Night of the Living Dead (Pickwick Group ltd., 1968) 
15 Ruben Fleischer, Zombieland (Columbia Pictures, 2009) 
16 Paul W. S. Anderson, Resident Evil (Pathé, 2002) 
17 Naomi Alderman, The Meaning of Zombies (2011), in: Granta, accessed 25/10/12 
(http://www.granta.com/New-Writing/The-Meaning-of-Zombies)  
18 Karen Randell, Lost Bodies/Lost Souls: Night of the Living Dead and Deathdream as Vietnam 
Narrative, in: Stephany Boluk and Wylie Lenz (eds.), Generation Zombie; Essays on the Living Dead 
in Modern Culture (Jefferson: McFarland and Company, 2011) 
19 Kim Paffenroth, Dying to Live: Life Sentence (Midwest: Permuted Press, 2008) 
20 George A. Romero, Day of the Dead (United Distribution Film Company, 1985) 
21 Victor Halperin, White Zombie (United Artists, 1932) 
22 Travis Adkins, Twilight of the Dead (Midwest: Permuted Press, 2004) 
23 Kim Paffenroth, The Gospel of the Living Dead; George Romero's Visions of Hell on Earth (Waco: 
Baylor University Press, 2006) 
24 Brian Yuzna, Return of the Living Dead Part III (Trimark Pictures, 1993) 
25 Andrew Currie, Fido (Lions Gate Films, 2006) 
26 Michael Simon, Gay Zombie (Passion Fruit Productions, 2007) 
27 Sarah Juliet Lauro, Playing Dead; Zombies Invade Performance Art, in: Deborah Christie and Sarah 
Juliet Lauro (eds.), Better Off Dead; The Evolution of the Zombie as Post-Human (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2011) 
28 Daniel W. Drezner, Theories of International Politics and Zombies (Woodstock: Princeton 
University Press, 2011) 
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The Voudou zombie;29 the porno zombie;30 the dancing zombie;31 the Nazi zombie;32 
the biker zombie;33 the eco-zombie;34 the cyberpunk zombie;35 the newborn baby 
zombie;36 the breast-eating oedipal zombie;37 the Zen zombie;38 the analysand 
zombie;39 the shark vs. zombie;40 the ovine zombie;41 the e-zombie;42 the app 
zombie…43 
 
It would seem that zombies are everywhere and everything; as such, I do not claim to 
contend with the myriad permutations of undeadliness in this thesis. Nor do I attempt 
to exhaustively discuss all the ways in which the zombie has been read by other 
critics, theorists and academics. Throughout this project I use the figure of the zombie 
to help me re-politicise the obsolete psychoanalytical term ‘melancholia’. This 
theoretical endeavour eventually enables me to propose the dimensions of a critically 
engaged contemporary practice. I limit my investigation to the manifestation of the 
zombie in George A. Romero’s films, and I do this for two reasons; firstly, due to the 
fact that Romero uniquely targets “instinct” as the motor driving his undead hoards; 
and secondly, because I detect in his oeuvre a neglected potential – an absence that I 
seek to address in my own writing. I will expand on these reasons by way of a brief 
introduction to Romero’s particular brand of zombie.  
 
 
 
                                                
29 Jasper Bark, Way of the Barefoot Zombie (Oxford: Abaddon Books, 2009) 
30 Bruce LaBruce, L.A. Zombie (Dark Alley Media, 2010) 
31 John Landis, Michael Jackson’s Thriller (Vestron Music Video, 1983) 
32 Tommy Wirkola, Dead Snow (Euforia Film, 2009) 
33 Todd Brunswick, Biker Zombies from Detroit (American Film Partners, 2001) 
34 Sarah Juliet Lauro, The Eco-Zombie: Environmental Critique in Zombie Fiction, in: Stephanie Boluk 
and Wylie Lenz (eds.), Generation Zombie; Essays on the Living Dead in Modern Culture (Jefferson: 
McFarland and Company, 2011) 
35 Andrea Austin, Cyberpunk and the Living Dead, in: Stephanie Boluk and Wylie Lenz (eds.), 
Generation Zombie; Essays on the Living Dead in Modern Culture (Jefferson: McFarland and 
Company, 2011) 
36 Zack Snyder, Dawn of the Dead (Universal Pictures, 2004)  
37 Andrea Bianchi, Burial Ground: Nights of Terror (Shriek Show, 1981) 
38 Scott Kenemore, The Zen of Zombie (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2007) 
39 Marc Fratto, Zombies Anonymous (Beyond Home Entertainment, 2008) 
40 Lucio Fulci, Zombie Flesh Eaters (The Jerry Gross Organization, 1979) 
41 Jonathan King, Black Sheep (The New Zealand Film Commission, 2006) 
42 Brendan Riley, The E-Dead: Zombies in the Digital Age, in: Stephanie Boluk and Wylie Lenz (eds.), 
Generation Zombie; Essays on the Living Dead in Modern Culture (Jefferson: McFarland and 
Company, 2011) 
43 Destination Creation, Zombie Me, accessed 25/12/12 (http://www.zombieme.com) 
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Romero’s Zombie 
 
Romero’s Night of the Living Dead (1968)44 was the first film to establish the zombie 
as a stupefied and lurching corpse animated by a rapacious appetite for living human 
flesh. This figure has become a recognised norm within the zombie genre, and when I 
refer to undeadliness throughout my thesis I am specifically referencing this particular 
manifestation of it. Prior to Romero’s articulation, the zombie was typically cast as a 
bewitched body – a wholly instrumentalised worker – that carried out the dastardly 
biddings of a malevolent Voudou master.45 Zombified undeadliness was often 
presented as a state from which humans could recover, as if the loss of the 
characteristics specific to life might be redeemed once a particular spell or curse has 
been broken. Whilst Romero’s zombie shares the dead-eyed stupor and mindless 
wandering of its celluloid predecessors, his particular re-articulation of the figure 
brings the finality of undeadliness to the fore. Anyone bitten by a zombie in Romero’s 
films is condemned to a feverish and excruciating demise. Once dead, the victim lies 
still for only a few agonising moments before rising up again, stiff-limbed and staring 
– the latest convert to the diabolical undead throng. So Romero’s zombie is very 
specifically and unambiguously an animated corpse, rather than a living human 
trapped in a mystical or biochemical purgatory.  
 
But more distinctively, instead of treating the zombie as a passive instrument that has 
acquiesced to the authoritative will of another, Romero casts the walking corpse as a 
rampaging manifestation of the most malignant of appetites that pays no head to 
authority whatsoever, devouring all semblance of order and civility as it stumbles 
across the prairies of dust bowl America. A redneck posse halts the undead advance in 
Night of the Living Dead, but their trigger-happy zombie purge heralds only a 
temporary reprieve. In his next film, Dawn of the Dead (1978),46 Romero shows the 
zombie insurrection penetrating deep into the urban sprawl, closing in on media 
outlets and malls across the country. By Day of Dead (1985),47 the conurbations of 
America have been lost. Zombies stumble unimpeded through the wreckage of a 
masticated society, whilst alligators sprawl across the steps of the national bank and 
                                                
44 George A. Romero, Night of the Living Dead (Pickwick Group Ltd., 1968) 
45 Victor Halperin, White Zombie (United Artists, 1932) 
46 George A. Romero, Dawn of the Dead (MKR Group Inc., 1978) 
47 George A. Romero, Day of the Dead (United Distribution Film Company, 1985) 
 20 
dollar bills collect in the gutter. Only a ragtag ensemble of survivors remains, locked 
inside an underground military bunker, undertaking macabre and brutal experiments 
on the undead in an effort to fathom their condition.  
 
 
Zombie Fiction and Psychoanalysis 
 
In a memorable scene from Day of the Dead that I discuss in Chapter One, Dr Logan 
expounds the merits of his wildly gruesome research, claiming that the zombie’s 
violently erotic and fatally disruptive drive for flesh might be the product of an 
instinctual residue that has survived the death of the rest of the body. I treat this scene 
– specifically the word ‘instinct’ deployed within it – as an invitation to understand 
Romero’s zombie using a psychoanalytical vocabulary. Whilst many other 
manifestations of zombie fiction explore the genesis of undeadliness in relation to 
contagions, Voudou, toxins, viruses, chemical weapons, nuclear disaster and science-
gone-wrong etc, Romero’s films attribute undeadliness to an abject psychical 
disturbance within the recently deceased that, in turn, has apocalyptic ramifications 
within the social realm. I limit my thesis to an investigation of this particular quality 
within Romero’s films. So in response to Romero’s own suggestion within Day of the 
Dead, I initially read the zombie’s characteristics using psychoanalytical texts – 
specifically Freudian texts that contend with the notion of instinct.  
 
Whilst psychoanalysis is now a much-disputed diagnostic tool within contemporary 
medicine, it nevertheless understands itself as an empirical and structural mapping of 
the psyche based on observations of, and disclosures from, the analysand. I am not 
concerned with its veracity as much as I am with its capacity to function as an 
analytical tool with which I can read the properties of undeadliness. The zombie, 
however, is a fiction in a conventional sense of the word; it is an invention that does 
not exist outside its own fictitious conceit – it is a fabricated figure that does not index 
a pre-existing real beyond the diegesis that contains it. In my first chapter I explore 
the consequences of using psychoanalysis to analyse the field of zombie fiction. I 
position myself in opposition to Slavoj Žižek, who cites examples of popular film – 
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including zombie fiction – in order to illustrate Lacanian psychoanalysis.48 By 
claiming that popular culture is able to elucidate elements of Lacan’s thinking, Žižek 
recognises an equivalence and a direct commonality between fiction and 
psychoanalysis.  
 
However, through a detailed and rigorous reading of both Romero and Freud, I claim 
that no such equivalence exists between the two. In fact my work grows from the 
points at which zombie fiction and psychoanalysis refuse to tessellate – the points at 
which one antagonises the other. I claim that psychoanalysis cannot contend with 
undeadliness precisely because the zombie cannot be categorised psychoanalytically – 
it is neither alive nor dead, and so sidesteps the fundamental classifications that 
psychoanalysis trades in. There is thus no pre-existing Freudian terminology that can 
describe the liminality of the zombie. I therefore add to Freud’s vocabulary so that I 
might more accurately describe the moments when conventional psychoanalysis is 
exceeded by the operations of undeadliness. I do not use existing Freudian terms; I 
invent my own zombie terminology throughout Chapter One, so at this point my 
writing breaches the integrity of Freud’s work by inserting a fictional dimension into 
it. The resulting categories are still couched within psychoanalysis, but a 
psychoanalysis that is in service to, and expanded by, the fictitious conceit of 
undeadliness. As such, I claim that my rewriting of Freud, drafted as it is in response 
to the zombie, is an original hybrid text – a mash-up of Romero and Freud that pulls 
psychoanalysis into a fictional realm. In my subsequent chapters I perform similar 
manoeuvres with the psychoanalytical texts of Jacques Lacan, Herbert Marcuse, Julia 
Kristeva and Darian Leader. 
 
 
The (R)evolutionary Zombie 
 
So, in Chapter One, I use zombie fiction to revise the psychical categories proffered 
by psychoanalysis. In Chapter Two, however, I use psychoanalysis to expand the 
potentials of zombie fiction. Again, this is a very particular response to a narrative 
trajectory that I have identified in Romero’s films. At the end of Land of the Dead 
                                                
48 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry; An Introduction to Lacan through Popular Culture (London: The MIT 
Press, 1992) 
 22 
(2005),49 the zombies begin to exhibit a sense of compassion and communitarianism 
towards each another. They cease to be beholden to their base drives, seemingly more 
concerned with surviving as a social group than they are with procuring more human 
flesh. This sets up the proposition that undeadliness has been subjected to an 
evolution of sorts, whereby the zombie acquires a degree of consciousness, restraint 
and self-reflexivity.  
 
However, in his subsequent films, Diary of the Dead (2007)50 and Survival of the 
Dead (2009),51 Romero takes us back to the beginning of the zombie apocalypse. The 
former satirises the culture of reality TV and the impulse to document life (and 
undeadliness) at all costs, while the latter is effectively a zombie western in which 
two patriarchal Irish families – both settlers in a hostile post-apocalyptic landscape – 
are locked in a bitter dispute over how to survive the zombie scourge.  
 
With this sudden change of direction, Romero effectively refuses to explore the 
potential zombie evolution that he himself suggested in his earlier films. So I use my 
thesis to imagine a new future for undeadliness by colliding Romero’s zombie with 
Herbert Marcuse’s re-reading of Freudian theory. I seek to devise an original direction 
for the zombie in response to the tantalising proposition at the end of Land of the 
Dead that Romero himself chooses to neglect. Marcuse’s treatment of Freud, 
specifically with its provocative discussion of sublimation, allows me to author an 
undead civilisation in which the zombie’s base instinctual drives are radically 
transformed into libidinally emancipated and socially responsible tendencies. Again, 
other authors and filmmakers have modulated undeadliness in all sorts of fascinating 
ways, but I am specifically concerned with resurrecting Romero’s abandoned vision 
within a lexicon of Marcusian psychoanalysis and political theory. The fictitious 
undead revolution that Romero hints at already bears a relationship to Marcuse’s non-
repressive civilisation, so I specifically set out to pull these orbiting ideas into closer 
proximity by adding an unwritten chapter into Romero’s oeuvre. Once again, the text 
that I write – a fictional zombie utopia – eventually refuses to tessellate with 
                                                
49 George A. Romero, Land of the Dead (Universal Pictures, 2005) 
50 George A. Romero, Diary of the Dead (Dimension Films, 2007) 
51 George A. Romero, Survival of the Dead (E1 Entertainment, 2009) 
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Marcuse’s political aspirations. My fiction of an undead civilisation thus ruptures the 
integrity of the theoretical text from which it is drafted.  
 
I do not choose to narrate this fiction directly to the reader; rather I use the form of the 
thesis to reflect upon and discuss the constituent parts of the fiction as I propose them. 
I claim that the thesis itself, as opposed to a film or short story etc, is the optimum 
form to carry my proposal precisely because it allows me to critically interrogate my 
own invention without having to constantly constrain my writing within a fictitious 
conceit.   
 
 
Undead Melancholia 
 
So far I have identified a methodological approach within my thesis that brings 
together Romero’s zombie and psychoanalysis in order to forge a hybrid fiction, but I 
have said very little about the content of the fictions that grow out of this collision. 
Whilst ‘instinct’ provides the way in to my psychoanalytical discussion of Romero, 
the term that perseveres throughout my project is ‘melancholia’. Both the zombie and 
melancholia occupy an oppositional position in relation to the status quo, mobilised 
through a particular libidinal attachment to death. 
 
I initially categorise the zombie using the fictitious term ‘undead melancholia’ – a 
state that permits the suicidal subject to rid herself of her own life without dying 
completely. Undeadliness allows the melancholic subject to be reunited with the death 
that she craves, without succumbing to total annihilation. Whilst the Freudian 
melancholic orally incorporates the lost object into her psyche on a symbolic level, 
the undead melancholic is devoured by the lost object in a very literal feeding frenzy; 
this undead formulation rewrites the dimensions of Freudian melancholia.  
 
The zombie, as an unthinking and unconscious body, is unaware of its own status. In 
Chapter Two, however, I use Marcuse’s theory of sublimation to establish undead 
melancholia as a transgressive subjectivity that knowingly survives its reunion with 
death. Sublimated undead melancholia thus becomes a radical subject position that 
wilfully resists the status quo. I devise a zombie utopia in which life willingly 
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acquiesces to an egalitarian and emancipatory marriage with death – a marriage that 
confounds the homogeneity of life precisely through its idealistic inhabitation of 
undeadliness. My zombie utopia becomes a phantasy of the melancholic urge to 
refuse the libidinal limitations of mortal existence.  
 
I then explore how the condition of melancholia has been replaced within 
contemporary medicine by the term ‘depression’. I equate the move from melancholia 
to depression with the emergence of postmodern homogeneity that collapses radical 
opposition from the outside by assimilating dissent within its own operations. The 
subversive qualities of melancholia are superseded by the classification of depression 
as a dysfunctional inability to assimilate the logic of capitalist production. The 
phantasy of transgressive subjectivity evoked by a zombie utopia is then understood 
as a melancholic introjection of an oppositional critical strategy that has been deemed 
outmoded and obsolete by the contemporary climate. Sublimated undead melancholia 
evokes the spectre of a lost modernism that might interrogate the homogeneity of 
contemporaneity. 
 
In Chapter Three I revisit Romero’s original zombie and read it as an outrageously 
Real collapse of meaning. As a walking corpse that refuses to be laid to rest, it 
violates the protocols of mourning that typically register death within language.  
Undead melancholia emerges as a violation of symbolic death that allows the suicidal 
subject to survive her self-expulsion from language and exist instead within the Real 
territories of semiotic collapse. Crucially, it is precisely the zombie’s base materiality 
– its vertiginous mobilisation of the corpse – that makes it so horrifically Real.  
 
This reading leads me to undo my formulation of undead melancholia as a 
transgressive subject position, and re-cast it instead as a haptic materiality beyond 
subjectivity. At this point I acknowledge that the process of sublimation driving my 
zombie utopia in Chapter Two is incompatible with the haptic quality of undead 
melancholia, set up in Chapter Three, that privileges affective materiality over 
idealised subjectivity.  
 
In Chapter Four I explore the formal qualities of Romero’s zombie films. The allure 
of his early work owes a lot to his ability to create for the spectator riotous and 
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frenzied set pieces – gory tableaux of artificial excess – that privilege visceral thrill 
over narrative cohesion. In these moments Romero does not try to evoke a 
hermetically sealed fictitious conceit in which a drama can unfold; rather, he displays 
the materiality of an explicitly artificial diegesis. This playful subversion of filmic 
protocols might be understood as an eruption of thingness – a moment of haptic 
materiality – staged not between the zombie and the human within the diegesis but 
between the zombie and the spectator. 
 
I then explore how the haptic quality of Romero’s early films invites the practitioner, 
as a zombie spectator, to harness melancholia as a material antagonism – a glitch of 
affective weirdness – that flattens the illusion of normalisation specific to 
contemporaneity. Rather than asserting the interiority of subjective experience, 
melancholia becomes a performative intervention that scours the uniform ideological 
consistency of a given situation. Undead melancholia no longer functions as an 
unobtainable phantasy of a lost modernism, but as a viable critical methodology 
within contemporary culture. Zombie spectatorship allows the practitioner to exhume 
the obsolete term melancholia, harnessing it not as a subject position but as a haptic 
antagonism to contemporary homogeneity.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
   
A Deep, Dark Primordial Instinct 
 
 
 
 
Image 1 
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A figure lies prone on an operating table, its bloodied ribcage exposed and empty. All 
of the vital organs have been surgically removed. But this body is not dead; not 
completely. It is struggling against the restraints that pin it down, straining to bite a 
doctor whose hand is just out of reach. “See, it wants me. It wants food, but it has no 
stomach—it can take no nourishment from what it ingests,” says the doctor, toying 
with the undead corpse. “It’s working on instinct—a deep, dark primordial instinct.”52 
Suddenly the corpse breaks free. The bloody remains of its stomach slop out onto the 
cotton white sheets and then slither off the side of the bed, accelerating to meet the 
floor with a wet slap. The doctor grabs a surgical drill and bores a hole deep into its 
skull. Only now is it completely dead.  
 
It is in this scene from Day of the Dead (image 1) that Romero unveils human instinct 
as the star turn within his zombie films. This proposition – that the endless ranks of 
undead corpses staggering across the screen are in fact propelled by an instinctual 
drive – is the closest Romero comes to explicitly offering an explanation or 
rationalisation of undeadliness within the conceit of his films. As such, Romero 
invites us to unpack the notion of instinct as a means of formulating an understanding 
of the zombie figure, and my first chapter is a response to this invitation. I limit 
myself at this point to a Freudian discussion of instinct; the reasons for this will be 
made explicit in Chapter Two when I begin to author an evolving figure of the 
zombie.   
 
But to continue on my current trajectory, this first chapter initially surveys Sigmund 
Freud’s account of the instincts. Freud’s text is then brought to bear on Romero’s 
oeuvre in an effort to read further insights into the zombie figure itself. If the undead 
corpse is indeed a manifestation of instinctual drives, how might a close theoretical 
study of these instincts impact upon a reading of the zombie? What does a 
consultation of Freudian psychoanalysis allow us to see in the zombie that is not 
immediately evident? How might psychoanalysis function as a device that allows us 
to unpack and eviscerate the zombie figure that Romero presents to us onscreen?  
 
                                                
52 George A. Romero, Day of the Dead (United Distribution Film Company, 1985)  
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I will consult an increasing number of Freudian texts in an effort to enable my reading 
of the zombie in this first chapter. These texts are not chosen chronologically, and hail 
from different Freudian typologies of the psyche.53 By setting these texts in 
conversation with each other I am treating them as fragments, and, as such, I do not 
claim that my treatment of Freud maintains a historically accurate perspective on the 
development and progression of his thinking. So in my thesis Freudian 
psychoanalysis is not a globalised text that underwrites my analytical endeavour, but a 
series of provisional frameworks that allow me to approach the figure of the zombie 
theoretically.  
 
In Chapter One I use the term ‘civilisation’ within an exclusively Freudian context 
because I am specifically concerned with an exploration of how the zombie figure 
might interrogate Freudian psychoanalytical vocabulary (and vice versa). As such, I 
do not claim at this point in my thesis that the term is a relevant or accurate diagnosis 
of the contemporary status quo.54 As the chapter climaxes I will explore how the 
conceit of the zombie figure actually contests certain psychoanalytical overtures. The 
zombie will eventually refuse to be instrumentalised as a figure that faithfully 
rehearses a rendition of established Freudian paradigms.  
 
 
Civilisation and its Undead Contents 
 
Freud claims that human instincts are fundamentally built around an unswerving quest 
for pleasure.55 I will discuss the particularities of these urges presently, but at this 
point it is enough to say that, for Freud, instinctual drives fundamentally underwrite 
the human urge to pursue as much pleasure as possible. This axiom, which decrees 
                                                
53 My formulation of the undead pleasure principle is a response to Freud’s model of the life/death 
instincts, whereas undead melancholia responds to the ego instincts. Despite my use of references that 
span a significant part of Freud’s career, I do not collapse the fundamental variance between these two 
formulations of the psyche. The distinction between the undead pleasure principle and undead 
melancholia still upholds the differing trajectories of these separate typologies.   
54 I will discuss contemporary and critical implications/applications of the zombie in Chapters Two, 
Three and Four. 
55 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in: Peter Gay (ed.), The Freud Reader (London: 
Vintage Books, 1995) p.596 
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that instinctual satisfaction is of utmost importance to the psyche, is known as the 
“pleasure principle”.56  
 
Freud points out that when the pleasure principle makes itself felt in the “external 
world, it is from the very outset inefficient and even highly dangerous.”57 Total 
pleasure for one individual typically demands the subjugation of another; any 
burgeoning civil order would soon melt away in a hot orgy of erotic violence and 
murderous rivalry. The pleasure principle is thereby replaced by the “reality 
principle”58 – an internalised psychical doctrine that advocates the postponement and 
compromise of pleasure so that the individual might survive comfortably within the 
civilised group. The reality principle chooses the unpleasure of instinctual 
dissatisfaction over the pleasure of instinctual satisfaction because a compromised 
collective civility is easier to bear than the burden of surviving alone in “a state of 
nature.”59  
 
And so the individual consciously renounces the out and out quest for instinctual 
pleasure, and is rewarded in return with the privileges of a civilised life – security, 
leisure time, material wealth, etc. But how are the instincts – the drives that target 
pleasure before all else – persuaded to relinquish their bounty? Why would they 
surrender their hold over the individual’s conscious psyche to the anodyne conformity 
of the reality principle?  
 
Freud claims that the pleasure principle is banished from the individual’s conscious 
mind by the psychical mechanism of repression. He specifically identifies the concept 
of “…primal repression, a first phase of repression which consists in the psychical 
(ideational) representative of the instinct being denied entrance to the conscious.”60 
 
This now suggests that instinctual drives are barred from the conscious psyche by this 
first wave of inhibiting and renouncing control. The individual is never truly exposed 
to the full-blooded pleasure-seeking mantra of the liberated instincts; these drives are 
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ambushed before they have a chance to reach the conscious strata of the psyche. 
Instead, heavily sedated and benign manifestations of the instincts are harnessed by 
the civil order and turned into socially useful drives. It is these enslaved and diluted 
impulses that constitute the individual’s conscious ego.  
 
But the pure pleasure-seeking drives are far from defeated. They might be prohibited 
from conscious expression, but the conscious domain is only the surface of an 
unfathomable mental entity that stretches deep into the unknown corners of the 
individual’s psyche. Primal repression bars the instincts from finding expression in 
the conscious realm, and expels them instead into the unmapped territories of the 
unconscious. But this eviction does not amount to an extermination. Far from it: 
 
The instinctual representative develops with less interference and more 
profusely if it is withdrawn by repression from conscious influence. It 
proliferates in the dark as it were, and takes on extreme forms of expression.61  
 
And so Freud says that within the unconscious realm of the psyche the pleasure 
principle still reigns supreme, and rejects the renunciations that the conscious mind 
has accepted so readily. The pleasure principle gathers force in the dark recesses of 
the unconscious, and the repressed instincts then secretly plot their own return from 
the hidden territories to which they have been banished. This is when we discover that 
the repressive regime of civilisation is unable to carry out its inhibiting project 
entirely; a pustulous glob of instinctual pleasure always oozes through the cracks in 
repression’s grip. Indeed, the harder the grip – the more tyrannical the repression – 
the more the pleasure principle resists its own cull and bleeds back into the fabric of 
civilisation. Freud calls this haunting presence the “return of the repressed”.62 It is a 
blister on the social order – an unwanted by-product of relentless authoritarian 
control. Civilisation is therefore in a constant state of hostile negotiation, always 
trying to manage the chaos that it creates by repressing the instincts in the first place.  
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The return of the repressed is dangerous precisely because it nurtures a prohibited 
commitment to pleasure that ruptures the doctrine of unpleasure from which the basic 
principle of civilisation is drafted. I propose that Romero’s celluloid figure of the 
zombie – the body motored by a violent and transgressive drive that dismantles 
civilised coherence – can be understood as a fantastical embodiment of Freud’s return 
of the repressed. We can start to understand the zombie as a visual literalisation of the 
“extreme forms of expression” taken on by the instincts as they spill into the civilised 
territory from which they were barred. The conflict between humans and zombies in 
Romero’s films now dramatises the struggle that exists between civilized individuals 
and their own repressed instincts. We can claim that Romero authors a fictitious 
conceit in which the instinctual urges, ripped out of the civilized population by 
repression, are manifested in a separate body altogether – the undead corpse. This 
body, as an agent of unconscious pleasure, then eats its way through the social order 
in an effort to reunite the civilised body with its lost instinctual drives.  
 
So Freudian theory invites us to conceive of the zombie as an embodiment of the 
pleasure principle that transgresses the logistics of repression and forces itself into the 
very civilised territories from which it has been excluded. The return of the repressed 
testifies to civilisation’s inability to annihilate the instincts completely. Similarly, 
throughout Romero’s films there are always more zombies beyond those that we see 
being destroyed. Therefore, within the fictitious conceit of undeadliness, civilisation 
never manages to totally subdue the instincts. Romero’s films play out the irony 
inherent in the claim that it is nothing less than civilisation’s own repressive squeeze 
on the pleasure principle that forces the instincts to come oozing back into the social 
order in the first instance. So in Romero’s films the undead corpse is the nemesis, but 
also the product, of a repressive civilisation. If Freudian civilisation is the author of its 
own trauma, then Romero hyperbolically exploits this irony to great effect. 
 
I will now explore this claim using some specific examples. In his first two zombie 
films Romero presents scenarios in which the individual’s “superego”63 – the 
internalisation of an exterior authoritative law – is overtaken by an aggressive and 
unlawful quest for power. But crucially, this collapse in civil authority is caused by 
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that same civil authority’s repressive regime. Romero effectively fantasises about a 
tipping point after which civilisation is unable to contend with the forces that its own 
repressive mechanisations have unleashed upon itself. In Night of the Living Dead 
Mr. Cooper is the traditional patriarchal figure. He is severe and cruel, but the other 
survivors holed up in the farmhouse no longer respect his authority. His attempt to 
take control of the situation unravels into a spiteful and neurotic tirade directed at 
anyone who disagrees with him. As a repressive figure he is no longer functioning 
effectively precisely because of the threat posed by the growing zombie hoard 
outside. His ineffective posturing becomes a destructive and treacherous force that 
exacerbates the already precarious situation. As a result he is constantly undermined 
by the other individuals who are struggling to survive the night on their own terms. 
This breakdown of common authority leaves them vulnerable and accelerates the 
zombies’ advance. Ben, who survives until daybreak, is mistaken for a zombie by 
other humans. The sheriff’s men shoot him dead and then throw his body onto a pile 
of zombie corpses. This scene subtly suggests that Ben’s antagonistic and violent 
struggle with patriarchal authority actually puts him in cahoots with the zombies.64 
The return of organised and disciplined law enforcers quashes the undead advance at 
the end of the film, amounting to a temporary reprieve for civilisation in its battle 
with the instincts. But Romero’s next film states explicitly from the outset that this 
remission was only short-lived.    
 
At the beginning of Dawn of the Dead civilisation is already crumbling at its 
foundations. Those humans who normally serve the controlling order abandon their 
posts in an effort to ensure their own immediate survival. Stephen and Francine work 
for a television network, whilst Peter and Roger are both policemen. They all desert 
their civil duties and escape together as the zombie chaos swells out of control. This 
collapse of common authority effectively creates a void in civilisation’s defences that 
sucks in the advancing hordes of zombies. Romero presents a battlefield in which the 
struggling humans are effectively caught in a no-man’s land between civilisation and 
instinct. Those who reject the civilized hierarchy and plot a course towards their own 
immediate gratification are either consumed by the undead or murdered by other more 
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civilized humans. As the unlawful individuals attempt to reclaim their prohibited 
urges, the zombies, as an embodiment of these urges, close in on them. The only 
survivors are those who surrender their immediate pleasure and adhere to some 
measure of common civility. But nothing remains of the old repressive regime, so the 
survivors are faced with the prospect of having to draft an entirely new social contract 
for themselves. Romero effectively claims that if civilisation is to survive it must 
fundamentally re-negotiate its repressive relationship with the instincts.   
 
This is played out in the climax of Dawn of the Dead. The civilized economy is 
completely redundant. Within the mall, Francine, Stephen, Peter and Roger are able to 
take whatever they want for free. The mall has become a domain of lawless pleasure. 
The zombies in the mall may have been destroyed, but an undead throng is steadily 
gathering outside. Once the gang of bikers violently force their way through the 
barricade, destructive incivility takes hold and the zombies return to wreak their 
bloody havoc. Stephen refuses to surrender the luxurious mall to the marauding bikers 
without a fight. Because he gives in to his selfish instinctual desire, he is savaged by 
the undead hoards and becomes a particularly flamboyant zombie himself. Francine 
and Peter only survive because they leave the mall behind in order to forge a new 
future amidst the wreckage of their now defunct civilisation.  
 
The presence of zombies in Romero’s films becomes inversely proportional to 
civilisation’s ability to enforce its repressive regime. The more we see humans 
violating civilized law as a result of the zombie threat, the more the zombies close in 
and destroy the social order. The number of zombies steadily increases throughout his 
films, so Romero effectively portrays a dysfunctional society that is descending into 
unlawful chaos. It is unable to cope with the forces it has unleashed against itself. A 
reading of Freud allows us to state that the horror of Romero’s films is founded in this 
nightmarish vision of a broken civilisation that has definitively lost its repressive grip 
on instinctual pleasure. The undead apocalypse in Romero’s fiction that besets 20th-
century America is a hyperbolic dramatisation of a Freudian conceit; namely that 
human instinct refuses to be repressed by the coercive forces of civilisation.  
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But why should the zombie in particular read as an articulation of the return of the 
repressed? What is specific to the zombie that makes it the body par excellence 
through which a Freudian conceit might be extrapolated?  
 
 
Eros and Thanatos 
 
To respond to these questions I will now address the instincts themselves in more 
detail. Freud claims that human instinct is motivated by two primary drives – Eros 
and Thanatos – the life and death instincts respectively. Eros is the urge to create and 
reproduce – to unite, nurture, and protect all human life. It embodies the basic 
principle of survival and growth. As Freud says,  
 
Eros, by bringing about a more and more far-reaching combination of the 
particles into which living substance is dispersed, aims at complicating life 
and at the same time, of course, preserving it.65  
 
This life affirming instinct attempts to generate ever more abundant constellations of 
living matter; it is the libidinal chemistry that draws people to one another so that they 
might reproduce and proliferate as a species. Freud goes on to identify a component 
within the jurisdiction of Eros that functions as the “uninhibited sexual instinct 
proper.”66 So the life instinct not only creates all the emotional and psychological 
bonds that pull groups of people together, it fuels a more extreme desire for 
immediate sexual gratification as well. Within this sexual dimension of Eros, 
reproduction and the continuation of the species are only incidental by-products of the 
overwhelming urge to obtain total physical bodily pleasure from other humans. 
 
Thanatos, on the other hand, is the instinct to regress – to return to the inertia of 
simple and base matter. Freud identifies this as a “death instinct, the task of which is 
to lead organic life back into the inanimate state.”67 Thanatos is the urge to oppose the 
proliferating structures of life, and is therefore essentially destructive and violent. It 
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yearns to reverse the turbulent process of growth, and summons the universal inertia 
of death in order to stifle the friction of organic existence. Thanatos drives the work 
of decay and entropy in an effort to reverse the generative processes presided over by 
Eros.  
 
Both of these opposing instinctual urges find pleasure in fulfilling their respective 
tasks, and are thus urgently motivated to achieve their aims so that they might obtain 
as much pleasure as possible. But as we have already explored, these instinctual 
drives are blocked from achieving their aims by the coercive culture of civilisation. 
The repressive order decrees that the body must be primarily engaged as a tool of 
labour, and this immediately alienates the individual from her erotic pleasure. 
Civilisation would soon grind to a halt if everyone constantly pursued their own 
physical gratification, so any manifestation of erotic desire that is not an act of 
civilized reproduction is heavily repressed by the social order. Through the resolution 
of the Oedipal Complex the infant learns how to organise eroticism into a socially 
productive expression of Eros. The child is taught that heterosexual and monogamous 
reproduction – a strictly private affair that takes place in the meagre supply of leisure 
time provided by civilisation – is the only permitted manifestation of the sexual 
instinct. So Eros is not completely annihilated; an element of erotic desire is allowed 
into the civilised realm. But under the regime of repression, the conscious Eros can 
only ever be in chains. However, Freud also acknowledges the existence of an 
infantile sexual drive that doesn’t conform to the repressive will of civilisation:  
 
…the oral or, as it might be called, cannibalistic pregenital sexual 
organisation. Here sexual activity has not yet been separated from the 
ingestion of food… the sexual aim consists in the incorporation of the object.68  
 
If we apply this to Romero’s fiction we can recognise the undead corpse’s rampaging 
appetite for flesh as a pregenital sexual urge that does not obey the logistics of 
civilised sexuality. The undead refuse any sort of curfew on their erotic quest to 
obtain oral pleasure from the living human being; they will bite any flesh they can 
sink their teeth into. This reactivates the victim’s entire body as an erogenous zone – 
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an object to ingest – and in so doing refuses the monogamous and heterosexual 
genital contact privileged by civilisation. The zombie’s desire to bite and consume 
human flesh is also an act of reproduction that causes the undead population to grow 
at a terrific speed. But as Freud establishes, this reproduction and self-perpetuation – 
the hallmark of Eros – is merely a by-product of the immediate urge for total sexual 
gratification.  
 
 
The Undead Pleasure Principle 
 
It would seem paradoxical to claim that a walking corpse can somehow embody and 
carry out the will of the life instincts. But Freud himself claims that Eros in its most 
crude manifestation is overtly hostile towards the measured compromises of 
civilisation. The unchecked excesses of eroticism that violate the sanctity of the 
civilised body come into orbit with death. The zombie becomes an apt articulation of 
Eros’ disregard for the rarefied human body that civilisation presides over. The 
seemingly oppositional drives of Eros and Thanatos – of life and death – thus share, 
on closer inspection, a curious alliance.  
 
Let’s explore this alliance further. If the zombie’s bite is indeed a moment of erotic 
proliferation, then this act of reproduction can only take place through death; the 
undead corpse can only be born once the living human has passed away. So within 
Romero’s conceit Eros needs Thanatos. The erotic bite transforms living civilised 
human beings into walking rotting corpses, but in doing so it simultaneously strips 
away the complexities of identity so that individuality is substituted for the generic 
dead-eyed vacancy of undeadliness. Living people, as the working parts of the 
civilized infrastructure, are dismantled and reanimated as undead husks – receptacles 
of deceased matter. These corpses stumble around, wearing uniforms that used to 
define their roles within civilisation when they were still alive. The uniforms speak of 
a civil function that is rendered obsolete under the reign of the destructive instinct. 
The individual regresses to dead matter – becomes no more than walking decay – and 
is therefore released from the tribulations of a compromised civilized existence. And 
this is precisely the ambition of Thanatos – an ambition that it could not accomplish 
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without the erotic bite in the first instance. Again, within Romero’s conceit, Thanatos 
needs Eros.  
 
This sheds more light on the alliance between Eros and Thanatos. The destructive 
nature of Thanatos corrupts the proliferation of life as decreed by Eros. But in turn, 
the proliferation of Eros corrupts the destruction of life as decreed by Thanatos. By 
collapsing their oppositions onto one surface – the ultimate paradox of the living 
corpse – both instincts simultaneously subvert and propagate each other in their 
conflicting alliance. Eros and Thanatos sign a pact to reanimate the dead body, a deal 
that demands their mutual corruption, but nevertheless allows them to burst forth into 
the social order so that they might satisfy their diabolical thirst for instinctual 
gratification. Their union spawns a new mandate – the undead pleasure principle.   
 
The corrupting coalescence of Eros and Thanatos within the logic of the zombie 
figure moves beyond a purely faithful Freudian account of the instincts. The alliance 
that I have been describing rests on a liminal state that resides between life and death, 
but of course this is a fictitious proposition that Freud himself never entertained. 
Whilst he wrote at length about the complex ways in which Eros and Thanatos oppose 
and attract each other, he always conceived of this relationship as a dialectic that 
either plays out within life or pushes towards death. To put this bluntly, there is no 
human state of zombie liminality – no category of undeadliness – within Freudian 
psychoanalysis.  
 
The zombie wrests Eros and Thanatos away from their containment within the 
theoretical paradigms of Freud and starts to write its own theory of the instincts – a 
theory in which an adapted and completely fictional account of the return of the 
repressed is proffered. Romero’s zombie sanctions a theoretical formulation of Eros 
and Thanatos that corrupts the structural logic of psychoanalysis by exposing it to a 
diegesis that sustains the anomaly of undeadliness.  
 
Freudian psychoanalysis does not have the vocabulary to contend with this fictitious 
and liminal state, so any further psychoanalytical treatment of the zombie must 
acknowledge that the psychoanalysis being deployed has, itself, been infected by the 
conceit of zombie fiction. Freud has been bitten; his theory is now infected with the 
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contagion of undeadliness – a presence that adds a fictitious dimension to 
psychoanalysis. This is an important claim because up until now I have been treating 
zombie fiction and psychoanalysis as mutual texts that can stand in for each another. I 
have been using one text to elucidate the particularities of the other; the zombie is 
equivalent to the return of the repressed for example. But in fact these two texts 
cannot tessellate because, as I have discussed above, the fictitious liminal state of 
undeadliness has no equivalence with the logic of psychoanalysis. So despite my 
initial claims that explored the commonality and coherence between psychoanalysis 
and zombie fiction, it is now necessary to acknowledge the incompatibility of the two 
texts. This schism then produces in turn a liminal text – a zombie text perhaps – that 
is both fiction and psychoanalysis, but not exclusively one or the other. Each text 
opens up to – and is changed by – the other’s conceit. The zombie brings a fictitious 
liminality to psychoanalysis, and psychoanalysis brings an explicit theoretical context 
to the zombie. Both are modified as a result. This resulting text – my own thesis – is 
itself a liminal overlapping of both fiction and psychoanalysis. Two registers of 
liminality are now emerging: the liminality of the undead corpse within the conceit of 
zombie fiction, and the liminality of my own writing as it inhabits a porous space at 
the edges of undeadliness and psychoanalysis simultaneously. 
 
The following short story is a stand-alone piece of writing that plays with the 
possibilities of colliding zombie fiction with Freudian theory. 
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The Freudian Zombie 
 
The walking corpse is motored by a single and overwhelming urge to 
consume flesh. If Freudian theory invites us to recognise this urge as 
specifically erotic, then the undead body is effectively engorged with desire – 
bloated by its own sexual appetite. The rigid and stumbling corpse now reads 
as a tumescent phallus, stiffly swaying this way and that in its quest for 
pleasure. Eros is resurrected as an unruly swelling of desire within the 
civilized order – a transgressive fleshy bulge within the very social fabric that 
attempts to smother all manifestations of sexual arousal. Civilisation requires 
the body to be instrumentalised and malleable, yet the sexually primed and 
defiantly stiff corpse refuses to be moulded into a pliable and subservient 
human tool.  
 
But the zombie is more than phallic. It consumes life so that it might give birth 
to death. And by spawning death it simultaneously creates a new life – 
undead life. Barbara Creed argues that the Freudian castration complex 
perpetually casts women as being sexually and symbolically passive.69 She 
recites instead the figure of a consuming and all-encompassing womb that 
wishes to draw life back into itself. The female genitals are no longer 
castrated, but castrating. This notion of a devouring femininity summons the 
mythological image of the vagina dentata – the toothed vagina – that literally 
consumes life and returns it to the womb from whence it came. That which 
gives birth now also gives death. Thanatos is thus able to find symbolic 
expression in the devouring capabilities of the womb. The bloodied mouth of 
the undead corpse – the very thing that consumes living flesh and turns it into 
decaying mater – becomes a vivid articulation of the consuming female 
genitals.  
 
And so the alliance between Eros and Thanatos casts the zombie as both a 
phallus and a vagina dentata. Its stiff body is the insubordinate erection and 
its bloody mouth the toothed entrance to the devouring womb. The two 
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symbols coalesce as an undead psychoanalytical monster with an erotic 
appetite for death. The phallus is all a-quiver, coursing with a libidinal intent 
that refuses the reality principle’s doctrine of un-pleasure. Its frenulum splays 
open to reveal a fissure on the underside of the glans. This parting of flesh 
forms a pair of labia that frame a glistening set of teeth. This diabolical 
symbolic hybrid shuffles along awkwardly, propelled only by the motion of its 
cumbersome testicles that lilt and lurch erratically one after the after.   
 
And so it is that psychoanalysis and undeadliness collide with and corrupt one 
another to author an entirely new breed of zombie. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 2 
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The Zombie as Lost Object 
 
The undead alliance of Eros and Thanatos allows us to understand the zombie as a 
fictitious extrapolation of the return of the repressed. But the zombie is also the return 
of that which has died, and we should not casually conflate repression and death. So 
far I have explored undeadliness as a means of overcoming repression, but not as a 
means of overcoming death itself. It is necessary to remember that the zombie is 
fundamentally a deceased body, and yet it continues to assert its presence on the 
living. To explore this in more detail I will consult a text that resides within a phase of 
Freudian thinking that pre-dates the conception of Eros and Thanatos.  
 
Freud understands melancholia as a very particular response to loss. This condition is 
typified by the ego’s refusal to give up its yearning for an object, even though that 
object is no longer available. The object here is understood as anyone or anything 
with which the individual in question has formed a strong relationship. Freud claims 
that the attachment the ego makes to its object is facilitated by the libido. This can be 
understood as a feeler stretching out from the ego into the external world that allows 
the individual to form loving and emotional bonds with other people. If the object 
becomes unavailable, the ego gradually detaches its libidinal connection to it through 
a process of mourning, and eventually learns to form connections with other objects 
instead. However, in cases of melancholia, the ego is smitten with the absent object to 
the point where it cannot bear to separate itself from what it has lost. The bereft ego 
thus performs a very particular manoeuvre.  
 
The free libido was not displaced onto another object; it was withdrawn into 
the ego. There, however, it was not employed in any unspecified way, but 
served to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object. 
Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego.70  
 
And so a trace of the lost object emerges within the ego through a process of 
identification. Freud’s use of the word “shadow” reminds us that this is an echo or an 
outline – an insufficient and incomplete psychical image – of that which has been lost. 
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This remnant exists precisely because the ego wilfully incorporates it. The presence of 
this shadow splinters the ego’s coherence as it attempts to contend with the 
internalised presence of an external absence. The lost object might be an idea, a 
principle or an estranged partner, but it typically describes a person who has died. In 
cases of the latter example, melancholia becomes a blooming identification with the 
deceased in which the “shadow” of death erupts within the living ego.  
 
If we apply this to Romero’s undead fiction, to what extent can the zombie be 
understood as an articulation of the melancholically introjected lost object – as the 
emergence of death’s spectre within life? The first point to make is that there is 
nothing spectral, ghostly, immaterial or otherworldly about the zombie. It is a 
resolutely material presence – an active corpse, devoid of human consciousness, that 
nevertheless insists on rising from its own grave and walking around. In this sense the 
zombie might resemble the shadow of the lost object on account of its paradoxical 
and preposterous liminality. The zombie is a perverse echo of the person it used to be; 
it is a horrifically incomplete and hollowed out rendition of life. It superficially looks 
like the living person, but it no longer is that person.71 So in this sense undeadliness 
can initially be understood as the shadowy return of the lost object in that it is a 
radically flawed and traumatising presence of that which has died.  
 
 
Melancholic Introjection 
 
But we now encounter the problem of introjection that is so important to the 
melancholic model. If the zombie is indeed the shadow of the lost object, how could 
we then understand it as having been internalised by the living individual through a 
process of identification? This is the move that would have to take place in order for 
the zombie to conform to the Freudian model of melancholia. The living human body 
and the undead corpse would need to be understood as mutual constituents of a single 
melancholic identity, whereas in fact Romero presents the zombie as being very much 
a separate body that is independent from, and indeed hostile towards, the living 
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individual. There are countless scenes in Romero’s film in which the living stare on in 
disbelief as the undead hoard draws ever closer. The humans affect their escape by 
smashing their way through the bloody throng, or else they succumb to the zombie’s 
rapacious appetite for flesh. Either way, there is no integration or coalescence of the 
zombie within the living human. We could counter this by claiming that the zombie 
bite injects the undead contagion into the living human body. So that which was 
external to the living body now becomes internalised in the form of a virus. But this 
still does not fit the model of melancholic introjection because the presence of the 
contagion is dependent on an external hostile act as opposed to a process of 
identification carried out by the individual. Despite the undead contagion breeching 
the integrity of the human body, it still hails from an aggressive undead agency 
without. To put this in Freudian terms, the human ego in Romero’s films (the living 
body) is still very much separated from the shadow of the lost object (the undead 
body), and so we cannot yet claim that the zombie is equal to the psychical 
incorporation of death within life. We can claim that the zombie is an uncanny 
presence of death within life, but we still have some work to do before we can assert 
that this presence is beholden to a process of melancholic identification. For this 
formulation to work, the external antagonism of the zombie itself would need to be in 
some way introjected by the living ego. To address this I will consider the 
particularities of Romero’s films in more detail. 
 
In Night of the Living Dead, a group of humans are trapped inside a farmhouse whilst 
a growing number of zombies gather outside. Barbara, who sees her brother being 
attacked by a zombie at the beginning of the film, is rendered hysterical. She is semi-
comatose, her body is rigid and she stares at the other humans with wide unblinking 
eyes. She utters guttural noises and appears to have lost the faculty to think rationally 
for herself. Her behaviour starts to echo that of the mindless corpses gathering 
outside. If we also consider again the last sequences of this film, Ben is shot because 
the sheriff’s men mistake him for a zombie as he cautiously approaches the farmhouse 
window. So Romero initially invites us to see a trace of the zombie’s unthinking 
inertia in Barbara’s hysterical behaviour, and then uses the execution of Ben to 
suggest that the perceived differences between the living and the undead have 
temporarily collapsed. Barbara assimilates undead qualities into her own identity, 
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whilst Ben is actually identified as a zombie by other human beings. Characteristics 
of undeadliness start to constitute and contextualise the identities of the living.  
 
Romero accentuates this in Dawn of the Dead. Once Fran, Stephen and Peter have 
cleared the mall of zombies they have nothing else to do. They start to wander around 
listlessly and perform futile tasks devoid of meaning. Everything has lost its value, 
and the dollar bills blowing around in the bank are nothing more than worthless 
pieces of paper. The mall itself becomes a lifeless shell – a kernel peppered with 
worthless tat – that has been utterly stripped of its function and its interior logic. The 
characters stare vacantly into empty space for an indeterminate amount of time. These 
passages echo earlier sequences in the film in which the zombies toy mindlessly with 
various consumer trinkets as they stumble purposelessly beneath the harsh neon light. 
Their undead eyes flit from one object to the next with prevailing indifference. 
Romero intersperses these shots with images of the shopping mall mannequins, whose 
plastic features echo the gormless countenance of undeadliness.  
 
In one particular scene, a heavily made-up Fran gazes listlessly at her own reflection. 
Her numb and dispassionate features appear to be no different from the images of 
hollowed out mannequins and undead corpses that surround her – grotesque 
imitations of the human body with no interior psychical life (image 3).  
 
 Image 3 
 45 
Romero explicitly portrays the humans in the mall as an echo of the zombies who 
occupied it previously. The humans internalise undead behaviour to the point where 
we could claim that a process of identification is taking place – the living start to 
emulate undeadliness within the rubric of their own identities. It is now possible to 
claim that these characters in Romero’s films do indeed introject the shadow of the 
lost of object through a process of melancholic identification. They constitute their 
own sense of selves through an internalisation of the dead.  
 
 
An Ego at War with Itself 
 
By melancholically identifying with the zombies, the human characters become 
increasingly de-motivated and unconcerned about their own particular existences. 
This exposes them to danger. The only human survivors are those who refuse to 
assimilate undead indifference and maintain a wilful desire to affirm their own 
individual human lives.  
 
This can be seen at the end of Dawn of the Dead. Fran actively plans her escape, and 
climbs up to the roof in order to pilot the waiting helicopter. However, Peter remains 
in the storeroom, having resolved to shoot himself. As the zombies draw ever closer 
he stares on coldly, neither escaping nor pulling the trigger (image 4). His 
indifference and inertia almost deliver him into the hands of the zombies. Only at the 
last moment does he spring into action and save himself. 
 
 
Image 4 
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This scene in particular demonstrates the notion of self-reproach that Freud claims is 
an important part of melancholia.  
 
The self-tormenting in melancholia which is without doubt enjoyable, 
signifies… a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an 
object, and which have been turned around upon the subject’s own self.72 
 
Idealised love is mirrored by strong feelings of hate precisely because the ego is 
rendered exposed and vulnerable by the intense intimacy of its libidinal connection to 
its object. In cases of melancholia the ego feels acutely abandoned by the object and 
directs a ferocious fury against it. But as soon as it incorporates the lost object, the 
ego’s ambivalent feelings are channelled inwards.  
 
This is graphically demonstrated when Peter turns his gun on himself. His zombie-
hatred re-constitutes as self-hatred, and the bullet once destined for an undead brain is 
aimed at his own brain instead. His is a splintered ego at war with itself, propelled 
towards self-destruction by a melancholic identification with the dead. Freud says that 
it is precisely this “tendency towards suicide which makes melancholia so interesting 
– and so dangerous.”73 This logic is played out by Peter, whose ego is perilously at 
odds with its own introjection of the lost object. Only a sudden assertion of his own 
will to live saves him from himself.  
 
Roger and Stephen, however, do not survive their identification with the lost object. 
Just before their respective deaths they become hysterically gung-ho. Their strategy of 
cautious and intelligent self-preservation is replaced by a giggling and dumb 
machismo. They mete out a casual and indiscriminate violence that starts to reflect the 
zombies’ mindless and voracious marauding. Their reckless rampaging puts them in 
harm’s way until the zombie throng eventually closes in and delivers its fatal bite. 
Roger and Stephen identify not with undead inertia and indifference (like Peter) but 
with the zombie’s overarching appetite for violence at the expense of self-
preservation. This internalisation of undeadliness effectively prompts Roger and 
                                                
72 Sigmund Freud, Mourning and Melancholia, in: Peter Gay (ed.), The Freud Reader (London: 
Vintage Books, 1995) p.588 
73 Ibid. 
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Stephen to fatally jeopardise themselves in a hysterical blaze of melancholic self-
reproach. 
 
 
Undead Melancholia 
 
Freud goes on to claim that the melancholic’s introjection of that which has been lost 
is a regressive rejection of external object choices. Instead the ego satisfies its libido 
through the process of oral incorporation.  
 
The ego wants to incorporate this object into itself, and, in accordance with the 
oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development… …it wants to do so by 
devouring it.74 
 
So Freud says that the melancholic ego internalises the lost object through a symbolic 
process of oral incorporation. But crucially, within Freudian melancholia 
identification and oral incorporation are played out simultaneously by the ego’s 
introjection of the lost object. If we map this understanding of melancholia onto the 
zombie an important incompatibility emerges.  
 
I have already discussed how certain human characters start to identify with 
undeadliness in Romero’s films. This identification leads to an ineffective listlessness 
or a violent thoughtlessness that makes them increasingly unable to repel the undead 
advance. The zombies then draw closer and closer until a bloody feeding frenzy 
ensues. But this now jars with Freud’s account of melancholia; in Romero’s films it is 
clearly the lost object itself – the zombie and its appetite for human flesh – that stages 
the act of oral incorporation. The individual is consumed by the undeadliness that 
he/she identifies with, thereby reversing the conventional process of melancholic 
introjection. Whilst Freudian melancholia dictates that the ego’s identification with 
death is staged through the symbolic incorporation of the lost object, Romero presents 
a much more literal act of incorporation in which the ego itself is devoured by its own 
lost object. Zombie fiction thus authors a new psychoanalytical text – undead 
                                                
74 Ibid. p.587 
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melancholia – that stages the ego’s identification with the lost object, and its reversed 
oral incorporation by the lost object, as two different events.  
 
There is still another crucial difference between Freudian melancholia and undead 
melancholia. For Freud, the melancholic’s internalisation of death proliferates in an 
odyssey of self-reproach (as discussed earlier). The living ego battles with the 
introjected shadow of the lost object until it destroys itself completely. This is the 
trajectory towards suicide that Freud recognises in melancholia. If the living human 
being in Romero’s films is completely incorporated by the zombie then he or she is 
indeed devoured out of existence. There is nothing left save for a steaming pile of 
bones. But this does not take into account one of the most enduring facets of 
Romero’s fiction. Those living humans that are bitten or only partially devoured 
become zombies themselves. They survive the total annihilation that their 
melancholia propels them towards. Freud’s melancholic either suffers life or 
surrenders to death, whereas the undead melancholic inhabits a fictitious liminality 
strung out between the two.  
 
A Freudian treatment of Romero’s zombie therefore facilitates the formulation of a 
new psychoanalytical subject – the undead melancholic – who lives through the 
coalescence with death that she craves so ardently. This theory clearly transgresses 
Freudian vocabulary and moves into the realm of a psychoanalytic fiction. Within this 
new conceit the undead melancholic can choose death without completely letting go 
of life. She is delivered from the burden of mortal existence without succumbing to 
total annihilation; life and death are overcome.  
 
This reading allows zombie fiction to be understood as a phantasy in which the 
melancholic is able to survive death. It sets up undeadliness as an idealised 
melancholic subject position – albeit a subject position that that we, as viewers, know 
to be impossible except within zombie fiction. Within this conceit, however, the 
melancholic wants to be bitten in order to escape the privations of life. Undead 
melancholia becomes a libidinal alternative to suicide. 
 
A new and un-chartered trajectory for undead fiction is emerging here, but before this 
burgeoning story can be mapped out there is still a significant problem to be 
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overcome. My claim that the undead melancholic is able to inhabit death does not yet 
take into account the fact that there is no conscious residue of the person left within 
the undead corpse. The body might continue to exist, but there is no sense in which 
individual human identity and consciousness can survive within undeadliness. 
Romero does suggest that the zombie retains a residue of basic memory or habitual 
behaviour. In Dawn of the Dead Stephen claims that the undead swarm to the mall 
precisely because that is how they behaved when they were still alive. Once Stephen 
himself becomes a zombie at the end of the film he is able to lead the other zombies 
to the human hideout. This unconscious retention preserves a trace of the person that 
the zombie used to be, but does not amount to a continuation of conscious self-
reflexivity. Romero is always quick to remind us that any appeal made to the 
zombie’s better nature falls on dead ears; the undead corpse will unflinchingly bite 
into the flesh of its closest friends and relatives without reflection or regret.  
 
So choosing to become a zombie would still amount to an act of suicide on a 
conscious level because the victim would have no awareness of her newly acquired 
undead subject position. The undead melancholic can only exist as an unconscious, 
hollowed out and abjectly destitute rendition of her former self. More work needs to 
be done before my conception of undead melancholia can be understood as a phantasy 
– an idealised fiction – of life that knowingly survives the reunion it craves with death. 
 
 
An Undeadly Dissent 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I discussed how undeadliness forges a particular 
union between Eros and Thanatos that goes beyond a Freudian articulation of the 
instincts. I then explored how the conceit of Romero’s fiction authors a formulation of 
undead melancholia that transgresses the theoretical integrity of Freud’s original text. 
As I have already claimed, these two sections reference Freudian typologies that hail 
from different points in his career. This is a strategic decision on my behalf because in 
Chapter Two I will claim that these two differing psychoanalytical accounts of the 
zombie can function in cahoots with one another to author a new formulation of 
undeadliness. But I acknowledge that whilst Freud himself used one set of terms to 
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revise and replace the other, I am using these two opposing registers of theoretical 
vocabulary concurrently.  
 
Both the undead pleasure principle and undead melancholia set up undeadliness as a 
defiant refusal of the psychical limitations and privations placed upon the living 
individual. The alliance of Eros and Thanatos rejects the ubiquitous regime of 
civilised repression by resurrecting the undead pleasure principle; undead melancholia 
allows the subject to pursue and finalise a libidinal attachment to the lost object within 
death without succumbing to total self-annihilation. In both these cases a close 
psychoanalytical study of the liminality of undeadliness reveals a moment of critical 
transgression. Psychoanalysis has allowed us to fathom readings of the undead corpse 
that are antithetical to its surface presentation and to psychoanalysis itself.  
 
The zombie starts to articulate a particular yearning to go beyond the constraints of 
the mortal body – to push through the perceived privations of life – without 
capitulating to notions of transcendent divinity on one hand or emancipatory suicide 
on the other. And from this position of animated death/inert life the zombie refuses to 
accept that which must be so; it cries out for what the viewer knows to be impossible 
outside the conceit of undeadliness. The rank and petrified husk of Romero’s undead 
corpse nurtures a kernel of yearning that rejects the hegemonic dichotomy of life and 
death, and demands life within death (and death within life) instead. When filtered 
through psychoanalysis, the zombie’s gurgled groaning starts to bear the harmonic 
strains of a fictitious idealism. The undead cacophony becomes a perpetual and 
protesting dirge that refuses to be cadenced.  
 
But this song remains trapped and encased within a crude and vile body that cannot 
conceive of its own exception. As such, the surface presentation of the zombie’s 
liminality remains a desperate and unthinking purgatory, rather than a wilful and 
affirmative inhabitation of an idealised subject position. How might undead fiction be 
modified so that the basely indifferent and diabolically transgressive zombie starts to 
read as an idealistic phantasy of dissent and refusal? Can the zombie evolve to 
embody and articulate the impossible yearnings that remain hidden beneath its 
senseless wailing? What would undeadliness look like if it were to shift from being a 
horrific apparition of walking death, to an idealistic evocation of the melancholic 
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desire to be released from the frustrations of mortal existence without succumbing to 
complete annihilation?  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Phantasy and the Non-Repressive Reality Principle 
 
In the previous chapter I explored how Freud understands the reality principle as the 
condition under which the pleasure-seeking instincts are banished from conscious life 
so that the authoritative coercions of civilisation might function effectively. Freud can 
only recognise the sexual and destructive drives as vile impulses that would push 
civilised humans towards a state of diabolical nature; as such, he says, they must be 
repressed at all costs. The return of the repressed is the ghost in the machine – the 
operational glitch – that interrupts civilisation’s attempts to eradicate the pleasure 
principle exhaustively. Civilisation subsequently exists in a perpetual state of hostile 
negotiation with the unconscious instinctual forces it created through its own project 
of repression.  
 
In Eros and Civilisation, Herbert Marcuse draws attention to the fact that the 
repressive coercion of the pleasure principle is never exhausted; there is no definitive 
resolution to the schism between civilisation and the instincts. But whilst Freud 
understands this tension as the inherent product of the human struggle to survive 
cohesively as a society, Marcuse suggests that the struggle between civilisation and 
the instincts is a contingent product of the historical processes that have moulded it. 
He challenges the Freudian assertion that “another form of civilisation under another 
reality principle is impossible”,75 and claims that Freud misrecognises “a specific 
historical form of civilisation as the nature of civilisation.”76 Instead Marcuse – 
writing in the mid-1950s – proposes that the current status quo is not an inevitable, 
essential and timeless reality, but a particular point on a spectrum of progress that has 
the potential to move beyond the ostensible ubiquity of the repressive reality 
principle. 
 
Marcuse speculates as to how the instincts might have a relationship with civilisation 
that exceeds the Freudian model. He takes as his starting point Freud’s own claim that 
                                                
75 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation; A Philosophical Enquiry into Freud (London: Routledge, 
1998) p.147 
76 Ibid. 
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a small portion of instinctual activity, in the form of phantasy, is able to escape the 
mechanisms of repression and manifest consciously within civilisation: 
 
Freud singles out phantasy as one mental activity that retains a high degree of 
freedom from the reality principle even in the sphere of developed 
consciousness.77 
 
Phantasy – the mental play of imagination – bubbles up into conscious life without 
passing through the ‘cooling’ strata of the reality principle. It is pure pleasure made 
conscious – an instinctual eruption on the hardened crust of repressive reality. This 
register of mental activity is indifferent to necessity, pragmatism, obligation and 
coercion. But, unlike the return of the repressed, phantasy is not a hostile overflow of 
pent-up instinctual forces that manifest as an antagonistic counterpoint to civilisation. 
It is instead a vent that allows a harmless portion of pleasure to flow freely within 
civilisation without disturbing the fundamental integrity of the reality principle. When 
harnessed within specific fields of creative endeavour, phantasy serves civilisation 
under the banner of the arts. Otherwise, this imaginative frolicking can be understood 
as an end in itself, devoid of a rational function, that is committed to pleasure for 
pleasure’s sake alone. Disembodied from the social, it is a ‘useless’ mental act – a 
puff of intangible dreaminess that escapes the grinding mechanisms of repression 
without interfering with the instinctual austerity of civilisation. But then Marcuse 
makes an important manoeuvre.  
 
In its refusal to accept as final the limitations imposed upon freedom and 
happiness by the reality principle, in its refusal to forget what can be, lies the 
critical function of phantasy.78 
 
Marcuse claims that precisely because phantasy does not consent to the reparations of 
repressive civilisation, it is critical of the status quo espoused by the reality principle. 
Phantasy holds on to the prospect that the instincts might yet be freed – a prospect 
sustained by an archaic memory of a time prior to their subjugation. The instincts 
have not always been culled by civilisation; it is only the current form of civilisation 
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that denies them access to the conscious strata of human mental life. Even though 
phantasy is unrealistic according to the logic of the reality principle, it nonetheless 
dreams of a different reality altogether in which the instincts are not curtailed. 
Phantasy contains a seed of dissent – a “protest against unnecessary repression”79 – 
that refuses the ubiquity of the reality principle, and insists instead upon a new 
organisation between the instincts and civilisation. The transient, immaterial and 
groundless nature of the imagination – the very quality that made phantasy harmless 
to the function of the reality principle – suddenly opens up a space beyond the reality 
principle that becomes, in itself, a real proposition. It is phantasy alone that sustains 
the “Great Refusal”80 – the dogged determination to not coalesce completely to the 
existing status quo. This refusal spurs humans on in their efforts to conceive of a 
reality counter to the one in which they currently exist. Marcuse calls this the 
“revolutionary implications of Freud’s discoveries”,81 stating that the transformative 
potential suggested by phantasy is not a utopian proposition but a real political 
possibility – “a new reality principle.”82 
 
If Marcuse understands phantasy as the first step towards the articulation of an 
alternative political reality, then it is important to remember at this point that phantasy 
is itself a conscious manifestation of the pleasure principle within civilisation. 
Furthermore, if the pleasure principle describes the conditions under which the 
instincts can pursue their aims freely, Marcuse’s vision of a new reality principle is 
founded on the release of the very instinctual drives that civilisation sought to 
subjugate. The freeing of the instincts – the one manoeuvre that repressive civilisation 
must prohibit – acquires a revolutionary potential that opens up the possibility of a 
non-repressive reality.  
 
 
The Conscious Zombie 
 
In Chapter One, I set up the idea of the undead pleasure principle as a fictional hybrid 
that straddles psychoanalysis and undeadliness. A reading of Marcuse allows us to 
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start developing this fiction; we can now claim that the instinctual urges that drive the 
undead corpse on its diabolical odyssey of chaotic erotic destruction contain the seed 
of an organised instinctual insurgency. Beneath the undead husk of the zombie lies a 
kernel of revolutionary fervour. Undeadliness need no longer be antagonistic to the 
social order; it contains within itself – within its own instinctual drives – the blueprint 
for a new and emancipated relationship between the zombie and civilisation. I will 
explore the details of a non-repressive zombie reality principle presently. But I want 
to draw attention to one particular Marcusian claim that has massive implications for 
the fiction of undeadliness.  
 
In Marcuse’s vision of a non-repressive reality principle, “the unreasonable images of 
freedom become rational, and the ‘lower depth’ of instinctual gratification assumes a 
new dignity.”83 He claims that the unconscious barbarism of the instincts that haunted 
repressive civilisation is re-formatted as a galvanising and organised force within the 
conscious strata of a free civilisation. The previously “destructive and ‘savage’ 
forms”84 of unchecked sensuousness would acquire “a new rationality”85 when 
released form the grips of repression. In short, that which was previously phantastical 
becomes tenable, and the repressed and savage unconscious assumes an emancipated 
and dignified consciousness. 
 
What would be the implications to the unthinking and derelict zombie figure if its 
base and repugnant urges were to be reconstituted as conscious drives? Is it possible 
to understand the zombie’s mindless and indiscriminate hankering for flesh – its 
repressed instinctual urges – as the bedrock of a new undead civility? If the undead 
pleasure principle in my first chapter was a fictional collision between Freud and 
Romero, how does the introduction of Marcuse into this mash-up allow us to rewrite 
the fiction of the zombie?  
 
Marcuse’s efforts to recognise in the instincts a capacity for conscious rationality 
allows us to conceive of a measure of self-awareness within the fictional figure of 
undeadliness. However, this would initially appear to be an oxymoron when so much 
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of Romero’s work establishes the zombie as a body without cognition and 
consciousness. But Romero himself lays the foundations of the conscious zombie in 
Day of the Dead. He depicts a zombie called Bub who has been singled out by the 
unhinged and unethical Dr Logan for a series of experiments. Deep in an underground 
military bunker, Dr Logan demonstrates that Bub retains certain memory traces from 
his previous life. As Bub successfully interacts with and negotiates the objects placed 
in front of him, Logan coos like a proud mother and Bub himself gurgles with 
pleasure. Under Logan’s supervision, Bub picks up a gun and points it in a manner 
that demonstrates an understanding of its function (image 5).  
 
 
 
This is in direct contrast to previous Romero films in which we see zombies limply 
clinging on to rifles with complete indifference to their utility. At the end of Dawn of 
the Dead for example, the wounded Stephen attempts to effect his getaway by 
climbing out the top of an elevator, but he is attacked and bitten by the marauding 
undead mob before he is able to escape. Stephen still manages to expel the zombies 
from the elevator before he dies, and this of course means that instead of being 
devoured out of existence, he will himself turn into a zombie. Meanwhile a hoard of 
undead corpses is gathering outside, and one of them inadvertently presses the button 
that summons the elevator. The doors slide open to reveal a bloodied and newly 
undead Stephen. Indifferent as they are to their own kind, the other zombies 
immediately turn away and stumble off in their never-ending pursuit of human flesh. 
Image 5 
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The pistol that Stephen had been clutching with violent intent now dangles limply 
from his finger. The weapon of repression – the instrument that keeps the undead 
pleasure principle at bay throughout Romero’s films – is rendered impotent in the 
hands of the repressed (image 6). 
  
 
 
Bub, however, has a very different relationship with the gun. The soldiers in the 
underground bunker eventually murder Logan for experimenting on one of their own 
company. On witnessing this brutal slaying Bub is visibly devastated, and breaks free 
from his chains. As the zombies above ground spill into the bunker to wreak their 
bloody chaos, Bub closes in on the soldier who murdered Logan. Crucially, Bub 
battles with him using a gun that he finds discarded on the floor. Bub is no longer 
interested in eating the soldier in order to satisfy his erotic urge for flesh; he shoots 
him instead. This is a pure revenge killing, evidenced by Bub’s display of steely 
satisfaction once he has destroyed his nemesis. The rest of the zombies close in on the 
floundering soldier, and plunge their hands deep into his abdomen before ripping him 
in two. Bub salutes sarcastically, turns away and shuffles off down the corridor.  
 
Bub clearly grieves for Dr Logan and is motivated to avenge his death; his mindless 
appetite for flesh is thus superseded by other more complex demonstrations of 
interiority. So this is the first time that Romero presents us with an evolving zombie 
that is able to make conscious decisions that mitigate and modify its unconscious 
Image 6 
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instinctual urges. However, at this point in the trajectory of the zombie (r)evolution, 
an alternative reality principle does not emerge through Bub’s actions. Whilst his act 
of defiant revenge is a self-aware rejection of authority, his gesture can only mimic 
the gun-toting aggression of repressive civilisation. His dissent amounts to a 
watershed manifestation of undead consciousness, but this does not yet constitute a 
new reality principle that might author a non-repressive relationship between 
civilisation and the instincts.  
 
 
The Undead (R)evolution 
 
In Land of the Dead Romero introduces another zombie that displays a degree of self-
awareness. This particular zombie was a garage attendant when he was still alive, and 
the name Big Daddy is sewn into his work overalls. He now shuffles around the 
forecourt performing a set of impotent and non-functioning tasks that mimic his old 
work routine. However, Big Daddy is visibly distressed when he witnesses the 
slaughtering of his undead brethren at the hands of a group of pillaging humans. Big 
Daddy remembers the vehicle used for these brutal forays, and the next time it drives 
through his town he attempts to warn his fellow zombies to take cover. When he fails 
to save them he is incensed, and throws his face skywards as a guttural moan escapes 
his decaying lips. We then see him starting to organise his fellow zombies. He gathers 
them into an ever-growing group until he has assembled a vast army that is ready to 
march on the one surviving human conurbation. His army closes in on the city with 
unswerving determination, apparently galvanised by the collective desire to be rid of 
the human murder squads that have been destroying their kind indiscriminately. Big 
Daddy’s mob can start to be recognised as the victims of a highly oppressive regime; 
they become the instinctual revolutionaries marching to overthrow the seat of 
repressive power. They learn how to use weapons, they display compassion towards 
one another, they develop a cunning strategy to invade the city and above all they 
start to share a common political goal. Zombies are no longer indifferent to each 
other; they have become a conscious and self-aware collective who operate 
communally in order to affect the demise of repressive civilisation.  
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As Big Daddy leads his undead comrades into battle he picks up a discarded machine 
gun. He notices that the human soldiers have an advantage because of their weaponry, 
but quickly works out how to use the gun himself. He then hands it to a young 
cheerleader zombie, and together they dispatch a prostrate soldier with a torrent of 
bullets (image 7). The two zombies work in cahoots with one another, and for the first 
time we witness the undead using firepower not as a means of personal retribution, as 
in Bub’s case, but as a tool that aids their collective emancipatory revolution.   
 
 
 
Sure enough, Big Daddy’s army brings about the downfall of the capitalist 
organisation that controls the human city. In the aftermath of the zombie onslaught, 
the main human protagonist and Big Daddy gaze at each other from a distance. 
Instead of closing down on the surviving humans, Big Daddy keeps his distance and 
then leads his undead entourage off into the night. Romero implies that the zombies’ 
appetite for flesh has been superseded by a newfound desire to exist peacefully as a 
coherent and self-contained community that is free from the tyranny of the repressive 
reality principle. So we can now say that the undead pleasure principle has not only 
found its way into conscious existence, it has spearheaded a violent overthrowing of 
the repressive regime under which it suffered. This trajectory is both evolutionary and 
revolutionary, hence the title of this section: The Undead (R)evolution. After their 
inevitably bloody insurrection destroys the subjugating order, the zombies appear to 
be organising themselves peacefully in a new order of their own. A Marcusian 
Image 7 
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reading of these scenes would assert that whilst civilised human life is forever fraught 
with conflict and aggression, undeadliness has the potential to foster a non-repressive 
reality principle in which the released instincts propagate within a new civil order. 
But Romero’s narrative ends at this point, and in his subsequent films he takes us 
back to the beginning of the zombie outbreak, so we are denied the opportunity of 
seeing Big Daddy pioneer an emancipated existence for the undead pleasure principle.  
 
If we could, however, imagine a fictional follow-up to Land of the Dead in which the 
zombie revolution has taken hold, what would a non-repressive civilisation built on 
the undead pleasure principle look like? How might the unchained Eros and Thanatos 
be the bedrock of an emancipated undeadliness? Following the trajectory set out by 
Romero in Land of the Dead, the subsequent sub-section of writing is an attempt to 
write undeadliness directly into Marcusian political philosophy in order to author a 
fiction of non-repressive zombie civilisation. I cite Marcuse directly, but modify his 
quotes with a zombiefied vocabulary in order to formulate a philosophical claim for 
the emancipation of undeadliness. These modified quotes constitute the main body of 
text in the following section of writing, whilst the footnotes contain the original 
corresponding quotes from Marcuse.  
 
 
Zombies and Civilisation 
 
The vision of a non-repressive culture aims at a new relation between zombies and 
reason.86 Liberated from the tyranny of repression, the undead instincts tend toward 
free and lasting existential relations – they generate a new reality principle.87 This 
notion of an undead instinctual order must first be tested on the most disorderly of all 
instincts – namely, sexuality.88 A non-repressive order is possible only if zombies can, 
by virtue of their own dynamic and under changed existential and societal conditions, 
generate lasting erotic relations among themselves and their living counterparts. We 
                                                
86 The vision of a non-repressive culture, which we have lifted from a marginal trend in mythology and 
philosophy, aims at a new relation between instincts and reason. (Ibid. p.197) 
87 …liberated from the tyranny of repressive reason, the instincts tend toward free and lasting 
existential relations – they generate a new reality principle. (Ibid.) 
88 The notion of a non-repressive instinctual order must first be tested on the most “disorderly” of all 
instincts – namely, sexuality. (ibid. p.199) 
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have to ask whether the erotic drive of undeadliness – the compulsion to consume 
flesh – after the elimination of all surplus repression, can develop a libidinal 
rationality which is not only compatible with but even promotes progress toward 
higher forms of civilised freedom.89 As we have previously noted, the entire human 
body is re-sexualised when the undead pleasure principle erupts within civilised life. 
The zombie’s pursuit of erotic gratification through the ingestion of human flesh does 
not discriminate between body parts. The spread of the undead libido manifests itself 
in an undead appetite for all erotogenic zones and, consequently, in a resurgence of 
pregenital polymorphous feeding. The living human body in its entirety becomes 
flesh to be enjoyed – a source of oral pleasure for the zombie’s orgiastic appetite.90 
 
These prospects seem to confirm the expectation that instinctual liberation can only 
lead to a society of undead sex maniacs – that is, to no society. However, the 
emergence of the civilised undead pleasure principle involves not simply a release but 
a transformation of the libido.91 This free development of the transformed libido 
would minimize the violent manifestations of the zombie’s crude sexual appetite by 
integrating it into a larger92 libidinal rationality which promotes progress toward 
higher forms of civilised freedom for both humans and zombies.93 In this context, 
undeadliness tends to its own sublimation: its libido would not simply reactivate the 
human body as a site of erotic gorging, but would also transform the perverted content 
of its instinctual craving for living human flesh.94 Libido can take the road of self-
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individuals. We have to ask whether the sex instincts, after the elimination of all surplus repression, 
can develop a libidinal rationality which is not only compatible with but even promotes progress 
toward higher forms of civilised freedom. (Ibid.) 
90 No longer used as a full-time instrument of labor, the body would be resexualised. …this spread of 
the libido would first manifest itself in a reactivation of all erotogenic zones and, consequently, in a 
resurgence of pregenital polymorphous sexuality and a decline in genital supremacy. The body in its 
entirety would become… a thing to be enjoyed – an instrument of pleasure. (Ibid. p.201) 
91 These prospects seem to confirm the expectation that instinctual liberation can only lead to a society 
of sex maniacs – that is, to no society. However, the process just outlined involves not simply a release 
but a transformation of the libido: from sexuality constrained under genital supremacy to eroticisation 
of the entire personality. (Ibid.) 
92 …the free development of transformed libido… …would minimize the manifestations of mere 
sexuality be integrating them into a far larger order, including the order of work. (Ibid. p.202) 
93 We have to ask whether the sex instincts, after the elimination of all surplus repression, can develop 
a libidinal rationality which is not only compatible with but even promotes progress toward higher 
forms of civilised freedom. (Ibid. p.199) 
94 In this context, sexuality tends to its own sublimation: the libido would not simply reactivate 
precivilized and infantile stages, but would also transform the perverted content of these stages. (Ibid. 
p. 202) 
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sublimation only as a social phenomenon: it can promote the formation of a non-
repressive civilisation only by uniting constellations of humans and zombies95 within 
a system of expanding and enduring libidinal relations.96 In light of this revolutionary 
idea of non-repressive sublimation,97 the Erotic zombie now strives to form undead 
substance into ever-greater unities so that undeadliness may be prolonged and brought 
to higher development.98 Undead sublimation thus proceeds in a system of expanding 
and enduring libidinal relations – prolonged and sustained bouts of feeding – which 
are in themselves work relations in so far as they sustain the burgeoning zombie 
order.99 The zombie’s biological drive to consume flesh at all costs becomes a cultural 
drive to produce more zombies, thereby engendering the proliferation of unrepressed 
and sublimated undeadliness.100  
 
But is there perhaps in the zombie itself an inner barrier which “contains” its driving 
power? Is there perhaps a “natural” self-restraint in the undead Eros so that its 
genuine gratification would call for a delay, detour and arrest of its own appetite for 
flesh? Then there would be obstructions and limitations imposed not from the outside, 
by a repressive reality principle, but set and accepted by the zombie itself because 
they have inherent libidinal value. Unrestrained feeding from the beginning results in 
lack of full satisfaction;101 if a human is completely devoured it cannot turn into a 
zombie. What distinguishes sublimated undead pleasure from the blind satisfaction of 
want is the zombie’s refusal to exhaust itself in immediate satisfaction – its ability to 
build up barriers against its own appetite so as to intensify the erotic fulfilment of 
                                                
95 Libido can take the road of self-sublimation only as a social phenomenon: as an unrepressed force, it 
can promote the formation of culture only under conditions which relate associated individuals to each 
other in the cultivation of the environment for their developing needs and faculties. (Ibid. pp.209-210) 
96 …sublimation proceeds in a system of expanding and enduring libidinal relations, which are in 
themselves work relations. (Ibid. p.212) 
97 …revolutionises the idea of sublimation. (Ibid. p.169) 
98 In light of the idea of non-repressive sublimation, Freud’s definition of Eros as striving to “form 
living substance into ever greater unities, so that life may be prolonged and brought to higher 
development” takes on added significance. (Ibid. p. 212) 
99 …sublimation proceeds in a system of expanding and enduring libidinal relations, which are in 
themselves work relations. (Ibid.) 
100 The biological drive becomes a cultural drive. (Ibid.) 
101 But is there perhaps in the instinct itself an inner barrier which “contains” its driving power? Is there 
perhaps a “natural” self-restraint in Eros so that its genuine gratification would call for delay, detour, 
and arrest? Then there would be obstructions and limitations imposed not from the outside, by a 
repressive reality principle, but set and accepted by the instinct itself because they have inherent 
libidinal value. Freud indeed suggested this notion. He thought that “unrestrained sexual liberty from 
the beginning” results in lack of full satisfaction. (Ibid. p.226) 
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creating more zombies.102 The striving for lasting gratification makes not only for an 
enlarged order of libidinal relations (a community built on the undead pleasure 
principle’s extension into consciousness) but also for the perpetuation of this order on 
a higher scale as the sublimated zombie population swells. The sublimated zombie’s 
reasonable erotic urge to proliferate as an undead and unrepressed civilisation is what 
sustains the order of gratification.103 With the transformation from sexuality into Eros, 
undeadliness evolves into a sensuous order, while reason becomes sensuous to the 
degree to which it comprehends and organises the consumption of human flesh in 
terms of protecting and enriching a larger and emancipated zombie community.104 
 
The mere fact that the undead erotic urge to bite human flesh is not guided by 
reciprocity constitutes a source of unavoidable conflict between zombies and 
humans.105 How can the road to undead sublimation promote the formation of a non-
repressive culture that tends to the developing needs and faculties of living human 
beings?106 Put simply, why would the living willingly choose undeadliness? 
 
Prior to the acceptance of the reality principle107 the human psyche accessed a 
different, lost reality,108 formed through identification with the mother and expressed 
in a castration-wish rather than a castration-threat.109 At this early stage, reality is not 
                                                
102 What distinguishes pleasure from the blind satisfaction of want is the instinct’s refusal to exhaust 
itself in immediate satisfaction, its ability to build up and use barriers for intensifying fulfilment. (Ibid. 
p.227) 
103 The striving for lasting gratification makes not only for an enlarged order of libidinal relations 
(“community”) but also for the perpetuation of this order on a higher scale. The pleasure principle 
extends to consciousness. Eros redefines reason in his own terms. Reasonable is what sustains the order 
of gratification. (Ibid. p.224) 
104 With the transformation from sexuality into Eros, the life instincts evolve their sensuous order, 
while reason becomes sensuous to the degree to which it comprehends and organises necessity in terms 
of protecting and enriching the life instincts. (Ibid. p.223) 
105 The mere fact that, in the choice of its objects, the sex instinct is not guided by reciprocity 
constitutes a source of unavoidable conflict among individuals. (Ibid. p.226) 
106 Libido can take the road of self-sublimation only as a social phenomenon: as an unrepressed force, 
it can promote the formation of culture only under conditions which relate associated individuals to 
each other in the cultivation of the environment for their developing needs and faculties. (Ibid. pp.209-
210) 
107 He speaks of a pre-genital, pre-historic, pre-oedipal “pseudo-morality prior to the acceptance of the 
reality principle, and calls the mental representative of this pseudo-morality” the superid. The 
psychical phenomenon which, in the individual, suggests such a pregenital morality is an identification 
with the mother, expressing itself in a castration-wish rather than a castration-threat. (Ibid. p.228) 
108 …traces of the “superid” appear as traces of a different, lost reality… (Ibid. p.229) 
109 He speaks of a pre-genital, pre-historic, pre-oedipal “pseudo-morality prior to the acceptance of the 
reality principle, and calls the mental representative of this pseudo-morality” the superid. The 
psychical phenomenon which, in the individual, suggests such a pregenital morality is an identification 
with the mother, expressing itself in a castration-wish rather than a castration-threat. (Ibid. p.228) 
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hostile and alien to the ego, but intimately connected with, originally not even 
distinguished from it. This reality is experienced in the child’s libidinal relation to the 
mother, before the maturing ego is subsequently divorced from it at the hands of the 
repressive reality principle. And with this division of the original unity, an urge 
towards re-establishing the original unity develops: a libidinal flow between infant 
and mother. At this stage the primary experience of reality is that of a libidinous 
union110 to which the ego responds with an attitude of integral identification with the 
environment. But in the light of the repressive reality principle, the “maternal 
concept” of reality here emerging is immediately turned into something negative, 
dreadful. The impulse to establish the lost maternal unity is interpreted as a “threat,” 
namely, the threat of “maternal engulfment” by the overpowering womb. As such, the 
incest wish to be bitten by a zombie is punished in order to protect the living from 
being annihilated completely by a union with maternal undeadliness. The question 
does not arise whether this maternal reality cannot “return” in less devouring forms 
under the power of the sublimated zombie in a mature undead civilisation.111 
 
It is only beyond the repressive reality principle112 that sublimated undeadliness offers 
living humans a libidinal union with their social environment – a sensuous maternal 
engulfment113 – in which being consumed to the point of becoming undead is an 
erotic castration-wish rather than a monstrous castration-threat.114 By devouring the 
condition of repression, the undead womb delivers the human, as a newly undead 
                                                
110 …at this early stage, reality “is not outside, but is contained in the pre-ego of primary narcissism.” 
It is not hostile and alien to the ego, but “intimately connected with, originally not even distinguished 
from it.” This reality is first (and last?) experienced in the child’s libidinal relation to the mother – a 
relation which is at the beginning within the “pre-ego” and only subsequently divorced from it. And 
with this division of the original unity, an “urge towards re-establishing the original unity” develops: a 
“libidinal flow between infant and mother.” At this primary stage of the relation between “pre-ego” and 
reality, the Narcissistic and the maternal Eros seem to be one, and the primary experience of reality is 
that of a libidinous union. (Ibid. pp.229-230)  
111 …a reality to which the ego responds with an attitude, not of defense and submission, but of integral 
identification with the “environment.” But in the light of the paternal reality principle, the “maternal 
concept” of reality here emerging is immediately turned into something negative, dreadful. The 
impulse to establish the lost Narcissistic-maternal unity is interpreted as a “threat,” namely, the threat 
of “maternal engulfment” by the overpowering womb. The hostile father is exonerated and reappears 
as savior, who, in punishing the incest wish, protects the ego from its annihilation in the mother. The 
question does not arise whether the Narcissistic-maternal attitude toward reality cannot “return” in less 
primordial, less devouring forms under the power of the mature ego and in a mature civilisation. (Ibid. 
p.230) 
112 It is only beyond this repressive reality principle that the “maternal” images of the super ego convey 
promises than memory traces – images of a free future rather than of a dark past. (Ibid. pp.230-231)  
113 But in the light of the paternal reality principle, the “maternal concept” of reality here emerging is 
immediately turned into something negative, dreadful. (Ibid. p.230) 
114 …a castration-wish rather than a castration-threat. (Ibid. p.228) 
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body, into a newly emancipated reality. The prospect of being bitten by and then 
becoming a sublimated zombie within undead civilisation conveys to the living the 
promise of a free future.115 
 
For living humans, the brute fact of death denies the reality of a non-repressive 
existence. Death is the final negativity of time, but joy wants eternity. The zombie, 
however, suspends death by slowly decaying within joyful undeadliness. 
Timelessness is the ideal of pleasure, and the liminality opened up by becoming a 
zombie creates a libidinal intermission between life and death.116 The death instinct 
operates under the Nirvana principle: it tends towards that state of “constant 
gratification” where no tension is felt – a state without want.117 If the instinct’s basic 
objective is not the termination of life but of pain – the absence of tension – then the 
conflict between life and death is the more reduced as the pleasure principle and 
Nirvana principle then converge in a state of sublimated undeadliness.118 As the 
suffering and want of repressive civilisation recede, the Nirvana principle may 
become reconciled with the undead reality principle. Thanatos – as the instinct to 
draw back to an earlier state – would be effectively sated by the drawn out process of 
entropy attained by undeadly decay.119 The finality of death itself, whilst remaining a 
fact, would cease to be an instinctual goal for the sublimated zombie.120  
 
The zombie’s second and final demise can become a token of freedom. The necessity 
of death does not refute the possibility of it being experienced as a final liberation. It 
is made rational and painless by the passage of undeadliness that precedes it. 
Sublimated zombies can die their second death without anxiety if they know that what 
they love – a proliferating undead civilisation – is protected from misery and oblivion. 
                                                
115 It is only beyond this repressive reality principle that the “maternal” images of the super ego convey 
promises than memory traces – images of a free future rather than of a dark past. (Ibid. pp.230-231) 
116 The brute fact of death denies once and for all the reality of a non-repressive existence. For death is 
the final negativity of time, but “joy wants eternity.” Timelessness is the ideal of pleasure. (Ibid. p.231) 
117 The death instinct operates under the Nirvana principle: it tends towards that state of “constant 
gratification” where no tension is felt – a state without want. (Ibid. p.234) 
118 If the instinct’s basic objective is not the termination of life but of pain – the absence of tension – 
then paradoxically, in terms of the instinct, the conflict between life and death is the more reduced, the 
closer life approximates the state of gratification. Pleasure principle and Nirvana principle then 
converge. (Ibid. pp.234-235) 
119 As suffering and want recede, the Nirvana principle may become reconciled with the reality 
principle. The unconscious attraction that draws the instincts back to an “earlier state” would be 
effectively counteracted by the desirability of the attained state of life. (Ibid. p.235) 
120 Death would cease to be an instinctual goal. It remains a fact, perhaps even an ultimate necessity… 
(Ibid.) 
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After a fulfilling entropic demise, they may take it upon themselves to crumble into 
nothingness at a moment of their own choosing, satisfied in the knowledge that they 
have contributed towards, and are survived by, an emancipated civil undeadliness.121 
 
 
The Kiss of the Dead 
 
From this experiment we can claim that Marcuse’s theory of revolutionary 
sublimation, when exposed to the conceit of undeadliness, allows us to draft a new 
trajectory for zombie fiction that stretches beyond that imagined by Romero. If the 
zombie, as an embodiment of an undead union between Eros and Thanatos, is 
subjected to the same process of sublimation that Marcuse applies to the instincts, a 
transformed rendition of undeadliness can be postulated. I will summarise the key 
manoeuvres of this transformation. For Marcuse, liberated sexuality becomes re-
united with the pure version of Eros – the instinct to “combine organic substances into 
ever larger unities.”122 The task of building and maintaining a free civilisation 
becomes erotic and therefore instinctually gratifying in its own right. It is now 
possible to formulate a new fiction in which the sublimated zombie embodies the 
transformation of repressed sexuality into emancipated Eros – a shift that, for 
Marcuse, is the hallmark of a non-repressive civilisation. The repressed Eros, 
previously manifested in the zombie’s violently sexual bite, is liberated. Released 
from the clutches of repression, Eros expresses itself in the undead desire to 
proliferate as a community and to organise a libidinally harmonious mode of 
existence. Crucially, we can claim that humans would be compelled to join the 
revolution of undeadliness precisely because it offers an emancipatory release – an 
instinctual freedom – that is impossible to achieve under the repressive reality 
principle’s stranglehold over human life. Within the evolving fictitious conceit of 
sublimated undeadliness, becoming a zombie – that which is so abhorrent to human 
life under repression – is the very means of escaping repression and pioneering a new 
political order. The zombie bite becomes a sensuous embrace, a kiss – the kiss of the 
                                                
121 Death can become a token of freedom. The necessity of death does not refute the possibility of final 
liberation. Like other necessities, it can be made rational – painless. Men can die without anxiety if 
they know that what they love is protected from misery and oblivion. After a fulfilled life, they may 
take it upon themselves to die – at a moment of their own choosing. (Ibid. p.237) 
122 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in: Peter Gay (ed.), The Freud Reader (London: 
Vintage Books, 1995) p.616 
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dead – that heralds a release from the tribulations of repressive life. In this emerging 
new order, to give oneself to a zombie would be a radical act of self-initiation into a 
realm of pleasure and freedom.  
 
The state of zombiehood suspends the inevitability of time passing, opening up a 
liminality within death but without finitude. This undead delay to the work of entropy 
expands and extrapolates the condition of death so that time, as the ultimate inhibitor 
of instinctual pleasure, is drawn out of shape. Rather than playing out the inevitable 
succumbing of life unto death, undeadliness opens a non-repressive Nirvana between 
the two. It is a gradual tapering of life within death; it moulds the strict dichotomy of 
either life or death into a condition of neither life nor death. Thanatos, as the urge to 
be relieved from suffering and tension, no longer positions death as its ultimate 
aspiration. It finds satisfaction in the process of rotting away pleasurably within a 
civilised state of undeadliness, untroubled by the constant burden of being alive under 
a repressive regime. The sublimated zombie therefore embodies a fully gratified and 
emancipated Eros and Thanatos – the bedrock of Marcuse’s non-repressive 
civilisation.  
 
 
Orpheus and Narcissus 
 
I would like to spend some time exploring the specific properties of Marcuse’s non-
repressive civilisation in order to flesh out my own fiction of sublimated 
undeadliness. In order to develop his conception of a civilisation in which the 
instincts are released, Marcuse uses the mythical images of Orpheus and Narcissus as 
“symbols of a non-repressive erotic attitude toward reality.”123 These two figures help 
Marcuse sketch his vision of an emancipated reality principle. Orpheus is the image 
of un-alienated and libidinal play that has been released from a sense of work, 
obligation and duty. Whereas work is the perpetual delay and repression of pleasure, 
play is gratifying in itself – it serves no purpose other than that of creating pleasure. 
Marcuse then uses the notion of play to formulate his definition of freedom: 
 
                                                
123 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation; A Philosophical Enquiry into Freud (London: Routledge, 
1998) p.167 
 68 
The play impulse is the vehicle of… liberation. The impulse does not aim at 
playing “with” something; rather it is the play of life itself, beyond want and 
external compulsion – the manifestation of an existence without fear and 
anxiety, and thus the manifestation of freedom itself. … Freedom is thus, in a 
strict sense, freedom from the established reality: man is free when the “reality 
looses its seriousness” and when its necessity “becomes light.”124 
 
It is through this sense of light Orphic playfulness – the antithesis of alienated labour 
– that the released Eros manifests as a “culture building”125 force that is at the same 
time instinctually gratifying in its own right.  
 
Marcuse then explores how the image of Narcissus being libidinally connected to his 
own image outside himself evokes Freud’s “oceanic feeling”126 – a sense of “oneness 
with the universe”127 – “of being one with the external world as a whole.”128 Marcuse 
reminds us that “narcissism is more than auto-eroticism; it engulfs the “environment,” 
integrating the narcissistic ego with the objective world.”129 The Narcissistic image of 
connectivity and immersion – of seeing and contemplating beauty as an extension of 
one’s own self – allows Marcuse to further establish the nature of libidinal 
relationships within non-repressive civilisation. He formulates the idea of a 
community in which subjects are not set against each other competitively in order to 
acquire private wealth, but are instead connected harmoniously – in union – to the 
point where individual narcissistic gratification is at the same time a public 
phenomenon of libidinal coalition.  
 
These images of Orpheus and Narcissus can be used to ‘flesh out’ certain 
characteristics of the sublimated zombie. The original zombie emits no more than a 
monotone groan. It cannot be said to be a speaking body; it has no language. But the 
sublimated zombie is a conscious body – and with this consciousness comes 
                                                
124 Ibid. p.187 
125 Ibid. p.211 
126 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, in: Albert Dickson (ed.), The Penguin Freud 
Library Volume 12: Civilization, Society and Religion (London: Penguin Books, 1985) p.252 
127 Ibid. p.260 
128 Ibid. p.252 
129 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation; A Philosophical Enquiry into Freud (London: Routledge, 
1998) p.168 
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language. If the emancipated Eros within the sublimated zombie is forged in the 
image of Orpheus and Narcissus we can imagine how civilised undeadliness might 
engage with language. Marcuse tells us that Orpheus’ “language is song, and his work 
is play,”130 whilst “Narcissus’ life is that of beauty, and his existence is 
contemplation.”131From this we can imagine that the sublimated zombie articulates its 
playful odyssey of oral consumption through collective song – a radical and 
communal aestheticisation of undeadliness. Whilst hegemonic language is the mode 
of communication within repressive civilisation, these purely pragmatic linguistic 
tools would burst into harmonious melodies within an emancipated undead 
civilisation. The functional drone of language that marks the displeasure of repressive 
civilisation would be animated and embellished by a musicality – a sonorous 
celebration – articulating the newly acquired pleasure of undeadliness. The zombie, as 
an unconscious body without civilisation, could only emit a guttural moan. Once 
sublimated as a conscious body within civilisation it would be free to sing as part of a 
larger Erotic unity – free to celebrate undeadliness as a harmonious chorus of 
pleasured and playful bodies.  
 
 
An Undead Requiem 
 
We can imagine a scenario from this new fiction of sublimated undeadliness in which 
a living human who, tired of the repressive conditions of life, decides to join the 
growing zombie throng. She approaches the new undead conurbation looking haggard 
and desperate, her drawn features etched with the pain of having suffered for too long 
under the regime of unpleasure.  
 
Two zombies welcome her, reaching out to touch her arm reassuringly. They lead the 
woman to an open-air makeshift hospital that is full of other wretched and dejected-
looking humans. The two zombies find an empty bed and gesture for the woman to lie 
down. They then sit on the edge of the bed and start to stroke the full length of her 
body. The woman appears to relax. She then fixes one of the zombies with an intense 
stare, and nods slowly. The zombie leans in towards her and bites into her midriff. 
                                                
130 Ibid. p.171 
131 Ibid. p.171 
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The woman sits up sharply, her face suddenly contorted by a skeletal grimace. Her 
body spasms repeatedly and she lets out a series of gasps and groans. She gradually 
lies prone again as a large pool of crimson blood ebbs from the gaping wound. The 
zombies stroke her brow and gurgle sympathetically. The woman slips unconscious 
and death quickly follows. A small crowd of zombies gathers around her bed. One of 
them reaches into the dead woman’s wound and claws around inside her abdomen. 
The zombie eventually extracts the spleen and passes it into the undead crowd. Each 
zombie utters an ecstatic groan before taking a little nibble.  
 
The gurgling recedes, and a single note gradually emerges from the undead 
cacophony until all the zombies are humming in unison. This single note then breaks 
into a polyphonic kaleidoscope of harmony as the zombies launch into a profane 
Requiem – Requiem Aeternam Non Habebo – I Will Not Rest In Peace. The musical 
composition remains faithful to the formal conventions of the Classical Requiem, yet 
the adapted Latin text subverts the devout orthodoxy of its content.  
 
The dead woman has been lying still on the bloodied sheets beneath her, but then 
slowly rises up from her bed as a newborn undead corpse. A broad grin now animates 
her pallid countenance. One of the zombies hands her the remains of her own spleen. 
She offers a gracious nod in return and then bites into it enthusiastically. Throughout 
the makeshift hospital, more and more freshly-conceived and sublimated zombies are 
rising up from their beds, apprehending their newfound freedom with gentle 
astonishment. The older zombies coo and cluck over the latest additions to their fold.  
 
Some of the zombies then extend their pocked and decaying left arms as if gesturing 
formally to the ground before them. They reach over with their right hands and start 
plucking at the exposed and stringy tendons lining their outstretched arms. They pull 
at these bony lyres – strung out off their own dead bodies – until the mellifluous hue 
of zombie song has been overtaken by a pounding sinewy riff. The rest of the undead 
motley mob stumbles around in a jaunty and jerky dance. Orpheus and Narcissus 
manifest in the zombies’ collective and erotic immersion in a scene of joyful 
musicality. 
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From Horror to Slapstick 
 
There is a further sense in which Orphic playfulness might inform the fiction of a 
sublimated undead civilisation, and the seed of it can actually be detected in 
Romero’s films. I have already discussed a scene from Dawn of the Dead in which 
the zombified Stephen emerges from the elevator with his gun dangling limply from 
his finger. He stumbles out into the mall with an exaggerated zombie-shuffle, lurching 
precariously on an over-turned ankle that threatens to topple his undeadly 
perambulation at any moment (image 8). The actor David Emge’s commitment to the 
evocation of Stephen’s zombiehood is playfully enthusiastic to the point where its 
sheer excessiveness drains the narrative conceit of its horrific and ‘serious’ content. 
Even though one of the main protagonists has just become a zombie, this scene 
surprisingly and amusingly veers towards comedy slapstick. 
 
 
 
In fact, this slippage away from the pure horror genre takes place at numerous points 
throughout the film. When Romero first shows us the zombies in the shopping mall he 
presents them via a series of slapstick set pieces. We see zombies variously: failing to 
grasp which way to walk up an escalator; tumbling over a safety barrier and then 
plunging into an ornamental water display; walking on an ice rink with a hockey stick 
before becoming entangled in the goal; pawing impassively at consumer trinkets that 
no longer have any meaning or function… all the while, the mannequins populating 
Image 8 
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the shopping mall ‘gaze on’ blindly through gaudy eye shadow and fake lashes. Their 
static plasticity echoes the zombies’ gormless features as a saccharine muzak 
soundtrack pumps through the PA system. The nauseatingly cartoonish music renders 
these scenes grotesquely comical, and at points the film teeters on the edge of pure 
slapstick silliness.  
 
As the biker gang plunders the mall towards the end of the film, one of the raiders 
audaciously and inexplicably tests his own blood pressure on an arcade machine just 
as the zombie chaos is reaching a climax. The undead mob descends upon him and 
wrenches him from his seat, leaving only his severed arm attached to the machine. A 
close up shot shows the blood pressure gauge dropping to zero (image 9). Romero 
does not attempt to locate this scene within the narrative conceit in terms of the biker 
character’s motivation; he is clearly drawn to this visceral gag as an end in itself.  
 
 
 
 Image 9 
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I will analyse the specific properties of these scenes in more detail in Chapter Four, 
but for now I will concentrate on how this playfulness might have implications for my 
conception of a sublimated undead civilisation. 
 
These scenes that already exist in Romero’s films, considered alongside images of the 
playful Orpheus and the erotically-immersed Narcissus, allow us to imagine an 
undead civilisation in which the comedic qualities of the zombie come to the fore. 
The horror of the trundling shuffle of undeadliness might be transformed into a 
playfully choreographed sequence of absurd set pieces. The zombies would be 
constantly playing with themselves and each other in a manner that is perpetually 
“light” and antithetical to the horrific seriousness that shrouded them before their own 
sublimation. They would no longer inspire horror in the living, they would instead 
exist within a state of perpetual play that the living themselves would be encouraged 
to immerse themselves in through the act of being bitten.   
 
But not only might the sublimated zombies within a non-repressive civilisation 
interact with each other in line with the images of Orpheus and Narcissus, the genre 
of undead fiction itself might migrate from the ‘seriousness’ of horror into something 
more playful; zombie fiction would then become less beholden to the conventions in 
which it previously existed. The typical narrative devices that deliver the conceit of 
undeadliness might be allowed to sing – to playfully migrate into other cultural forms 
and stylistic modes of presentation. My fiction of a sublimated undead civilisation – 
my collision of Romero’s zombie with Marcuse’s philosophy – could exist as a trans-
disciplinary mash-up of song, dance and comic absurdity. I will return to discuss my 
fiction in relation to form at a later point in this chapter.  
 
 
Undeadliness vs. Sublimated Undeadliness 
 
Within the conceit of an undead civilisation, only those humans who give themselves 
freely to the zombie bite are able to acquire the status of sublimated undeadliness. 
Zombies that were created through a non-consensual attack would remain 
unsublimated – they would be no more than mindless corpses with a violent appetite 
for human flesh. In the aftermath of the undead revolution, whilst some zombies 
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sublimate of their own accord – like Big Daddy and his cohorts at the end of Land of 
the Dead – there would remain packs of zombies that have not gone through the same 
transformation. Marcuse claims that it is “those who have died in pain… that darken 
the prospect of a civilisation without repression.”132 It is precisely the unsublimated 
zombies who died in pain – who were turned into walking corpses against their will – 
that threaten the integrity of the new undead order. As I have already discussed, the 
sublimated zombie wilfully restrains its appetite for flesh; it only takes a little bite, 
thereby transforming consenting humans into zombies rather than devouring them 
completely. However, the unsublimated zombie would show no such restraint; it 
would seek out and consume as much human flesh as possible. Potential recruits for 
sublimated undeadliness would be eaten out of existence before they had a chance to 
become zombies, and the non-repressive order would therefore not be able to 
replenish and proliferate. An undead civilisation needs humans to keep on 
reproducing so that there is always a fresh batch of potential new recruits; the 
unsublimated zombie mob, however, simply wants to devour humans with no concern 
for the future. Furthermore, a rapacious zombie hoard preying on the living would 
perpetuate a hostile struggle between human life and the instincts, and this is precisely 
the struggle that undead sublimation seeks to defuse.  
 
So in order to protect their burgeoning civilisation – and the humans who might 
populate it as future undead citizens – the sublimated zombies would be forced to 
police their unsublimated counterparts. All the undead corpses that have not evolved 
would need to be herded up, and so the violently erotic instincts that these zombies 
embody would effectively be repressed once more. These imprisoned corpses would 
be the very shadow that Marcuse speaks of – the spectre that darkens the prospect of a 
civilisation that is completely without repression. Within my fiction I could set up a 
tension between the emancipatory project of non-repressive undead civilisation, and 
the fact that this civilisation, in order to libidinally prosper, must still repress the 
instincts that do not conform to its regime. There would be a secondary population of 
imprisoned unsublimated corpses desperate to break free so that they might consume 
more human flesh. The sublimated zombies would wring their hands in desperation, 
appalled by the underlying hypocrisy of their ostensibly non-repressive order. They 
                                                
132 Ibid. p.237 
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would resolve to devise a rehabilitation programme that encourages zombies to 
sublimate of their own accord. However, a more hardline faction of sublimated 
zombies would want to destroy their unsublimated counterparts once and for all, 
because the risk they pose to the emancipatory project of civilised undeadliness would 
be too great to countenance.  
 
 
Marcuse Would Never Choose to Become a Zombie 
 
I have been drawing from Marcuse’s non-repressive reality principle in order to 
sketch out the fictitious proposition of sublimated undeadliness as an emancipated 
social order. However, I need to state at this point that what I have now written is in 
no way equivalent to Marcuse’s account of a free civilisation. Though born out of a 
close reading of Marcuse, my text has become antithetical to his project for a number 
of important reasons. In Eros and Civilisation Marcuse attempts to formulate a 
political philosophy – a new reality principle – that might, in time, engender radical 
social change. He dismisses the notion of utopia because it describes a short-circuit 
within the process of praxis that rarefies the political idea whilst starving it of any 
corresponding action. As soon as a project becomes utopian it is politically harmless 
because it acknowledges within its own conceit that it is impossible and unobtainable. 
As such, a utopia for Marcuse is not critical of the status quo; its intangible idealism 
perversely asserts the impossibility of change, thus tacitly confirming the prevalence 
of the existing conditions. However retroactively utopian Marcuse’s thinking 
becomes to the 21st century reader, it is important to acknowledge that he was 
attempting to spearhead a revolution that would liberate the full potential of the 
instincts. In stark opposition to this, my writing effectively hijacks the political 
aspirations within Marcusian thinking and uses them to formulate the figure of the 
sublimated zombie. This new text, reliant as it is on the conceit of the undeadliness, 
becomes a purely fictitious proposition. Marcuse has allowed me to conceive of an 
idealised and unobtainable civilisation – an undead utopia – that is precisely at odds 
with the political intentions of his own project. 
 
But more than this, whilst Marcuse is attempting to author a political theory that 
might expand the potential of civilised human life, I am attempting to author a 
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fictional theory that expands the category of zombiehood. Marcuse’s formulation of a 
non-repressive civilisation is an affirmation of life; Thanatos is assimilated within an 
expanded Eros, and so rejects death as its instinctual aim. My formulation of a non-
repressive civilisation, however, is an affirmation of undeadliness; Eros is assimilated 
within an expanded Thanatos, and so embraces death as its instinctual aim. Whilst 
Eros in Marcuse’s civilisation proliferates in opposition to death, Eros in an undead 
civilisation proliferates in service of death – it reproduces the condition of 
undeadliness under an ascendant Thanatos. The undead Eros – manifested in the 
zombie’s bite – is a slave to the process of entropy over which Thanatos presides; it 
allows undeadliness to multiply. My undead utopia therefore inverts the union 
between Eros and Thanatos that defines Marcuse’s non-repressive civilisation. In a 
coalition of undeadliness, the sublimated Eros becomes the junior partner to 
Thanatos; its own aims are corrupted by the overarching influence of its senior 
counterpart. Marcuse’s vision of emancipated life, when devoured by the conceit of 
zombie fiction, transforms into its own antithesis – a condition in which life resides 
within death. An undead utopia would not suffice for Marcuse; he wants his text to 
inspire political change, not a fiction about musical zombies.  
 
 
Sublimated Undead Melancholia 
 
So what are the consequences of the fact that my desecration of Marcusian thinking 
has moved the political proposition of a non-repressive civilisation into the territories 
of zombie utopianism? What can we do with this irreverent construction? 
 
In Chapter One, I explored how the Freudian melancholic introjects the lost object, 
triggering an internalisation of death within her own psyche.  This yearning to become 
the death with which she identifies so ardently propels her towards self-annihilation. 
The split psyche – the hallmark of melancholia – stages a mortal struggle in which 
Thanatos and Eros battle for supremacy. The melancholic’s libidinal connection to 
death is stronger than her appetite for life, so Thanatos inevitably asserts a superior 
influence over the weakened Eros until the ultimate act of reversal and regression – 
suicide – presents itself as a desirable option. Whilst suicide is the final expression of 
the melancholic’s identification with death, there is bitter irony in the fact that death 
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prohibits the melancholic from experiencing the union she yearns for; she cannot 
consciously experience being dead. I then set up undead melancholia as a fictitious 
state that would allow the melancholic to have this experience; as a zombie, the 
suicidal melancholic can inhabit the death that she craves without being completely 
dead. 
 
This initially allowed us to conceive of undead melancholia as a transgressive subject 
position that defies the limitations of life that deem death to be forever inaccessible to 
the libido. Melancholia acquired a critical content, but then the problem of 
consciousness (or the zombie’s lack of it) re-emerged. The undead melancholic would 
be unable to conceive of itself precisely because it inhabits a body that is devoid of 
self-reflexivity. The zombie, at this point in my project, was still understood as a 
mindless corpse that could not consciously acknowledge its own existence. Undead 
melancholia could not then be positioned as a transgressive subject position, simply 
because the zombie cannot be understood as a subject.  
 
But my invention of sublimated undeadliness re-casts the zombie as a conscious and 
thinking body. The suicidal melancholic would be able exist within sublimated 
undeadliness as a self-aware subject, and could therefore knowingly inhabit death 
without dying. Sublimated undead melancholia thus becomes a fictitious subject 
position that opens up a liminal alternative to suicide. As a sublimated zombie, the 
melancholic is able to consummate her yearning for death by transgressing the 
prohibitions placed upon her libido all the time she was alive. 
 
This allows us to articulate the fundamental different between a Marcusian and a 
zombie civilisation. Marcuse wants to conquer death by enhancing the potential of 
life, whereas the melancholic wants to be conquered by death in order to escape life. 
Not all humans would be drawn to a zombie civilisation. Only those with a 
melancholic disposition would find solace in sublimated undeadliness. Earlier on in 
this chapter I referenced the notion of “the Great Refusal” – the part of the human 
psyche that does not accept the given reality principle as final, and strives instead for 
an improved mode of existence. We can now see in melancholia the traces of this 
refusal. It spurns a reality in which it cannot reclaim that which has been lost, and 
pursues instead its connection to death, despite there being no space for this 
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relationship within life. Only sublimated undeadliness can offer the melancholic the 
reunion she craves; the melancholic’s Great Refusal of life thus finds purchase in the 
undead reality principle – a condition of sublimated zombiehood that allows her to 
exist within death. 
 
Marcuse sees in the Great Refusal the possibility of a better life for future generations 
of humankind – it excavates a nugget of hope based on the memory of a time prior to 
displeasure. As such, a Marcusian civilisation would be of no interest to the 
melancholic. Marcuse offers an ameliorated life. But it is precisely the condition of 
life, however emancipated it might have become, that bars the melancholic from what 
she wants more than anything else. In relation to the future prospects of human life, 
Marcuse is hopeful whereas the melancholic is hopeless. Her rejection of the future 
propels her towards a Great Refusal of life itself – a state that can only be 
accommodated by sublimated undeadliness. 
 
So we must make a final modification to my burgeoning zombie fiction. Only a 
suicidal melancholic would be drawn to the condition of sublimated undeadliness. 
Non-melancholics, however repressed they might be, would still choose to be hopeful 
amidst their displeasure. Only those who are hopeless – who yearn for death over any 
possible organisation of life – would find sublimated undeadliness libidinally 
attractive. So within the conceit of my fiction, those humans who approach the 
zombies in order to be bitten are, by definition, melancholics; furthermore, they 
already know that undeadliness has evolved to become self-aware, so that when they 
are bitten they will be able to continue their conscious existence in a radically 
transformed state of being neither alive nor dead, but libidinally connected to death.  
 
But what of those melancholics who are not aware that they now have a liminal 
alternative to suicide? Within my fiction we can imagine the sublimated zombies 
forming outreach groups at popular suicide spots. They would target vulnerable 
melancholics and let them know that should they choose it, they have the potential to 
be freed from their suffering without succumbing to total annihilation. Some humans 
might still choose outright suicide; this would sadden the sublimated zombies because 
they are motivated by the prospect of creating an ever-expanding unity of 
undeadliness. We can imagine that non-melancholic humans might be hostile towards 
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the sublimated zombies. Even though sublimated undead melancholics only bite when 
asked – they would not submit a human to an undead initiation without gaining 
explicit consent – the living might still be disturbed by the hopeless vision of life 
proffered by undeadliness. The sublimated zombie outreach groups would therefore 
need to be discrete; we can imagine them loitering surreptitiously at Beachy Head or 
the Clifton Suspension Bridge under the cover of darkness, trying to spot the suicidal 
melancholics without drawing attention to their own undeadliness. They would 
probably remain undetected because a sublimated zombie civilisation can only grow 
out of a violent zombie revolution, so the human population would already be greatly 
depleted. 
 
 
The Zombie as a pre-1960s Critical Impulse   
 
In this section I take a step back from the process of constructing the internal conceit 
of an undead Utopia, and speculate as to how this fiction might operate as a 
contemporary cultural artefact. Marianne Dekoven discusses how Marcuse’s political 
philosophy after Eros and Civilisation diagnoses an insidious one-dimensionality that 
coopts dissent within its own logistics, yet still holds on to the possibility of a 
fundamental shift within these operations that would be tantamount to widespread 
socio-political upheaval.  
 
Modernity’s belief in the meaningful possibility of utopian revolution is still a 
very powerful force for Marcuse, despite his evident pessimism concerning 
any realistic prospect for bringing it about.133 
 
Marcuse’s pessimism is formed in response to what he recognises as a cultural and 
political homogeneity that is able to “coopt, absorb, neutralize, and render ineffective 
all opposition.”134 Dekoven claims that Marcuse’s diagnosis of a status quo that 
eliminates “revolutionary negation or Great Refusal, is a prime marker of 
                                                
133 Marianne Dekoven, The Sixties and the Emergence of the Postmodern (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004) p.29  
134 Ibid. p.30 
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postmodernity.”135 And so Marcuse recognises just a few years after writing Eros and 
Civilisation that his vision of civil emancipation, inspired by the human psyche’s un-
repressed phantasy of social amelioration, has been eclipsed by an overarching 
hegemony that nullifies radical dissent by recuperating it within a field of “non-
contradictory difference.”136 Furthermore, Dekoven recognises this shift in Marcuse’s 
thinking as a response to the emergent idea of postmodernism that grew throughout 
the 1960s. Whilst Eros and Civilisation diagnoses the hegemony of repressive 
civilisation, it does not acknowledge the extent to which the social order is able to 
absorb and assimilate difference within its prevailing operations. In relation to the 
climate of “modern/emergent postmodern”137 pluralism that, for Dekoven, typifies the 
early sixties, Eros and Civilisation’s assertion of oppositional political aspirations 
places it more in the former camp – the modern moment – of the blurry divide. 
Because the fiction of an undead civilisation borrows heavily from Marcuse’s 
political thinking, my own project can be recognised as a critical anachronism that 
references a set of political strategies belonging to the late 1950s; sublimated 
undeadliness – as a vision of a radically transgressive subjectivity – evokes a strain of 
modernist thinking that has been very much consigned to the past. I will presently 
explore the implications of deploying modernist utopian strategies within the current 
contemporary climate, but I will first address the anachronistic hues of sublimated 
undeadliness in more detail.   
 
 
Undead Modernism 
 
In The Aesthetics of Disengagement Christine Ross explores, through her discussion 
of the psychoanalyst Elisabeth Roudinesco, how the term ‘melancholia’ has been 
replaced by ‘depression’.  
 
“[now] everything is as though no rebellion is possible, as though the very 
idea of social, even intellectual, subversion has become illusionary […] hence 
the paradigm of depression.” This is one of the main manifestations of what 
                                                
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. p.29 
137 Ibid. p.29 
 81 
Roudinesco calls the paradigmatic shift from […] melancholia to depression, 
which brings with it the decline of psychoanalysis as a subversive force.138 
 
Ross sets up melancholia as a “conflict”139 in which the psyche refuses to internalise 
and assimilate the hegemonic status quo. This tessellates with my account of the 
melancholic who refuses to consent to the absence of, and her separation from, that 
which she has lost. Ross then evokes a contemporary climate in which this 
melancholic opposition now seems impossible, and the collapse of psychoanalysis as 
a “subversive force” heralds “the paradigmatic shift from melancholia to depression.” 
The status of melancholia as “a potential form of critique of social rules”140 is 
subsumed by the notion of depression as a failure to adopt the standardised values of 
economic independence and productivity. Ross describes these overarching and 
socially determined identity categories as:  
 
…norms of independence based on generalised individual initiative 
(personified by the model of the entrepreneur), self-sufficiency, and pluralism 
of values (exemplified by the dictum “It’s my choice”).141 
 
So whilst the melancholic might have wilfully refused this normative homogeneity, 
depression is cast as the failure to assimilate these values. The potential of the 
melancholic psyche to operate as an oppositional force outside the status quo is 
neutered, becoming instead a depressive inability to assimilate the consensual values 
of economic self-determination. The dissenting antagonism of melancholia is 
normalised as depression – as a disempowered state contained within the 
“noncontradictory difference” of contemporaneity.  
 
Crucially, we can now equate melancholia’s capitulation to depression with 
modernism’s acquiescence to the prevailing ubiquity of postmodern homogeneity that 
collapses radical opposition from the outside by assimilating dissent within its own 
operations. It is important to note here, as Dekoven herself does, that melancholia 
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2006) p.xxiv 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. p.xxiv 
141 Ibid. p.xxiii 
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might be understood as being akin to postmodernism in regards to its fracturing and 
fragmentation of meaning and the splintering of grand narratives. I will explore these 
ideas in my subsequent chapters, but at this point I will continue to understand 
melancholia according to its status as a potentially subversive psychical force prior to 
the emergence of postmodernism.    
 
I can now claim that my fiction of sublimated undeadliness, as an inhabitation of 
dissent, rejects the contemporary condition of depression, and insists upon the 
oppositional qualities of melancholia instead. Within this reading, the transgressive 
subject position of sublimated undeadliness stands for the text of melancholia itself – 
an anachronistic critical discourse that has returned to haunt the contemporary system 
of classification that has decommissioned it. The phantasy of radical refusal evoked 
by my undead utopia can now be understood as a melancholic introjection of a lost 
modernist strategy that has been deemed outmoded and obsolete. My fiction is, in 
itself, the internalisation of an oppositional critical impulse that is now lost to the 
contemporary practitioner. The notion of a zombie utopia does not of course resurrect 
modernism, but I claim my fiction of a transgressive oppositional subjectivity evokes 
an anachronistic and phantastical spectre of it – an undead modernism – that might 
critically examine the contemporary condition’s ubiquitous tactic of assimilating 
dissent and collapsing opposition by means of cooption and normalisation.  
 
 
A Melancholic Utopia 
 
In his book Utopias, Richard Noble explores the critical potential of utopian strategies 
within the contemporary cultural climate. He acknowledges in his introduction the 
shift that I have been describing over the preceding pages, namely that as the 20th 
century has proceeded, the possibility of full-scale cultural revolution has gradually 
been replaced by a condition of ubiquitous relativity that is always able to assimilate 
and nullify dissenting voices into its own project of self-perpetuation. The utopian 
urge might therefore be to create provisional and temporary manifestations of 
alternative realities that function as micro-utopias within the prevailing hegemony. 
These interventions do not claim to rupture the status quo or to imbue themselves 
with a radically oppositional politics; rather they offer little glimpses of something 
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other than the status quo that might then feed back into the status quo as a set of 
provocations or critical questions surrounding the assimilation of cultural practice into 
a non-oppositional norm.142  
 
Noble cites relational aesthetics and participatory practices as examples of situations 
that might, albeit temporarily, draft alternative strategies of human interaction and 
production. There is a particular quality in their formal procedures – in the 
experiences they engender – that opens up a critical space. This point raises an 
important limit to the work I have carried out throughout this chapter. My undead 
utopia is a speculative and self-consciously provisional fiction contained within the 
constraints of this thesis (provisional in the sense that I have not attempted to present 
this fiction as an exhausted and entirely resolved proposition). It does not exist as a 
cultural product – as a film, novel or some sort of live experience etc – that has formal 
properties beyond those of this thesis itself. I have not set up a sustained fictitious 
conceit that has asked you as a reader to suspend your disbelief; rather, I have 
explicitly acknowledged the thinking that has informed my construction of a zombie 
fiction throughout this chapter. I have specifically chosen to do this because to 
explicitly argue my case for an undead utopia is, I believe, more theoretically cogent 
than trying to narrate the fiction directly. This decision has allowed me to reflect on 
my own invention. As such, I claim that this thesis, as a self-reflexive and critically 
engaged piece of academic writing, is actually the optimum form in which to devise, 
and then discuss, the qualities of an undead utopia.  
 
To bring this back to the ongoing discussion, I do not claim that the formal properties 
of this thesis might be able to create a micro-utopia – a tangible experience that opens 
up a critical space – as formulated by Noble. This might be the outcome for someone 
reading my thesis, but it has not been written with this in mind; any such response 
belongs to the reader and is outside my jurisdiction as the author. However, Noble 
also sets up the idea of a “critical utopia”143 that does not try to formally produce a 
utopia, but deploys the content of utopian discourse in order to critically interrogate a 
particular facet of society. A critical utopia might deploy images and scenarios that 
ape and exaggerate aspects of the status quo; it might construct an absurd 
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foreign/alien ‘other’ as a thinly veiled personification of the issue that it wishes to 
critically examine. My fiction in its current state – as a theoretical proposal within my 
thesis – seems to perform a manoeuvre that is comparable to these strategies. It 
deliberately uses an anachronistic and outmoded notion of oppositional discourse – 
melancholia – in order to interrogate the conditions that render this discouse ‘out of 
time’ in the first instance. My utopia, by evoking the perpetuation of life within the 
radically transformative state of undeadliness, articulates the impossibility of 
transgressive opposition being mobilised by anything except a zombie fiction.  
 
Frederic Jameson warns in The Utopian Enclave that if “the utopia in question 
proposes the kind of radical transformation of subjectivity presupposed by most 
revolutions, a mutation in human nature and the emergence of whole new beings;”144 
then: 
 
We find ourselves in a science-fictional world […] in which human beings can 
scarcely even recognise themselves any longer (and which would need to be 
allegorised […] in order to bring such figuration back to any viable 
anthropomorphic and utopian function[)].145 
 
So I can immediately say that the transformed subjectivity of sublimated undead 
melancholia does indeed author “new beings” that cannot be recognised as human. If 
this is indeed the case, my treatment of undead melancholia would need to be 
allegorical for some facet of human life in order for it to function as a utopian 
strategy. Undeadliness would have to speak of something other than itself – 
something human instead – if its political function is to be redeemed. Without this 
anchoring of zombie figuration within the human realm, my fiction would not tally 
with Jameson’s definition of a utopia. I address the function of allegory in detail in 
Chapter Four, but I might provisionally claim that my undead utopia functions as an 
allegorical articulation of the fact that the contemporary climate has eradicated the 
possibility of being able to mobilise the sort of radical opposition to the status quo 
associated with the modernism of the late 1950s. But despite the presence of this 
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allegorical “figuration” in my project, there remains a sense in which my utopia does 
not sit at all well with Jameson’s definition of the term. His text climaxes with a 
rousing trumpeting of the utopian impulse: 
 
Utopia thus now better expresses our relationship to a genuinely political 
future than any current programme of action, […] it forces us precisely to 
concentrate on the break itself: a meditation on the impossible, on the 
unrealizable in its own right. This is very far from a liberal capitulation to the 
necessity of capitalism, however; it is quite the opposite, a rattling of the bars 
and an intense spiritual concentration and preparation for another stage which 
has not yet arrived.146 
 
My own project, like Jameson’s utopia, meditates on an “impossible” prospect – that 
the suicidal melancholic might consciously survive her reunion within death. But the 
“unrealizable” nature of this proposition does not jolt into a hopeful anticipation of 
some as-of-yet-unknown but radical future. An undead utopia anticipates only that 
which can in fact never be recouped, precisely because it has already been lost to the 
passing of time. For Jameson, the impossible is hopeful. The impossibility of my 
zombie fiction, however, can only confirm the hopelessness of melancholic politics. 
Jameson’s utopia looks forward to a life that “has not yet arrived”, whereas my 
melancholic phantasy of an undead modernism is a lament for that which cannot be 
redeemed. 
 
So my zombie utopia acknowledges that its own themes of transgressive subjectivity 
and radical opposition are impossible to realise. Whilst it might expose the failings of 
the contemporary condition, my fiction cannot propose a critical alternative precisely 
because its so-called oppositional politics are themselves no more than a phantasy. 
This tacitly endorses the postmodern notion that no viable alternative to the status quo 
is available. Ironically therefore, by conforming to this contemporary diagnosis of an 
insurmountable homogeneity, the radicalism of sublimated undead melancholia 
becomes, in the end, a conservative proposition.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
They’re Dead. They’re All Messed Up 
 
The zombie. An Oxymoron made flesh. A vile and stinking embodiment of 
paradoxical weirdness. A contagion of gory and slapstick nonsense that defiles 
reasonable sensibilities. As the louche and drawling sheriff from Night of the Living 
Dead says of the walking corpses stumbling before him, “They’re Dead. They’re All 
Messed Up.”147  
 
This chapter suspends my efforts to conceive of an undead utopia in response to the 
climax of Romero’s film Land of the Dead. It contends instead with undeadliness as a 
violation of hegemonic meaning – a rupturing of the symbolic protocols of language. 
I examine how the zombie’s vertiginous weirdness interfaces with Julia Kristeva’s 
account of the symbolic collapse engendered by melancholia. This discussion will 
eventually lead to a further interrogation of the critical claims imbedded in my 
formulation of an undead utopia.  
 
In his book Looking Awry, An Introduction to Lacan through Popular Culture, Slavoj 
Žižek reads “the return of the dead” as an articulation of a breakdown in the symbolic 
mechanisms that locate and fix the deceased within an established order of meaning. 
 
The return of the dead is a sign of a disturbance in the symbolic rite, in the 
process of symbolization… …The funeral rite exemplifies symbolization at its 
purest: through it, the dead are inscribed in the text of symbolic tradition, they 
are assured that, in spite of their death, they will “continue to live” in the 
memory of the community. The “return of the living dead” is, on the other 
hand, the reverse of the proper funeral rite. While the latter implies a certain 
reconciliation, an acceptance of loss, the return of the dead signifies that they 
cannot find their proper place in the text of tradition. 148 
 
                                                
147 George A. Romero, Night of the Living Dead (Pickwick Group ltd., 1968) 
148 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry; An Introduction to Lacan through Popular Culture (London: The MIT 
Press, 1992) p.23 
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Žižek is not specifically talking about zombies at this point; he is including all manner 
of ghouls, ghosts and gore-mongers within his categorisation. But we can already see 
from this quote that the symbolic disturbance – the corruption of established and 
reasonable meaning – triggered by the return of the dead in popular culture is 
explicitly linked by Žižek to a failure in the reconciliation and acceptance of loss. To 
unpack the role that loss plays in this collapse of meaning I will now return to a 
discussion of mourning and melancholia.  
 
 
Failing to Kill the Dead 
 
In his book The New Black; Mourning, Melancholia and Depression Darian Leader 
establishes the Lacanian idea that biological death is a separate event to symbolic 
death. A person may die physically, but this death in not automatically fixed within 
the Symbolic; the myriad traces of the lost object continue to press upon the subject as 
a haunting and unprocessed traumatic affect. The dead must therefore die twice before 
their absence can be registered within language.  
 
For symbolic death to occur, the dead must be banished and kept at bay. … 
The second killing represents a movement from empirical biological death to 
symbolic laying to rest.149 
 
Crucially, Leader claims that the living must enact this process of “killing the 
dead”150 so that the lost object might be framed within an ordered matrix of meaning. 
The deceased need to be subjected to a second symbolic demise that reifies them 
within language as that which has definitively gone. Leader claims that the registering 
of this second death within symbolic language allows the process of mourning to 
proceed. An example of this is the funeral service. It functions to ossify death as an 
event that can be understood – as an event that has meaning – however painful that 
meaning might be. The dead person’s name no longer signifies a life; it becomes 
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instead an engraving on a tombstone that names an absence and thus fixes death 
within language.  
 
At the beginning of Romero’s first film Night of the Living Dead we see Johnny and 
Barbara – a feuding brother and sister – driving into a cemetery. Romero never 
explicitly tells the viewer whose grave the siblings are visiting; all we know is that 
they are there at the behest of their mother who is not well enough to make the 
journey herself. Already there is a sense of foreboding and disquieting ambiguity 
surrounding the fact that the dead person has not been positively identified. Death is 
not fixed within the symbolic register – it has no definite form or meaning – and so 
haunts these opening credits as an unnamed presence that has not been pinned down 
by language. Johnny constantly moans about the inconvenience of travelling so far to 
the cemetery, and refuses to afford the occasion any sense of gravitas. Johnny scoffs 
at the cross-shaped wreath that they have bought which bears the inscription “we still 
remember.” He retorts petulantly, “I don’t. I don’t even remember what the man looks 
like.”151 Johnny then complains that the wreath will inevitably be gone by the time 
they next visit, and jokingly speculates that the same one is probably sold back to 
them year after year.  
 
A little spit and polish, you could clean this up and sell it next year. I wonder 
how many times we’ve bought the same one?152  
 
Not only does Johnny’s banter exhibit a cynical irreverence towards the protocols of 
the cemetery, it suggests that the wreath is no more than a banal commodity object 
with no intrinsic symbolic meaning. It is unable to function effectively as an 
articulation of loss that might frame death and allow the process of mourning to 
proceed. Once again death is present as an unnameable affect – a mood, a rising sense 
of tension – that has no corresponding form or sign that might fix it within symbolic 
meaning. This is heightened by the fact that the radio starts to buzz as they park the 
car. The tuner is unable to grasp a clear signal, and we hear a swirl of glitchy 
feedback and white noise before an announcer is heard apologising for the technical 
difficulties that took them off air. Johnny looks momentarily troubled by the 
                                                
151 George A. Romero, Night of the Living Dead (Pickwick Group ltd., 1968) 
152 Ibid. 
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portentous sound of the radio not making sense, but he is able to manage his anxiety 
by simply turning off the device. He immediately shrugs off this disruption and 
continues his puerile ribbing of his long-suffering sister. But as soon as Johnny 
switches off the radio an extradiegetic bell chimes, followed by a flurry of nervous 
and jittery strings. Romero immediately pushes the soundtrack beyond the diegesis, 
signalling to the viewer a new ambiguity and tension that Johnny cannot keep at bay. 
The music does not articulate Johnny’s interior mood – his own sense of foreboding – 
it serves to highlight just how much his cheery ignorance is fatally out of kilter with 
the peril that we know he is in. That tolling bell states that the sadistic narrative,153 
supported by the probing and voyeuristic gaze of the camera, has something terrible 
in store for him. He does not bear the gaze, nor is he a protagonist with whom we 
identify – a screen surrogate who carries our own spectatorial desire. In that moment 
the injection of a doom-laden extradiegetic affect states that he is an object, hurtling 
towards his demise, being acted upon by an unnamed and unknown ambiguity.  
 
A storm breaks over the cemetery. Flashes of lightning streak across Johnny’s face as 
he turns to see a figure walking slowing in the background. He does not react, but, as 
spectators, we note this classic cinematic trope for looming disaster. Whilst Barbara is 
praying at the graveside, Johnny taunts her with memories of the game they used to 
play in the cemetery when they were younger. Again he fails to heed the appropriate 
symbolic protocols associated with mourning the dead, and takes pleasure in 
disrupting Barbara’s attempts to align herself with these recognisable and familiar 
behavioural codes.  Johnny remembers how scared she used to be in the cemetery, 
and on noticing Barbara’s continued unease he resurrects their childhood game.  
 
They’re coming to get you Barbara!154 
 
The figure in the background wanders through the graves as Johnny continues to taunt 
Barbara. The man starts to draw closer, and Johnny incorporates him into his teasing. 
 
They’re coming for you! Look! Here comes one of them now.155 
                                                
153 Laura Mulvey, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, in: Charles Harrison and Paul Woods (eds.), 
Art in Theory 1900 – 2000; An Anthology of Changing Ideas (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) p.987 
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Barbara is agitated and rebukes Johnny for his churlish behaviour, but as the 
unidentified male figure approaches she composes herself. She turns away and starts 
to walk after Johnny, presuming that the stranger will simply pass her by on the path. 
But he does not. Instead he grabs her and tries to bite a chunk of flesh out of her neck.  
 
And it is through this unknown character in the cemetery that Romero introduces 
undeadliness for the first time (image 10). This man is a corpse. He is dead, and yet 
he tries to devour Barbara. She initially escapes him, but later succumbs to the 
devouring zombie throng. We do not know why the zombie exists – undeadliness 
remains a symptom without a cause throughout Romero’s films – but, as a walking 
corpse that evidently refuses to be laid to rest, his presence is a total violation of 
Leader’s second symbolic death. His attack on Barbara makes no sense, destabilising 
her normalised experience of reality with a sudden collapse of meaning. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
155 Ibid. 
Image 10 
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A Real Problem 
 
If Leader’s process of mourning involves the living symbolically “killing the dead”, 
then Romero’s zombie desecrates this procedure on two levels: firstly, by reversing it 
so that the dead are now killing the living, and secondly, by turning the act of 
symbolic killing into an abjectly literal killing, whereby the living are devoured by the 
dead until they are no more than a steaming pile of bones. Leader’s “killing the dead” 
makes sense – it is a strategy that generates meaning around death; Romero’s zombie 
makes no sense whatsoever – it violates symbolic death through its outrageous and 
undeadly ambiguity that does not sit within an ordered category of either life or death.  
 
This zombie nonsense throws Barbara into an encounter with an unnameable force 
outside of the Symbolic. If language constructs subjectivity as an inhabitation of lack 
that establishes the subject’s difference from the other, then the zombie is an agent of 
abjection156 that radically collapses the levees of subjectivity keeping the other at bay. 
Its vile bite breaches subjective coherence and infects the victim with a corrupting 
contagion – a malignant exteriority that proliferates under the skin. Undeadliness 
pollutes subjective integrity, turning it into an unclassifiable and grotesque anomaly – 
a macabre paradox of life infected with death. The zombie thus forces the subject into 
the horrifying Real beyond language – a territory of vertiginous and corrosive affect 
where meaning and selfhood collapses.  
 
In the build-up to the zombie cemetery attack, Barbara and Johnny fail to perceive the 
threat posed to them. They fatally misrecognise the undead body lurching toward 
them. Johnny incorporates the zombie into his childish game – he projects a meaning 
onto it that he had previously invented himself in order to assert his own subjective 
mastery over his sister. In his book The Sovereignty of Death, Rob Weatherill 
explores how Lacanian theory posits the Real as an absence of meaning that lurks 
behind a “phantasy screen”,157 and it is precisely this screen that the undead corpse 
tears asunder with a violent eruption of Real abjection that shatters Johnny’s 
Imaginary game. Lacan claims that: 
                                                
156 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror; An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982) p.3 
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The real has to be sought beyond the dream – in what the dream has 
enveloped, hidden from us, behind the lack of representation of which there is 
only one representative.158 
 
Barbara’s zombie is this “representative” of the “lack of representation” precisely 
because it stands in the spot where both Symbolic and Imaginary meaning no longer 
function. Johnny projects his phantasy of the dead rising from their graves onto the 
figure in the cemetery, and yet hidden behind this imaginary screen is a Real walking 
corpse that defies all symbolic conventions. The zombie inhabits a void where 
meaning ceases to operate. Johnny initially misrecognises the undead corpse as a 
monster from the Imaginary – as a fiction with which he can taunt his sister. But as 
soon as the zombie inexplicably lunges for Barbara, it gouges through Johnny’s 
“phantasy screen” and emerges instead as a monster from the Real. The zombie spews 
forth from a rent in the Imaginary, spreading a vile contagion of Real nonsense that 
devours the conventional protocols of language.  
 
 
Misreading Melancholia 
 
This collapse of meaning around death, so freakishly engendered by undeadliness, 
invites a re-examination of the term melancholia. Leader sets up melancholia as a 
state that occurs when living humans are unable to separate themselves from what 
they have lost. Instead of securing loss within the symbolic, and therefore outside of 
themselves, the melancholic preserves an element of that loss within her own psyche. 
The melancholic is unable to establish any distancing perspective that can frame and 
contextualise her loss. Instead death becomes a pervasive presence that seeps into the 
core of her being. Melancholia is effectively a collapse in meaning that prohibits 
death from being adequately laid to rest within language.  
 
If mourning establishes the absence of a positive by symbolically framing the 
disappearance of a loved one, then melancholia asserts the presence of a negative; it 
injects a morbid identification with death into the living subject’s own psyche. 
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Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1964) p.60 
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Melancholia stubbornly tries to keep death alive – however impossible this might be – 
by refusing to let it settle within the Symbolic.  
 
The melancholic suffers precisely because she has within herself an overarching urge 
to re-connect with what she has lost. The only state that would fundamentally satisfy 
the melancholic is a reunion with the death that she craves so ardently, and so self-
annihilation starts to assert its dark allure. As Leader says, “In mourning, we grieve 
the dead; in melancholia we die with them.”159 Leader here sets up the idea that whilst 
the mourner builds a buffer zone of symbolic meaning around death, the melancholic 
inhabits death through a process of identification. But crucially, Leader’s claim that 
“in melancholia we die with [the dead]” is a metaphorical articulation of the living 
melancholic psyche that submits to an Imaginary death. However Romero’s fiction 
re-stages this process, creating a conceit in which the living actually die at the hands 
of the dead. He depicts a scenario in which the dead stumble forth from a fissure rent 
through the Symbolic, and pull the living into the deadly abyss of Real nonsense. 
Zombie fiction is thus a grotesque literalisation of the psychoanalytical poetics of 
melancholia.  
 
If Žižek can claim that “Shakespeare had read Lacan”160 due to the Bard’s treatment 
of the eponymous protagonist in Richard II who is unable to inhabit his symbolic 
status as ‘King’, then I will claim that Romero has wilfully misread Leader in order to 
fashion his particular celluloid monster. Zombie fiction plagiarises psychoanalysis, 
restaging the melancholic’s Imaginary encounter with death (through identification) 
as a Real encounter. The zombie, as an abject literalisation of the collapse of meaning 
outside language, bites into the living subject – ripping sinew from skin and tearing 
gristle from bone – until she has been devoured out of symbolic existence.  
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The Undead Thing 
 
Julia Kristeva develops this relationship between melancholia and the collapse of 
meaning in exquisite detail in her book Black Sun – Depression and Melancholia. She 
formulates a particular brand of narcissistic depression161 that, unlike the pure 
Freudian model of melancholia explored in Chapter One of my thesis, does not 
involve the introjection of the lost object. 
 
The depressed narcissist mourns not an Object but the Thing. Let me posit the 
“Thing” as the real that does not lend itself to signification…162 
 
This Thing does not operate within the symbolic register; rather it asserts itself 
affectively on the subject as “the impression of having been deprived of an 
unnameable, supreme good, something unrepresentable…”163 This “something” is an 
archaic sense of self that eludes representation and dwells in the Real beyond the 
parameters of symbolic life. The Thing is the part of the subject that holds on to a 
sensation of supreme wholeness and connectivity that precedes the arrival of 
language. Kristeva claims that this yearning to re-establish links with a lost sense of 
self plunges the melancholic into a “battle with symbolic collapse.”164 This struggle 
persists,  
 
Until the weight of the primal Thing prevails, and all translatability become 
[sic] impossible. Melancholia then ends up in asymbolia, in loss of meaning: if 
                                                
161 Kristeva acknowledges that depression is not only a term used in contemporary psychology to 
describe a set of surface symptoms. She states that depression, like melancholia, has ontological roots 
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I am no longer capable of translating or metaphorizing, I become silent and I 
die.165 
 
The “Thing prevails” at the point where translation and metaphor – mechanisms of 
meaning within the symbolic register – fail, and the subject is then pulled into a fatal 
encounter with the “depressive void”166 at the heart of melancholia.  
 
 
Dead Language 
 
But why exactly should the Thing occasion a breakdown in meaning for the 
melancholic? Kristeva claims that “language starts with a negation (Verneinung) of 
loss,” in which the “lost essential object” is recovered “in signs.”167 The speaking 
subject unconsciously accepts that her loss of archaic unity has been replaced by 
language, and it is precisely the function of words – the ability of signs to link to their 
referents – that allows the subject to reach over the depressive void and locate herself 
within a field of Symbolic consistency. Speaking marks the subject’s ascension to a 
normative position among other subjects within language. However, Kristeva goes on 
to say: 
 
Depressed persons, on the contrary, disavow the negation: they cancel it out, 
suspend it, and nostalgically fall back on the real object (the Thing) of their 
loss, which is just what they do not manage to lose, to which they remain 
painfully riveted.168 
 
So the melancholic refuses the compensation offered by symbolic meaning. She 
chooses instead to fixate not on the substitute for her loss – language – but on the 
initial loss itself. Language fails to span the melancholic’s depressive void because it 
cannot place the Thing within an over-arching signifying chain that applies 
consistency and order to everything. So for the melancholic, words simply do not 
work:  
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The dead language they speak, which foreshadows their suicide, conceals a 
Thing buried alive. The latter, however, will not be translated in order that it 
not be betrayed; it shall remain walled up within the crypt of inexpressible 
affect…169 
 
The melancholic apprehends a deathliness within language. She is drawn to the Real 
death of suicide precisely to escape the stultifying ossification of the Symbolic that 
prevents her from reuniting with her Thing. The words she utters are dead – flat 
fragments of monotonous droning that has no signifying potential – and yet under this 
petrified husk of sound, the Thing lies buried as a kernel of unnameable and 
unrepresentable affect that refuses to be categorised and tamed by language. 
 
 
A Double Disavowal of Death 
 
Within Romero’s fiction, the subject’s encounter with the zombie is a violent negation 
of symbolic meaning that propels her into the territories of the Real beyond language. 
Crucially, we can now add that this embrace with undeadliness allows her to be 
reunited with her own Thingness. The melancholic’s  “unspeakable anguishes” push 
her towards a “fringe of strangeness”170 at the outposts of language. It is here that she 
encounters the zombie, who drags her through into the Real so that she might become 
one with her own Thing. The zombie that bites her is not her Thing, though it stands 
in the place of a more general Thingness. However, the zombie that she turns into, 
presuming that she is not devoured entirely, is her particular Thing – herself without 
language. Undeadliness becomes an abject contagion of violent affect that collapses 
the lack upon which subjectivity is based, and in so doing, reunites the melancholic 
with everything from which she was barred in life.  
 
Kristeva notes that the reunion with the Thing is unrepresentable; only the act of 
“devouring”171 might come close to invoking it. This reminds us of the symbolic oral 
incorporation staged by the Freudian melancholic who seeks to introject the lost 
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object. Once again we can claim that Romero’s fiction both reverses the act of 
psychoanalytical oral consumption, and pushes it from poetic metaphor into 
literalism; whilst Kristeva’s melancholic is reunited with Thingness by an imagined 
and un-representable act of devouring, the undead melancholic is herself devoured by 
Thingness in a very Real and crude feeding frenzy.  
 
Within Kristeva’s account of Melancholia this reunion is tantamount to self-
annihilation; to meet one’s Thing is to disappear from language altogether. But the 
zombie offers the melancholic a ‘third way’ that sidesteps the dichotomy of either 
unbearable life or emancipatory death. Instead of dying within the Real, the 
melancholic in zombie fiction can endure it within a state of undeadliness. This means 
that the zombie can occupy the impossible position of the Thing outside of language 
without succumbing to total annihilation. Crucially, this position is critical and 
transgressive; it refuses the logic of symbolic meaning that imposes a deathly limit – 
the limit of language – on the subject. Whilst Kristeva’s melancholic could only yearn 
for this oppositional refusal within life, or surrender to its fatal appeal through death, 
the undead melancholic can exist within this collapse of meaning – it can occupy the 
vertiginous territories of the Real as a Thing, without yielding to absolute dissolution. 
The zombie thus escapes the death within language without succumbing to the death 
without it. Rob Weatherill, quoting Jacques Lacan and then Malcolm Bowie, writes 
of:   
 
…a deathliness written into the symbolic. Lacan indicates this: “The symbol 
manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing, and this death constitutes 
in the subject the externalisation of his desire.” Bowie continues, “Death is the 
eventual triumph of the Real (finally), but is already homeopathically present 
in speech...”172 
 
Weatherill here sets up two registers of death. The first is the death of the Thing – a 
demise that destroys archaic wholeness and constitutes the desiring subject within 
language – whilst the second is the Real death of dissolution beyond the symbolic. 
Both Kristeva’s suicidal melancholic and the undead melancholic refuse this first 
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death, or “disavow this negation” as Kristeva herself puts it, by refusing to inhabit the 
symbolic dominion. As Weatherill outlines above, death is present in language in tiny 
measures. It infects all speaking subjects, but by refusing to consent to this death 
within language, the suicidal melancholic is felled by the Real death without it. 
However, at the moment of self-annihilation the suicidal subject is thrust back into the 
Symbolic. Lacan says of the suicidal melancholic: 
 
If he abolishes himself, he is more of a sign than ever, for the simple reason 
that it is precisely from the moment when the subject is dead that he becomes 
an eternal sign for others.173   
 
The suicidal subject inevitably ossifies her own place within the Symbolic by 
affecting her own demise. However awful this meaning might be, it is a fixed 
meaning that makes tragic sense within the Symbolic. It is also highly ironic, because 
the melancholic then becomes fixed forever as a ‘suicide victim’ – fixed, categorised 
and labelled within the very system that she was trying escape by doing herself in.    
 
In opposition to this, the undead melancholic avoids being cast back into the deathly 
grasp of symbolic consistency due to being neither alive nor dead. She continues to 
make no sense once she has propelled herself beyond language precisely because she 
becomes undead. Through her reunion with the archaic Thing, she does not succumb 
to the Real, but survives within it in a state of continual symbolic collapse and vividly 
affecting nonsense. The undead melancholic thus stages a double disavowal of death 
– she refuses the death within and without language.  
 
 
Undead Materiality 
 
When reading Kristeva, we have a strong sense of her poetic approach to 
psychoanalysis. She actively invites the reader to think into the spaces that she creates 
around her words. As such, the notion of the Thing – though the word itself pushes 
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towards a description of an indeterminate or unclassified form – is primarily an 
invocation of a formless space – psychological space – that is experienced by the 
subject as a disembodied affect of “unspeakable anguishes.” However, there are a 
number of striking passages in Black Sun where Kristeva talks about the materiality of 
the Thing as if it were on some level embodied – of the body – as opposed to purely 
of the mind.  
 
In the tension of their affects, muscles, mucus membranes, and skin, they 
experience both their belonging to and distance from an archaic other [the 
Thing] that still alludes representation and naming, but of whose corporeal 
emissions, along with their automatism, they still bear the imprint.174  
 
Here Kristeva suggests that a trace of Thingness haunts the living subject’s body, 
more specifically the parts of the body over which the human does not assert 
conscious mastery. Corporeal emissions and unconscious motor functions confront 
the subject with her own materiality – they constitute a purely physical dimension to 
her sense of self that is independent to the language through which she self-conceives. 
Kristeva says there is an “automatism” within subjectivity, implying a sense of 
mechanical functionality that is not driven by will, and it is precisely this embodied 
stratum of subjectivity that bears the “imprint” of the Thing. Kristeva continues: 
 
…the Thing is a recipient that contains my dejecta and everything that results 
from cadere [Latin: to fall] – it is a waste with which, in my sadness, I merge. 
… For those who are depressed, the Thing like the self is a downfall that 
carries them along into the invisible and the unnameable. Cadere. Waste and 
cadavers all.175  
 
This passage bears a resemblance to Kristeva’s account of the abject corpse in Powers 
of Horror:  
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The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, to fall)… …refuse and corpses show me what 
I permanently thrust aside in order to live. These bodily fluids, this defilement, 
this shit is what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of 
death. There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being. My body 
extricates itself, as being alive, from that border. Such waste drops so that I 
might live, until, from loss to loss, nothing remains in me and my body falls 
beyond the limit – cadere, cadaver. If dung signifies the other side of the 
border, the place where I am not and which permits me to be, the corpse, the 
most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon everything.176 
 
From these two passages we can observe an unnameable Thingness to the corpse, and 
an abject corpseness to the Thing. Both are that which the subject must push aside if 
she is to retain her coherence within the symbolic order. The effluence and the base 
materiality of the inert body must be renounced if subjectivity is to retain its integrity, 
and the abject Thing is expelled so that symbolic life might function meaningfully. 
However, in time “the corpse encroaches upon everything” – it devours meaning – 
until such a point that the melancholic subject, in her sadness, “falls beyond the limit” 
into its material dominion.  
 
And this starts to sound like an entirely apt articulation of Romero’s monstrous 
creation. Outside the conceit of undeadliness, the corpse is a passive object that can 
be mourned. The actual body is hidden and replaced by a network of signs that attest 
to its absence. To encounter the Real corpse is to experience a rupture in the way the 
living are able to manage their dead. But in Romero’s fiction, the undead corpse is 
animated and active; it is a weirdly anomalous material – a body with an unnameable 
purpose but without personhood – an abject Thing that devours meaning and 
collapses the symbolic armature holding the subject within language. From a reading 
of Kristeva we can say that this body is driven by a yearning to reconnect with itself 
outside the constraints of the Symbolic. Crucially, the condition of undead 
melancholia can for the first time be understood as a material condition. It is precisely 
the zombie’s embodied Thingness – its nonsensical mobilisation of the corpse – that 
makes it so horrifically Real.  
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The Haptics of Undeadliness 
 
The critical challenge posed to the Symbolic by undead melancholia is engendered by 
its abject materiality. The depressive void in meaning – the unfathomable dimension 
of the Real – collapses and congeals onto the surface of undeadliness. The zombie 
becomes a transgressive texture within language – a corrupting plane of glitchy 
flatness amidst Symbolic space – that collapses the normative distance of signification 
with a deathly closeness.  
 
In her book Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media, Laura Marks describes 
haptic looking as an intimate encounter with surface, materiality and texture that 
opposes the formulation of rational knowledge engendered by the more distant optical 
gaze.    
 
When I insist on the materiality of an image, I draw attention to its aspects that 
escape our symbolic recognition.177 … Haptic looking tends to rest on the 
surface of its object rather than to plunge into depth, not to distinguish form so 
much as to discern texture.178… In a haptic relationship our self rushes up to 
the surface to interact with another surface.179 
 
Marks goes on to use the term haptic to distinguish smooth space from striated space. 
Whilst striated space frames and categorises separate objects, keeping them distinct 
and symbolically familiar, smooth space collapses depth, distance and perspective 
onto a haptic surface of indiscernible texture. The haptic scours optical consistency 
and blurs familiarity; it evokes the materiality of the object without trying to forge a 
symbolic reading of it. 
 
Romero’s fiction plays out Marks’ account of the haptic on a gruesomely literal level. 
The zombie corrupts the striated space of stable symbolic consistency and plunges the 
subject into a viscerally haptic encounter with the “smooth space” of undeadliness 
where meaning gives way to base materiality. The walking corpse demands an abject 
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proximity, instigating a vile embodiment of the subject until she is no more than a 
body – until her subjectivity collapses altogether onto the surface of undead 
Thingness.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari assert that neither smooth nor striated space can exist 
independently.180 I dwell on this point because it helps me think through an essential 
quality of zombie fiction. If a subject encounters a hoard of zombies she will be 
inevitably devoured into non-existence. As Marks says:  
 
To lose all distance from the world is to die a material death, to become 
indistinguishable from the rest of the world.181  
 
So a total immersion in smooth space equates to a death in which the subject becomes 
no more than inert matter. This is the fate that befalls the victim who is devoured 
completely by the undead throng; she soon becomes no more than a pile of dead 
bones. But if “life is served” by an oscillation between smooth and striated space – 
“by the ability to come close, pull away, come close again”182 as Marks suggests – 
then undeadliness is served by the subject coming close, being bitten, pulling way, 
dying, and rising again as a zombie. Only the subject who is not entirely devoured – 
who is plunged into the smooth space of the abject zombie attack but then makes an 
escape of sorts back into the striated space of boundaried subjectivity (albeit until the 
fatal contagion takes hold) – is able to arrive at a state of undeadliness. She becomes a 
corpse, yet she is not completely inert, and retains “the look” of the subject she once 
was. There is a tension here between the opposing registers of the smooth body and 
the striated body – the body as pure material Thingness, and the body as recognisable 
and categorised subjectivity. This articulates the delicious and unique horror of 
Romero’s fiction; the zombie still looks like the living person that it once was, even 
though it has retained none of her subjective personhood. It is a vertiginously weird 
mixture of material Thingness and symbolic familiarity – the Real with a residual 
whiff of evacuated meaning still hanging around it. Undeadliness is not a single point 
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along the spectrum of smooth and striated space, it is simultaneously smooth and 
striated – two separate points folded in on one another. The symbolic function is 
totally decommissioned in that this body can no longer sign towards the subject, and 
yet the hollowed out shell of that same subject – the structural surface of signification 
– still remains on a visual and striated level.  
 
 
Against Sublimation 
 
Throughout this chapter I have been talking about the Thing outside language, but my 
latest analysis demands that I complicate this formulation. The zombie’s criticality 
lies in its ability to traumatise the fabric of the symbolic – it creates a weird 
materiality that renders the sign non-functional though still visible. So this 
interruption does not take place outside the Symbolic so much as within the texture 
and the grain of it. In the graveyard scene at the beginning of Night of the Living 
Dead, the zombie does not arrive from without – from some transcendent beyond; it 
exists within the weave of the Symbolic reality, but does not behave according to the 
protocols of that reality. Instead, its Thingness – its base materiality – creates a 
texture of haptic and nonsensical undeadliness in the very space where the corpse 
should submit to its symbolic death. The original zombie from Night of the Living 
Dead does not, unlike my sublimated zombie, articulate the melancholic phantasy of 
an undead modernism that yearns for a radically oppositional space outside 
postmodern homogeneity. Instead undeadliness now articulates a haptic materialism 
that pocks the status quo from within. Furthermore, the impossible and intangible 
nature of melancholic phantasy is replaced by a more pragmatic and critical notion of 
melancholic materiality.   
 
I will return to the potential political implications of this claim in Chapter Four, but I 
should now address the impact it has on the fiction of an undead utopia that I 
generated in Chapter Two. I claimed that the sublimation of undead melancholia 
allowed zombie fiction to be reworked as a utopian introjection of lost critical 
strategies of dissent. Sublimated undeadliness became the impossible phantasy of a 
transgressive subjectivity, reunited with death, that resists the ubiquity of the status 
quo. But what does sublimation do exactly to melancholia?    
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Kristeva claims that whilst the rhythms and melodies of hegemonic language become 
naturalised in the subject who is fully integrated within the symbolic, speech retains a 
deathliness that renders it devoid of meaning for the melancholic. Kristeva says that 
precisely because the melancholic sees speech as artificial and arbitrary, she has 
access to a poetic “polyvalency”183 – a radical plurality of signification – that wrests 
the word away from having a single function within the Symbolic. The melancholic’s 
conversational manner can be typified by either an authentic monotone that is absent 
of all expressive protocol, or an artificial colouring of speech that is rich in 
alchemical signification. Alchemy is understood here as a process that sublimates the 
deathliness of language into a poetic affect. The melancholic’s words become a 
melodious song – “a beautiful façade carved out of a foreign language”184 – in which 
an ornate and formal surface of sonorous artistry hides the void over which her speech 
is reaching. Words become free-floating signifiers that pour forth as an excess of 
fragments. From this detritus – this scrap heap of words – the melancholic can fashion 
semiotic meanings within the Imaginary realm, and this prevents her from dissolving 
completely into the depressive void of the Real. Conventional language perpetually 
fails the melancholic, but new constellations of melodic words might nevertheless 
move towards a poetic invocation of her unspeakable loss. Sublimation thus allows 
the melancholic to transform the spectre of the Thing into an aesthetic mask that 
deflects its fatal allure: “beauty emerges as the admirable face of loss, transforming it 
in order to make it live.”185  
 
Kristeva goes on to set up allegory as “a subtle alchemy of signs”186 that sublimates 
the melancholic’s dead language.  
 
it endows the lost signifier with a signifying pleasure, a resurrectional 
jubilation even to the stone and the corpse…187 
 
I will return to the specifics of allegorical meaning in Chapter Four, but the crucial 
point I wish to highlight is that Kristeva’s process of sublimation allows the 
                                                
183 Julia Kristeva, Black Sun; Depression and Melancholia (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989) p.14 
184 Ibid. p.55 
185 Ibid. p.99 
186 Ibid. p.101 
187 Ibid. p.102 
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melancholic to position herself once again within language through the Imaginary 
process of creativity. This amounts to the reconstitution of melancholic subjectivity 
within the Symbolic; through the poetic manipulation of normalised meaning the 
melancholic is able to accept the deathliness within language. This in turn allows her 
to reclaim her own subjectivity within life. Sublimation therefore diverts melancholia 
away from the reunion with the Thing without life.  
 
So within the conceit of zombie fiction, the creative act would protect the living 
subject from being devoured by the Symbolic dissolution of undeadliness. Her 
semiotic language would keep undeadly Thingness at bay by maintaining a degree of 
distance between herself and the collapse of meaning; the Real would remain hidden 
behind the artificial screen of the creative Imaginary. Sublimation would wrap the 
melancholic in a force-field of poetic agency that would repel any undeadly advances. 
Her newfound creativity would be her salvation.  
 
But what about those who have already turned into zombies? Sublimation would 
allow the zombie – the undead melancholic – to take up poetic language and thus 
locate herself as a transgressive subject who partakes of the Symbolic whilst 
remaining outside of symbolic life. The sublimated undead melancholic would 
become the phantasy of the artist who occupies a radical subject position outside the 
constraints of the status quo.  
 
In both these cases sublimation allows subjectivity to retain a measure of coherence. 
However, it is precisely the notion of a material and embodied Thingness within 
Symbolic language but without subjectivity that has allowed me to conceive of the 
haptic quality to undead melancholia. My melancholic phantasy of transgressive 
undead subjectivity is thus incompatible with the melancholic texture of haptic 
undead materiality. So whilst sublimation allowed my critical manoeuvres to proceed 
in Chapter Two, it now jars my efforts in Chapter Three to understand undead 
melancholia as a haptic surface, evacuated of its meaning, that exists outside the 
conceit of subjectivity. Sublimation takes the Real Thingness out of the zombie – it 
makes stable and familiar that which must remain volatile in order to function as an 
entangled artefact on the surface of the Symbolic. 
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The Grumbler 
 
In his utopian novel News from Nowhere, William Morris creates the figure of “the 
grumbler”188 – a sceptical old man who believes he was happier in the years 
preceding the socialist revolution that has transformed Britain into a bucolic idyll. 
This figure, as a narrative device, puts in place a self-reflexive strategy through which 
Morris can test his own claims. The grumbler interrogates the other protagonists who 
become in turn, through their replies, fervent mouthpieces for Morris’s utopianism. 
 
Whilst Morris uses the grumbler to examine his own thinking within the fictitious 
conceit of his utopia, the zombie from Night of the Living Dead tests my reasons for 
using a utopian conceit at all. This original zombie, now understood as a haptic 
figure, becomes an extra-diegetic grumbler (image 11) that questions the critical 
cogency of the sublimated zombie I have created. This haptic grumbler exists outside 
my conception of a zombie utopia and interrogates my efforts to formulate undead 
melancholia as a fictitious transgressive subjectivity.  
 
 
 
 
The main protagonist from News from Nowhere eventually steps back in time to his 
pre-revolutionary London; Morris leaves his utopia behind whilst retaining the 
integrity of his fiction overall. Within my thesis however, my attempt to generate a 
utopian fiction can no longer contain my most recent articulation of undead 
                                                
188 William Morris, News from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p.132 
Image 11 
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melancholia. The grumbler within my thesis – Romero’s original zombie – moves 
melancholia beyond a discussion of sublimated undeadliness (subjectivity) and into a 
new territory of haptic undeadliness (materiality).   
 
My thesis so far has primarily focused on the zombie as it appears to other characters 
within a fictitious conceit. In an effort to further explore the haptic qualities of 
undeadliness I will now proceed to analyse the formal mechanics of Romero’s films 
in order to explore the impact that they have on the spectator. This will eventually 
lead me to propose a new role for the zombie as a methodological device for the 
spectator, outside the protocols of a hermetically coherent narrative.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Obsolete and Nostalgic 
 
So far I have been primarily writing about the operations of undeadliness within its 
own fictitious conceit. In my previous chapter I formulated undead melancholia as a 
haptic materiality that explodes subjectivity and eviscerates Symbolic consistency. 
But this haptic quality depends on the other characters within the diegesis being 
totally bamboozled by the prospect of undeadliness, and in more recent zombie fiction 
this is no longer the case.189 In the Resident Evil films for example, Alice – the main 
protagonist – is stoically accepting of undeadliness as the condition of her apocalypse. 
As the series progresses, Alice barely affords a second glance towards the millions of 
undead corpses stumbling through the scorched remains of civilisation.190 The films 
thus contain none of the abject nonsense that is so particular to Romero’s early work.  
 
It is important to remember that Romero does not initially name the zombie as such; 
the undead body is a weird anomaly that cannot be classified within the diegesis of his 
films. However, Romero himself goes on to play with the way in which undeadliness 
is perceived by his protagonists. The zombies in Land of the Dead become a sub-class 
of pariahs who are taunted, teased and turned into caged attractions by the living 
human population. As I discussed in Chapter Two, the persecuted undead mob rises 
up against the tyranny of corporate capitalism and eventually unseats the corrupt 
oligarch. By the end of the film, the zombie throng is portrayed as a band of survivors 
who are trying to eek out an autonomous existence. They are still dangerous of 
course, but they do not traumatise meaning itself in the way that they used to in 
Romero’s earlier films. The lurching corpse in the graveyard that sends Barbara into 
paroxysms of hysterical fear is now an obsolete and nostalgic figure. Instead, the 
zombie has become normalised within its own diegesis; it has become assimilated and 
recognisable within the very symbolic order that it must collapse if it is to function as 
a transgressive haptic texture. 
 
                                                
189 Throughout this chapter I make occasional references to zombie fiction not authored by Romero in 
an effort to contextualise the particularities of Romero’s films within a broader cultural climate.  
190 Paul W. S. Anderson, Resident Evil: Afterlife (Screen Gems, 2010) 
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The Analogue Zombie vs. The Digital Zombie 
 
But this notion of normalisation does not account for how zombie fiction operates on 
the spectator outside of the fictitious conceit of undeadliness. Much of the pleasure 
generated by Romero’s early films – particularly Night of the Living Dead and Dawn 
of the Dead – resides in the improvised and playful approach to gore-making that is 
deployed throughout. In a behind-the-scenes short film on the Dawn of the Dead 
DVD, Romero’s special make-up effects supervisor Tom Savini fondly describes the 
ingenious devices he engineered in order to depict the exploding heads and torn up 
bodies that Romero demanded. Furthermore, the materiality of these analogue 
inventions can be seen on screen, and Steven Shaviro draws attention to this point in 
his essay Contagious Allegories.  
 
Romero turns the constraints of his low budget – crudeness of presentation, 
minimal acting, and tacky special effects – into a powerful means of 
expression: he foregrounds and hyperbolizes these aspects of his production in 
order to depsychologize the drama and emphasise the artificiality and 
gruesome arbitrariness of spectacle. … Our anxieties are focused upon events 
rather than characters, upon the violent fragmentation of cinematic process… 
…rather than the supposed integrity of any single protagonist’s subjectivity.191  
 
The singularity of Romero’s early films owes a lot to his ability to create these riotous 
and frenzied set pieces – these gory tableaux of artificial excess – that privilege 
visceral thrill over narrative cohesion and the protagonists’ subjective integrity. 
Romero invites the spectator to revel in this fakery – in the oozing orange blood, the 
rubber limbs and the patchy grey zombie make-up that appears to be turquoise on the 
cheap film stock. In these moments Romero does not try to evoke a hermetically 
sealed fictitious conceit in which a drama can unfold; rather, he displays the 
materiality of an explicitly artificial diegesis. I understand materiality here as a term 
that pinpoints the formal surfaces that constitute the onscreen image, as opposed to 
the representational function of these surfaces within the cinematic Symbolic.192 
                                                
191 Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) p.88 
192 I use the term ‘cinematic Symbolic’ to describe the dominant visual language – the prevailing codes 
of formal representation – that author and sustain the diegesis of narrative cinema.  
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In one particular feeding frenzy from Dawn of the Dead, we see a close-up of 
zombies toying with a pile of freshly exposed human innards. However, the zombies 
do not shovel the flesh immediately into their mouths. They rummage through the 
fake entrails and prod the miscellaneous viscera. These are only fleeting shots, but 
Romero is proudly asking us to enjoy the gory set piece as a self-contained 
phenomenon in its own right (image 12). The probing hands that we see cease to be 
those of a ravenous undead mob; they become instead the hands of Romero’s extras 
who have obviously been asked to show off the ooziness of the props as much as 
possible. These brief moments become a spectacle of material surfaces that are 
temporarily divorced from their representational function within the narrative. 
Romero is not bothered here with maintaining the illusion of a self-contained 
fictitious world; he wants us to revel in the playful artifice of his invention. 
 
 
Image 12 
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In Day of the Dead a pack of zombies decapitates a screaming soldier. They carry out 
this procedure with a serene gracefulness and lightness of touch that is fascinatingly 
incongruous with the act itself (image 13). One particular zombie pulls the severed 
head away from the body in a very deliberate manner, then slowly backs away as if in 
awed reverence to the special effects. The other zombies fervently pat and push at the 
soldier’s abdomen without exhibiting any real urge to plunder the newly exposed 
flesh. They add texture to the visceral scene and frame the gory manoeuvre; they 
become a stage-managed and static feature rather than a hungry hoard of zombies 
within a narrative trajectory. Again, this is a momentary and highly choreographed set 
piece that revels in, and invites us to enjoy, its own artifice.  
                       
 
 
Image 13 
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We are thrilled by this anarchic irreverence towards the illusion of a hermetically 
sealed fictitious world that narrative cinema typically maintains. This playful 
subversion of filmic protocols might be understood as an eruption of thingness – a 
moment of haptic materiality – staged not between the zombie and the human within 
the diegesis but between the zombie and the spectator. We witness a glitch in the 
hegemonic language of the cinematic Symbolic – a moment of nonsense that upsets 
diegetic meaning with a material texture of artificial and gory excess. We are seduced 
by the mechanics of the moving image as opposed to the meaning of the moving 
image, and it is precisely the former that the cinematic Symbolic, concerned as it is 
with the illusion of a coherent narrative, attempts to hide. Shaviro goes on to say,    
 
Just as the zombies cannot be catagorized within the diegesis (they cannot be 
placed in terms of our usual binary oppositions of life and death, or nature and 
culture), so on the formal level of presentation they transgress, or simply 
ignore, the boundaries between humour and horror, between intense 
conviction and ludicrous exaggeration.     
 
These films are wildly discontinuous, flamboyantly anti-naturalistic, and 
nonsensically grotesque. Yet the more ridiculously excessive and self-
consciously artificial they are, the more literal is their visceral impact. They 
can’t be kept at a distance, for they can’t be referred to anything beyond 
themselves. Their simulations are radically immediate: they no longer pretend 
to stand in for, or to represent, a previously existing real. Horror thus destroys 
customary meanings and appearances, ruptures the surfaces of the flesh, and 
violates the organic integrity of the body. It puts the spectator in direct contact 
with intensive, unrepresentable fluxes of corporeal sensation.193 
 
Steven Shaviro claims that these moments in Romero’s oeuvre undo the process of 
figuration. The zombie – in these instances of affective excess – does not stand for 
anything other than itself; it does not stay faithful to the coherent meaning of the 
narrative and instead ruptures its own diegetic continuum by making direct and 
unmitigated overtures to the spectator’s visual pleasures. Undeadliness bleeds beyond 
                                                
193 Ibid. p.101 
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the constraints of the horror genre that contains it, becoming, for a moment at least, an 
affective, subversive, grotesque and slapstick hybrid instead. We do not revel in the 
representational language of the narrative; rather we respond to the gleeful and gory 
excessiveness – the haptic texture of artificiality – that refuses to coalesce to the 
celluloid illusion of hermetically sealed narrative coherence. The notion of a 
normalising cinematic Symbolic that demands representative consistency is undone 
by a fabric of formal surfaces that refuses to make sense. The haptic quality of 
undeadliness no longer articulates the encounter between the zombie and the subject 
within the diegesis; it describes the spectator’s encounter with the disruptive 
materiality of Romero’s cinematic artefacts that suspend their own symbolic function.  
 
In contrast to this analogue and haptic rendition of undeadliness, contemporary 
zombie fiction now uses a lot of digital imagery as its prevailing means of 
representation. In series 2 episode 9 of The Walking Dead194 we see a car crash victim 
lying unconscious in her upturned vehicle as a zombie tries to gnaw its way through 
the cracked windscreen. As the undead corpse strives to push its head through the 
window, the skin on its face is increasingly lacerated by shards of broken glass until 
bloody patches of its skull starts to become visible beneath its shredded features. The 
effect is impressive, but at the same time the gore remains faithful to the diegesis; by 
looking so ‘realistic’ the effect heightens the integrity of the hermetically sealed 
narrative. But because of this, the cinematic Symbolic retains a prevailing consistency 
at the expense of the playful irreverence that Romero brings to the genre. This digital 
attempt to masterfully represent the zombie as a symbolically stable figure destroys 
the affective materiality of Romero’s analogue zombie.  
 
Accordingly, the digital effects in Romero’s fourth zombie film Land of the Dead 
separate it from its predecessors. In the early scenes we see Cholo throw a sack of 
refuse onto a landfill site. The bag breaks open to reveal an emaciated undead body 
lying amidst the waste. Cholo shoots the zombie with a crossbow. The undead body 
collapses as the bolt smashes through its head, but its pathetic slump is unmistakably 
digital. This particular zombie death is rendered insipid and translucent as a result. 
There is no gory weightiness to this demise – no makeshift artefact or fake physicality 
                                                
194 Frank Darabont, The Walking Dead (AMC Studios, 2010) 
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to it. It is merely a digital effect, but it alerts the spectator to the troubling fact that 
Romero has begun to assimilate the logic of the cinematic Symbolic in the fabric of 
his work. At this point Romero’s zombie stops being an artificial excess of materiality 
that violates the integrity of the diegesis. The fully integrated digital zombie is 
symptomatic of a larger stagnation within the genre. Generic zombie fiction now 
reproduces a range of over saturated tropes: the ostensibly isolated attacks that soon 
proliferate into a full blown zombie holocaust; the media descending into anarchy as 
chaos takes hold; the coma patient waking up to a scene of undead desolation; the 
character who must slay the undead corpse of a loved one; these scenarios have now 
become over-saturated motifs within the highly-commodified and ubiquitous brand of 
zombie fiction. Undeadliness no longer makes nonsense; it has spawned a series of 
instantly familiar celluloid tableaux that make total sense commercially. Undeadliness 
has lost its weird haptic closeness and become part of the normative language of 
cinema.  
 
 
Evacuated Meanings 
 
Without these affective and excessive analogue interruptions to the diegesis that I 
have been exploring, Romero’s zombie fiction would remain faithful to the notion of 
a hermetically sealed narrative. Furthermore, Shaviro claims that Romero’s narratives 
have the capacity to function on an allegorical level. By way of a brief consultation of 
Walter Benjamin, Shaviro understands allegory as a means of making meaning that 
maintains an unbridgeable gap between the signifier and the signified. Within the 
rubric of the allegory, the signifier is an empty and fragmented husk that has no 
immanent or equivalent discourse attached to it. Shaviro argues that allegory 
functions non-representationally in that it relies on decoding and interpretation in 
order for its meaning(s) to emerge. He then introduces the zombie into this allegorical 
model by understanding it as an example of a material form – the undead husk with 
no interiority – that points towards, but does not straightforwardly represent, a 
particular set of political ideas.  
 
The “living dead” emerge out of the deathly distance of allegory; their fictive 
presence allows Romero to anatomise and criticise American society, not by 
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portraying it naturalistically, but by evacuating and eviscerating it. Allegory is 
then not just a mode of depiction, but an active means of subversive 
transformation.195   
 
In this passage Shaviro outlines the critical potential of constructing the zombie as an 
allegorical figure. The ‘subversive transformation’ he talks of can be understood as a 
visual language that does not simply show that which it wishes to criticise; instead the 
zombie genre stages a critical dissection of ‘American society’ by casting it as a 
bloodied walking corpse. The zombie transmogrifies into a graphic and terrifying 
tableau of the de-humanising affects of late capitalism – an allegorical image that is 
all the more critical precisely because it is able to summon forth a level of visceral 
and abject horror that is invisible to conventional protocols of hegemonic 
representation.  
 
In The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Walter Benjamin uses allegory to criticise 
the romantic use of the symbol in which a harmonised unity is purported to exist 
between the object and its meaning.196 For Benjamin this has ideological 
ramifications because that which is historically contingent and subject to the passing 
of time can – through the symbol – be rarefied as an eternal and naturalised truth. The 
material object, such as the cross for example, becomes totally conflated with and 
inseparable from the meaning it stands for. But if the symbol is the coalescence of 
form and idea – a union that exalts the material world and totalises the physical 
signifier – then allegory tears this union asunder. Benjamin claims that the allegorical 
object is a lifeless fragment – an ossified husk – with no intrinsic kernel of meaning. 
It is indelibly marked with, and articulates, an evacuated interiority. Allegory 
congeals around this absence, so there is always a deathly void at its core. It is 
through this introjection of loss that allegory plays out a melancholic identification 
with death. So within the mechanics of zombie fiction dwells a trace of melancholia. 
The zombie’s allegorical refusal of Symbolic consistency, and its subsequent status as 
a fragment that is bereft of meaning, makes it structurally melancholic outside of the 
fictitious conceit, as well as thematically melancholic within it.  
 
                                                
195 Ibid. p.86 
196 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 1998) p.160 
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However I am suspicious of applying the allegorical mode of representation to the 
zombie. Allegory contains hues of sublimation as I discussed in my earlier section on 
Kristeva:  
 
[allegory] endows the lost signifier with a signifying pleasure, a resurrectional 
jubilation even to the stone and the corpse…197 
   
Shaviro does indeed endow the zombie with “a signifying pleasure” as I described 
above, but this pulls the zombie back into the service of meaning once more. Allegory 
sublimates zombie fiction, drawing it back into symbolic consistency. Of course, I 
carried out this manoeuvre myself in Chapter Two when I attempted to understand 
sublimated undead melancholia as an allegory for a lost modernism, but I am now 
trying to articulate a different manoeuvre. Throughout my project I have consistently 
found that the zombie resists existing paradigms of thinking precisely because the 
fiction of undeadliness has no equivalence outside of its diegesis. This has allowed 
me to write undead melancholia as a hybrid of zombie fiction and psychoanalysis that 
is faithful to the conceit of neither. As such, I have attempted to show that the zombie 
invokes original meanings as opposed to being a figure for existing meanings. It 
could be argued that the former is precisely what allegorical meaning is for Benjamin. 
But even so, within allegory the evacuated sign is recouped in some way so that it 
moves away from a collapse of meaning, and becomes a poetic and ‘expressive’ tool 
instead.  
 
My formulation of haptic undeadliness is dependent on the zombie’s ability to retain a 
materiality that doesn’t calibrate with the cinematic Symbolic, and functions instead 
for the viewer as a purely formal surface that cannot be conventionally ‘read’. Like 
the allegorical object, the haptic zombie is still a fragment – an evacuated signifier 
devoid of interiority – but unlike the allegorical object, it does not need to be 
redeemed or sublimated in some way in order to function. The zombie-as-allegory is 
now the normative position taken by the vast majority of theorists; this line of 
thinking has become as ubiquitous as the zombie itself. It is precisely through my 
                                                
197 Julia Kristeva, Black Sun; Depression and Melancholia (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989) p.102 
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rejection of zombie-as-allegory that I hope to prise open a new position for 
undeadliness that might reanimate its tired and commercialised ubiquity.  
 
 
A Contemporary Problem 
 
The highly derivative, over-familiar and saturated tropes that have colonised recent 
zombie fiction are symptomatic of the contemporary condition. The homogeneity of 
late capitalism collapses radical opposition from the outside by assimilating dissent 
within its own operations. Mark Fisher claims that the ‘success’ of the current status 
quo stems from its ability to present its own highly ideological systems and processes 
as the inevitable mechanisms of a ubiquitous reality to which no alternative exists.198 
Fisher self-consciously positions his diagnosis of the contemporary condition as a 
development of Fredric Jameson’s argument in the 1991 text Postmodernism, or The 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Jameson claims that a “fundamental mutation of 
the sphere of culture”199 has taken place whereby “aesthetic production today has 
become integrated into commodity production.”200 He continues, 
 
…some of our most cherished and time-honoured radical conceptions about 
the nature of cultural politics may thereby find themselves outmoded. 
However distinct those conceptions – which range from slogans of negativity, 
opposition, and subversion to critique and reflexivity – may have been, they 
all shared a single, fundamentally spatial, presupposition, which may be 
resumed in the equally time-honoured formula of “critical distance.”201 
 
He uses the term “critical distance” to evoke the notion of an oppositional and 
counter-cultural space from which autonomous critical arguments might be 
formulated in response to a hegemonic status quo. He then claims that “the possibility 
of the positioning of the cultural act outside the massive Being of capital… has very 
                                                
198 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism (Ropley; 0 Books, 2009) p.16 
199 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, in: Thomas Docherty 
(ed.), Postmodernism; A Reader (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993) p.86 
200 Ibid. p.65 
201 Ibid. p.87 
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precisely been abolished in the new space of postmodernism.”202 However contested 
the term postmodernism has become in the intervening two decades since Jameson 
made this claim, the proposition that we have witnessed the erasure of oppositional 
cultural spaces that might resist their own assimilation into capital concerns remains 
continually pertinent. Benjamin Buchloh offers a more recent articulation of this very 
point when he claims that “spaces of subversion, resistance, critique, utopian 
aspiration”203 have been “eroded, assimilated, or simply annihilated”204 by the 
“homogenizing apparatus”205 of contemporaneity, and that this “necessitates a 
rethinking of what cultural practice can be under the totalizing conditions of fully 
advanced capitalist organization.”206 And Fisher brings us up to date with his notion 
of “precorporation” – a process that pre-formats practice to the point where it is 
contained within the dominant mode of culture from its very conception: 
 
What we are dealing with now is not the incorporation of materials that 
previously seemed to possess subversive potentials, but instead, their 
precorporation: the pre-emptive formatting and shaping of desires, aspirations 
and hopes by capitalist culture.207 
 
The notion of an exterior critical space that can operate as a counterpoint to dominant 
culture, even if it later becomes assimilated into the mainstream (like punk for 
example), has been eradicated. Instead, Fisher claims that contemporary cultural 
productivity – and indeed human life itself – is already contained within, and internal 
to, the logic of capital. 50 Cent captures this pre-existing co-option of human life in 
the title of his album Get Rich Or Die Tryin’.208 Life is measured solely on a 
continuum of financial solvency and commercial success; life is wealth, and death 
becomes inseparable from the absence of it.  
 
 
                                                
202 Ibid. p.87 
203 Benjamin H. D. Buchloh et al., The Predicament of Contemporary Art, in: Hal Foster, Rosalind 
Krauss, Yve-Alain Bois, Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, David Joselit, Art Since 1900; Modernism, 
Antimodernism, Postmodernism (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2004) p.673 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid. p.676 
207 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism (Ropley; 0 Books, 2009) p.9 
208 50 Cent, Get Rich or Die Tryin’ (Aftermath Entertainment, 2003) 
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The Depressed Practitioner 
 
During a performance by The Vines on the Late Show with David Letterman, the lead 
singer Craig Nicholls gives an impressively off-piste rendition of the hit single Get 
Free.209 Large sections of the catchy song are rendered unrecognisable by Nicholls’ 
howling vocals and squawking guitar; he ends up prostrate and writhing on the studio 
floor while his bandmates desperately try to maintain some semblance of the song. 
Nicholls eventually destroys the drum kit in a blaze of rock’n’roll cliché, and then the 
camera cuts back to a grinning Letterman. The unruffled host shares a bemused joke 
with his sycophantic musical director before announcing the advertisement break. 
Despite Nicholls’ nihilistic and raging self-sabotage, his protest becomes exactly what 
he is protesting against, namely his own assimilation within the commercial 
mainstream. His is a perfectly hollow rebellion packaged into three minutes – a purely 
stylistic spectacle of dissent that dovetails seamlessly with the TV schedule, raising 
the stock of The Vines immeasurably. I recognise in Nicholls’ behaviour the 
symptoms of a particular desire to inhabit a cultural position deemed impossible by 
the homogenous machinations of contemporaneity. There is a futility to Nicholls’ 
actions of which he is only too painfully aware.  
 
Martin Seligman formulates the notion of “learned helplessness” 210 to describe a 
situation in which, due to difficult environmental conditions (as opposed to internal or 
biological conditions) the subject is unable to recognise any meaningful purpose to 
her actions. She develops a depressive position in response to the realisation that the 
tasks she carries out, and the intentions embedded within them, fail to have a 
corresponding consequence. She comes to recognise a prevailing futility to all her 
actions. And this is not negative thinking; within her situation there is a prevailing 
futility to the choices she is making.  
 
We can use this idea of learned helplessness to formulate the notion of a depressed 
practitioner, exemplified by Craig Nicholls, who yearns to inhabit the alternative and 
counter-cultural position that has been rendered obsolete by the homogenous 
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machinations of contemporaneity. But as I have established through Fisher and 
Jameson, there is a futility to this intension to want to be outside the hegemonic status 
quo. As I mentioned in Chapter Two, Christine Ross claims that the contemporary 
political condition sets up “norms of independence based on generalised individual 
initiative (personified by the model of the entrepreneur).”211 We might then say that 
the depressed practitioner refuses to assimilate these normative values of economic 
productivity. But within the prevailing cultural climate there is no critical space for 
her refusal to manifest oppositionally. Instead her position can only be understood as 
depressive, triggered by her failure to integrate the figure of the entrepreneur within 
her role as a practitioner. Her learned helplessness – her depression – grows from the 
schism between her critical intentions as an artist and the lack of opportunity for these 
intentions to have any oxygen within the stifling homogeneity of the contemporary 
climate.  
 
 
The Zombie Spectator   
 
If we go back to the example of The Vines and analyse it again, an interesting detail 
emerges. As the camera cuts back to Letterman, Nicholls’ guitar amp continues to 
emit a high-pitched drone of feedback. Whilst his performance is an inevitably futile 
cliché, it produces a moment of unintentional excess that does, for a moment at least, 
interfere within the technical protocols of the show. The feedback bleeds outside of its 
allotted sequential segment, and its presence as an out-of-place sonic texture is more 
disruptive to the seamless spectacle of TV than Nicholls’ display of subjective 
rebellion. The single high-pitched note is not an external disruption; it grows from 
within the mechanical materiality of the studio, and yet it does not behave according 
to the protocols of that location.     
 
When I was looking for the example of the car crash zombie on YouTube I found a 
low-resolution clip in which the surface artefacts of the image – the glitchy and grainy 
pixels – interfere with our ability to read and decipher the content (image 14). The 
                                                
211 Christine Ross, The Aesthetics of Disengagement (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006) p.xxiii 
 
 121 
illusion of filmic space is flattened in places by abstract visual noise. The moving 
image, that, in the original footage, supports a hermetically sealed diegesis, now 
appears as a haptic surface. The flatness of the glitch collides a smooth and affective 
texture with the striated space of the cinematic Symbolic. This image effectively 
becomes more zombie-like than the zombie figure itself. It bears the trace of 
signification, but is emptied of its associated meanings. The image therefore appears 
to the spectator in the same way that the zombie initially appeared to its victims in 
Romero’s early films; it evacuates the sign of its content, leaving a haptic material 
trace – a surface without symbolic substance. 
 
This example further illustrates how the haptic qualities of undead fiction (in this case 
an accidental glitch produced by compression) formally interrupt the integrity of the 
cinematic Symbolic. To understand how this quality might then contribute to the 
construction of a particular zombie spectator I will briefly consult Laura Mulvey’s 
famous essay Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema. Mulvey details the formal 
filmic conventions that sustain the illusion of a fictitious diegesis.  
 
Image 14 
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There are three different looks associated with cinema: that of the camera as it 
records the profilmic event, that of the audience as it watches the final 
product, and that of the characters at each other within the screen illusion. The 
conventions of narrative film deny the first two and subordinate them to the 
third, the conscious aim being always to eliminate intrusive camera presence 
and prevent a distancing awareness in the audience. Without these two 
absences (the material existence of the recording process, the critical reading 
of the spectator), fictional drama cannot achieve… …the unity of diegesis… 
the world of illusion.212     
 
Mulvey goes on to say that these conventions would be undone if a filmmaker were to 
“free the look of the camera into its materiality in time and space and the look of the 
audience into dialectics, passionate detachment.”213 Romero’s analogue set pieces can 
be understood as an instance the privileges the materiality of the filmic image in that 
we can explicitly see how the diegesis has been constructed. As I’ve already 
discussed, the “look of the camera” is freed from the service of narrative and shows 
us instead an unmediated tableau of affective viscera that, in that moment, is not 
operating within the narrative. Similarly, the glitchy YouTube video renders the 
materiality of the screen as a flattened surface of artefacts that no longer describes the 
illusion of a self-contained diegesis. 
 
So these haptic moments within the formal presentation of zombie fiction undo the 
conventions of the cinematic image by exposing its “materiality in time and space”, 
but I will now explore how these instances might open up in the spectator what 
Mulvey calls a “distancing awareness” and “detachment.” One of the devices 
deployed by narrative cinema is the visual process of identification, whereby the 
spectator effectively inhabits the fictitious conceit through the gaze of the main 
protagonist.214 However, in Romero’s films there is a consistent absence of shots that 
enable the spectator to firmly identify with any one character within the diegesis. 
Instead Romero constructs a range of gazes that emanate from many different points 
of view. When Roger and Peter execute the zombies in the basement of the tenement 
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building in Dawn of the Dead, the camera looks directly into the barrel of their guns, 
offering us a zombie’s-eye-view of imminent annihilation (image 15).  
 
 
 
Alternatively, when Stephen is attacked in the elevator towards the end of the same 
film, we see from his point of view what it looks like to be pounced upon and 
devoured by a ravenous undead mob (image 16).  
 
 
 
Image 15 
Image 16 
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Romero deliberately plays with these camera positions to prevent us from identifying 
with any one protagonist within the film. As such, we do not lose our sense of 
ourselves as spectators by connecting with the characters within the illusion of the 
diegesis; rather we watch from a self-reflexive distance and acknowledge that we are 
consciously witnessing the very formal operations that Mulvey says must be hidden if 
narrative cinema is to function effectively.  
 
At the beginning of Day of the Dead, we see a woman sitting alone in an unfurnished 
breezeblock room. She stands up and approaches the wall, upon which hangs a 
calendar depicting an image of a pumpkin field. Suddenly, countless zombie hands 
burst through the wall and try to grab her (image 17). The woman spins around in 
terror, and then Romero cuts to a shot of the same character waking up in the back of 
a helicopter. We realise that the previous image was the climax to her dream.  
 
 
 
Image 17 
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But as the woman spins away from the zombie hands in the dream sequence, she 
strikes a pose that is overtly stylised and theatrical. Instead of running away – an act 
that the fictitious conceit surely demands – she holds her hammy stance in front of the 
camera long enough for us to notice its kitsch artifice. If Romero had cut away from 
this shot a second earlier we would not notice the acting straying beyond the limits of 
what we might call naturalistic, but the image remains on screen long enough for us to 
register its explicitly artificial staging. Romero invites us to recognise this set piece as 
a hyperbolic spectacle deliberately played to the camera, as opposed to an image that 
faithfully conforms to the illusion of a self-contained diegesis. This scene is another 
example of the way in which Romero’s films do not attempt to sustain the illusion of 
a hermetically sealed reality; by revealing – and revelling in – their own artifice, they 
playfully subvert the “conventions of narrative film” as identified by Mulvey. 
 
I propose that Romero’s films combine an overt theatricality, a visceral excess and an 
absence of a stable protagonist’s gaze in order to construct a particular zombie 
spectator who is aware of her own distance and detachment from the fictitious conceit 
of undeadliness. She relishes instead the affective materiality of undeadliness that has 
been prised away from the illusory protocols of narrative cinema. This zombie 
spectator is interested not in the ostensible unity and symbolic consistency of undead 
fiction, bound up as it is in tired genre conventions, but in the haptic fragments of 
undead fiction – the irreverent, playful and unruly spectacles – that interrupt their own 
fictitious conceit.  
 
 
Haptic Undeadliness as a Melancholic Methodology 
 
So this haptic undeadliness, recognisable in analogue fragments of zombie fiction, 
harnesses a materiality that infects the weave and the fabric of the cinematic 
Symbolic. This manoeuvre would appeal to the depressed practitioner who yearns to 
make a cultural intervention, but refuses to consent absolutely to the operations of the 
ubiquitous homogeneity she inevitably inhabits. I now suggest that haptic 
undeadliness performs on the surface of the screen a procedure that the depressed 
practitioner aspires to in her own practice. But why would the practitioner be drawn to 
the formal procedures of Romero’s films in particular? Early Structuralist film, for 
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example, completely shatters the normative language of cinematic representation. 
However, the depressed practitioner cannot replicate this critical strategy in her work 
because, as I’ve already established, there is no longer any critical space within 
contemporary culture to play out such a radical break with the status quo. Romero’s 
zombie films, on the other hand, irreverently play with the conventions of narrative 
cinema whilst remaining within that particular category. And this notion of triggering 
an antagonistic critical movement, albeit one contained by a larger homogenous 
structure, is a strategy that the depressed practitioner might yet hope to activate in her 
own work. The haptic excess and the rush of artefacts that cloud meaning in 
Romero’s films might now be understood as a prescription for how the practitioner 
might engineer a material interruption to the homogeneity she exists within.   
 
When attempting to imagine a means of contesting the ubiquity of contemporaneity, 
Mark Fisher claims that, “Capitalist realism can only be threatened if it is shown to be 
in some way inconsistent or untenable; if, that is to say, capitalism’s ostensible 
realism turns out to be nothing of the sort.”215 This strategy would involve asserting 
that “capitalist realism” is a contingent ideology as opposed to a naturalised fact. 
Fisher goes on to suggest that, “One strategy against capitalist realism could involve 
invoking the Real(s) underlying the reality that capitalism presents to us.”216 
 
In the spirit of Fisher’s proposition I claim that haptic undeadliness allows the 
depressed practitioner to conceive of a material practice of glitchy artefacts that might 
flatten the illusion of normalisation specific to late capitalism. This proliferation of 
haptic materiality would not be outside the structural mechanisms that support the 
ideological conceit of the prevailing symbolic reality; rather it would play across the 
surfaces of these mechanisms as an affective texture that infects the dominant status 
quo with a dose of Real thingness.  
 
But if the depressed practitioner recognises in haptic undeadliness a methodology for 
making work without precorporating the condition of contemporary homogeneity, 
how might she then reproduce this methodology in her own practice? Mimesis will 
not suffice; she cannot simply pretend to be a zombie, because the image of 
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undeadliness has already been lost to the spectacle of capitalist homogenisation. Sarah 
Juliet Lauro explores this very point in her essay Zombies Invade Performance Art. 
She attempts a political reading of the recent phenomena of zombie walks and flash 
mobs, in which the public assemble en masse in full undead regalia, and then proceed 
to stumble unannounced through high streets and city centres. These events have 
inevitably been hijacked by commercial zombie conventions to the extent that “the 
zombie walks that began as a playful resistance to consumer culture are becoming the 
very thing they set out to mock.”217 However, Lauro insists that there remains in these 
public gatherings the germ of political praxis.  
 
The zombie gatherings that most interest me are those that are neither 
organised fund-raisers nor overt protests, but rather demonstrations that 
communicate nothing but the participants’ embrace of the zombie as a legible 
cultural signifier; the signified is up for grabs.218  
 
This assertion returns the zombie to being no more than a highly saturated figure 
within popular culture that stands allegorically for all manner of “signified” content. 
Lauro’s public zombie gatherings simply reproduce a highly commodified image that 
tessellates seamlessly with the dominant symbolic language of contemporary culture. 
This is antithetical to my own claim that the image of undeadliness must retain a 
haptic quality – a measure of unreadability – if it is to antagonise the hegemonic 
status quo. However, Lauro goes on to assert the political potential of the zombie 
walk phenomenon. 
 
The mute staggering zombies that are coming soon to a city near you… attest 
to the possibility of organised rebellion, giving us the form but not the 
substance of insurrection.219 
 
Lauro claims that the collective nature of the zombie walk amounts to a “form” of 
“insurrection”, yet this fails to contend with the fact that this “form” – the communal 
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gathering – is inseparable from and precorporated within, the dominant contemporary 
hegemony. The idea that collective public action alone might amount to a form of 
insurrection ignores the exhausted and predominantly ineffective status of protest that 
currently prevails within Western culture. By proposing a vague and naïve form of 
oppositional insurrection, Lauro’s argument fails to acknowledge the widespread 
diagnosis of the contemporary status quo as a system that forever precorporates 
dissent within its own operations to the point where the prevailing and historical 
model of protest within liberal democracy has become part of the mainstream political 
discourse. Contemporary protest might well raise awareness, such as the actions of 
UK Uncut and the resulting spotlight that has been shone on the tax avoidance 
schemes of large multinational companies. But this does not amount to an 
“insurrection” as Lauro suggests. Quite the opposite in fact; the companies concerned 
either justify their actions or make small adjustments to their tax arrangements so that 
business might continue as usual. The wider hegemony remains undisturbed by this 
modulation. Whatever self-organised groups manage to accomplish, whether dressed 
as zombies or not, it is surely problematic to claim that these accomplishments are 
formally outside, and in opposition to, the prevailing status quo.    
 
So in opposition to Lauro’s argument, I propose that the depressed practitioner might 
treat the zombie in a very different manner. She needs to understand haptic 
undeadliness as a methodology that she can replicate in her own practice without 
literally copying the image of the zombie on a visual level. Haptic undeadliness 
invites the practitioner to activate in her work a material interruption – a glitch of 
affect – that might break the ubiquitous seamlessness of contemporaneity without 
claiming to be outside its operations. This practice would not resemble undeadliness, 
but would function like undeadliness in its efforts to flatten the ostensible realism of 
the ideological status quo with an array of disruptive artefacts.  
 
 
A Haptic Antagonism 
 
In my previous chapter I understood undead melancholia as a collapse of meaning 
that traumatises the fabric of symbolic consistency. I now claim that the methodology 
learned from haptic undeadliness might be understood as melancholic precisely 
 129 
because it refuses the symbolic protocols of the status quo. The practitioner’s 
depressive failure – her inability to open up an oppositional space for her work – can 
be superseded by a wilful melancholic productivity. I will now explore how this latest 
and final account of melancholia in my thesis is no longer a transgressive subject 
position but a haptic antagonism to contemporary culture. Once again there is a 
political dimension embedded in this shift from depression back to melancholia. If 
depression is an anomaly that can be medically rectified according to a model of 
normalised behaviour, then contemporary melancholia might be understood as an 
interruption to this procedure of normalisation. To play out this argument I now need 
to modify my understanding of melancholia itself.     
 
In her historical account of the vicissitudes of melancholy, melancholia and 
depression, Jennifer Radden articulates the difference between subjective and 
behavioural states within clinical medicine.  
 
The distinction between subjective and behavioural is reflected in the contrast 
between a symptom-based and a sign-based diagnostic emphasis in clinical 
medicine. The symptom is a patient’s complaint, a description of inner states; a 
sign, in contrast, is an outwardly observable feature of behaviour or bodily 
condition.220    
 
If melancholia is understood across this schism between the subjective and the 
behavioural – between internal states on one hand and external signs on the other – 
then the semiotic collapse engendered by melancholia is no longer an inner 
experience of subjective dissolution; it manifests visually on the surfaces of the body 
instead. If melancholia previously antagonised the internal psychical state of the 
subject, it might now be understood as a behavioural surface that undoes the visual 
homogeneity of the Symbolic. Clinical medicine uses notions of the behavioural to 
classify and fix mental illness as a stable set of observable signs, but I am formulating 
here a contemporary haptic melancholia that interferes with the ability of these signs 
to make sense. I claim that haptic melancholia uses the form of the behavioural 
diagnosis – the observed body – to resist the fixed content of the behavioural 
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diagnosis. Melancholia’s haptic evisceration of the sign would assert the body as a 
material texture that refuses to be read as a classifiable condition. Melancholia still 
articulates a loss, but this loss no longer manifests subjectively; it resides instead on 
the surface of the haptic body that evacuates the normative protocols of 
contemporaneity. This body – as a material artefact – refuses pre-existing 
classifications and exhaustive readings; instead it invites the spectator into a 
proximity of surfaces that do not yield to symbolic consistency. This echoes the 
understanding of a material and illegible melancholia that I formulated in Chapter 
Three, but the state of haptic melancholia is now engendered by the performativity of 
the artist instead of the undeadliness of the zombie.  
 
So I propose that the practitioner might adopt this haptic melancholia as a 
performative artefact within her practice that interrupts the homogenous protocols of 
her immediate environment. Haptic melancholia becomes a methodology, learnt from 
the ways in which undeadliness undoes its own fictitious conceit, that teaches the 
practitioner how to swamp the protocols of the live occasion with an unruly dose of 
excessive and nonsensical affect. This melancholic performance, as a haptic texture, 
might be apprehended by the spectator as a cringe-worthy, awkward, joyous, 
humorous or embarrassing moment; the practitioner would decide on the intervention 
that most effectively derails the formal appropriateness of a given situation.  
 
Of course there are all manner of unexpected and inauspicious scenarios not allied to 
art practice that have the potential to author a haptic disturbance to normalised 
protocols. Awkward greetings, misfiring jokes, ill-judged wedding speeches, 
insufficient funds, inopportune accidents, miscommunication, enforced intimacies; 
these all have the ability to create in us a giddy vertigo – an excess of affective white 
noise that momentarily clouds our ability to read and rationalise our everyday 
exchanges. The haptic antagonism that I am attempting to formulate would, however, 
be a more premeditated and calculated occurrence that specifically targets the 
authoritative and prevailing operations of contemporary cultural production. Whilst 
the result of this antagonism might well be impossible to predict in terms of its 
affective impact, it would nonetheless be a strategic procedure as opposed to a 
random, chaotic or fortuitous occurrence – a volatile happening set in motion due to a 
process of focused and critical thinking as opposed to the surrendering of critical 
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thought altogether. So whilst the result itself might be volatile and mercurial, the 
methodology that triggers it constitutes a distinct and discerning practice. This 
practice would manifest through performative interruptions to the formal procedural 
norms that determine the production of cultural discourse. 
  
So the practitioner’s melancholic performance, devised from watching zombie films 
as a self-reflexive spectator, would eviscerate the normalised event, collapsing its 
prevailing protocols with a sudden texture of affective proximity and haptic 
unfamiliarity. This tactic would not amount to a cultural insurrection or an 
oppositional détournement. However, it might manifest as an unwillingness to 
coalesce absolutely with the status quo, and remind us that the ubiquitous procedures 
that determine our socio-political behaviour are contingent negotiations rather than 
essential conditions. And so it is that the depressed practitioner might discover a 
means of being melancholically active within the stifling climate of contemporaneity.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
(Post)Undead Melancholia 
 
The term ‘zombie’ has been expanded to evoke such a myriad, yet fragmented, 
spectrum of characteristics, traits and tropes – both within and without fiction – that it 
has become irreparably prised away from, perhaps even antonymous to, what it 
previously described. Unsurprisingly therefore, some critics have enjoyed hailing the 
era of the post zombie.221 In my own project, the figure of undeadliness migrated 
from an absence of subjectivity, into the formation of transgressive subjectivity, into a 
haptic texture beyond subjectivity, into a methodology for art practice that avoids 
subjectivity… becoming unrecognisable as a zombie along the way. Perhaps the 
understanding of undeadliness I have arrived at, as a haptic strategy for making work, 
is necessarily (post)undead.  
  
In this conclusion I speculate as to how the expansion of undeadliness from a 
fictitious conceit into a (post)undead performance methodology might continue to 
push upon the term melancholia with which it has been antagonistically coupled 
throughout my project. (Post)undeadliness has certainly prompted me to consider 
melancholia in relation to materialist discourses. The movement that melancholia 
engenders, previously understood as a desire to be reunited with death – the act of 
subjective self-annihilation – might now be described as a shift from the symbolic to 
the material. This chimes with current debates in materialism that attempt to look 
away from death for that which determines an ontology of life.  
 
I find the metaphysics of finitude a myopic way of putting the limits of what 
we call “life.” It is not because Thanatos always wins out in the end that it 
should enjoy such conceptual high status. Death is overrated.222 
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Rosi Braidotti, in this quote taken from her essay The Politics of Life Itself and New 
Ways of Dying, articulates precisely the point that death is a short-sighted and 
inadequate means for apprehending what life might be. She explores how the concept 
of zoë – animal life – has historically been seen in opposition to bios – the notion of 
discursive, rational, controlled and intellectual life. This distinction informs the mind-
body dualism that has perpetually cast zoë as secondary and subservient to bios. 
Zombie fiction endorses the same split; the original undead melancholic in my project 
effectively asserts that the material body – zoë – is no more than a bereft shell unless 
it is allied with something more than and other to the body, and so supports the old 
Cartesian dualism model; to be human is to be more than only matter. Braidotti claims 
that Agamben’s treatment of zoë performs a similar manoeuvre: 
 
Zoë – like the prediscursive in Lacan, the chora of Kristeva, and the material 
feminine of Irigaray – becomes for Agamben the ever-receding horizon of an 
alterity which has to be included as necessarily excluded in order to sustain the 
framing of the subject in the first place. This introduces finitude as a 
constitutive element within the framework of subjectivity, which also fuels an 
affective political economy of loss and melancholia at the heart of the 
subject.223  
 
And so melancholia is understood here to be in cahoots with this dualism that 
recognises a certain bodily materiality that must be kept at bay if the subject is to 
maintain her bios – her integrity as a self-reflexive human. Death is the threshold to 
this other and alienating material self, and so whilst it protects the subject from this 
otherness, it simultaneously fragments her, prohibiting her from being connected to a 
more immersive and integrated sense of zoë. Again, this tessellates with my reading 
of melancholia at the beginning of Chapter Three in which subjectivity itself is the 
very thing that blocks the melancholic from being reunited with her Thing. Death 
presents itself as the passage through which the subjective self must pass if she is to 
access her material self. 
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Braidotti passionately argues again this dualism, insisting that zoë is a radical position 
within human life as opposed to being an alterity that is necessarily exterior to it. 
 
Zoë, this obscenity, this life in me, is intrinsic to my being and yet so much 
“itself” that it is independent of the will, the demands and expectations of the 
sovereign consciousness. […] It thus ends up being experienced as an alien 
other. […] Are we not baffled by this scandal, this wonder, this zoë, that is to 
say, by an idea of life that exuberantly exceeds bios and supremely ignores 
logos? Are we not in awe of this piece of flesh we call our “body,” of this 
aching meat called our “self” expressing the abject and simultaneously divine 
potency of life?224   
 
I find this passage striking because it describes a state within life that explodes 
subjective consistency – a state of abject materiality that exceeds the symbolic self – 
that I could only recognise as being without life in the fictional realms of 
undeadliness. I understand the “divine potency” that Braidotti mentions as an 
immersive and vital state of being that is typically muted by the “stultifying inertia of 
the status quo.”225 Once again, she treats the state of zoë like I treated undeadliness – 
as being counter to the homogenising operations of contemporaneity. Braidotti uses 
zoë to perform political manoeuvres that I could only carry out within the conceit of 
undeadliness.  
 
But when I pushed my thesis into the realms of (post)undeadliness in Chapter Four, 
its haptic materiality pulled away from a dualistic relationship with death; its 
thingness – what Braidotti might call its vitality – was displaced from the spectrum of 
finitude. But I still called this a melancholic procedure because it involved a 
fragmentation and a loss of symbolic integrity. The haptic properties of this 
melancholia that I proposed certainly tally with the visceral, grainy and entangled 
qualities of Braidotti’s “life”; she claims that “zoë is certainly gritty.”226 Then again, 
Braidotti asserts that zoë is not an evisceration, a fragmentation or an emptying out of 
bios – of meaning – rather it is a radically immanent and immersive presence. Zoë is 
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the experience of “life itself”227 as opposed to the cognitive conception of life. So 
Braidotti is able to articulate a hapticity that is not dependent on melancholic notions 
of loss and absence.  
 
I wrote about haptic melancholia in relation to making work. I understood it as a 
strategy – articulated in response to watching zombie films – that involved a 
performative flattening of the prevailing protocols that afford a given situation its 
normative familiarity. As I mentioned above, I recognised this as a melancholic 
procedure because it involved splintering the whole into fragmented parts that are no 
longer capable of serving Symbolic consistency.  
 
But there is another sense in which this procedure is melancholic. It is born out of a 
notion of limits – of a pessimistic sense of ossification and stasis within 
contemporaneity that prohibits and denies a more oppositional or transgressive 
practice. It still holds on to some other but impossible beyond – a more ideal practice 
that is at the same time forever going to be an unobtainable alterity. And so this 
melancholic practice still bears the traces of duality – of an idealised and immaterial 
otherness that exists as a dialectical counterpoint to its own materiality. Zoë, however, 
embraces the vital materiality of “life itself” without recourse to the metaphysical; it 
does the work that haptic melancholia aspires to without othering an aspect of itself – 
without falling back on an oppositional alterity. Braidotti goes on to claim that a state 
of zoë is difficult to inhabit.  
 
“The limits are those of one’s endurance – in the double sense of lasting in 
time and bearing the pain of confronting “Life” as zoë.”228  
 
The suffering engendered by this intense mode of living that rejects normalised and 
habitual patterns of life, is fundamentally attributed to being present – being 
immanent – despite the prospect of death, whilst melancholia is forever haunted by an 
absence of that which has already been lost.  
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So my final formulation of a (post)undead melancholia, as a haptic evisceration of 
bios, hails a materialism that, in turn, rejects the notion of undeadliness (either “post” 
or otherwise) altogether. Zoë, as a materiality that refuses finitude as an oppositional 
other, rejects the dualism still implied by the zombie in favour of “life itself.” 
Braidotti’s account of materiality dissolves melancholia too, precisely because zoë is 
an affirmation of life instead of being pessimistic or idealistically opposed to it.  
 
(Post)undead melancholia thus heralds its own demise; stumbling into the realm of 
zoë brings it back to life, and thus collapses the liminal dualism that is so particular to 
its status. We might say that the figure of the zombie is finally slain; not by a second 
symbolic death, but by life – “life itself.”  
 
Whilst I am prepared to hail the demise of (post)undeadliness – to surrender the 
perpetual alterity of zombie discourse to “life itself” – I cannot let go of melancholia 
quite so easily. Braidotti ends her essay with a call for hope that is, among other 
things, set up in opposition to “the dominant ideology of the melancholic lament.”229 
In my own project I have attempted to reject an ideology of melancholia – a politics 
of loss and utopian idealism that in the end can only assert, through its plaintive 
pessimism, the dominance of the status quo that it seeks to oppose. Instead I have 
attempted to re-conceptualise melancholia, not as a dissenting subjectivity that is 
impossible to activate, but as a haptic antagonism to the status quo. Whilst there is 
still a sense of loss associated with this haptic melancholia – an evisceration and an 
emptying out of Symbolic consistency – I claim that it might yet function critically as 
a performative practice, and, as a result operate within life instead of yearning to be 
without it. But still, when Braidotti finishes her text with an affirmative trumpeting of 
life that is clearly attempting to rouse me on an affective level, I can only be 
suspicious of her call for optimism:   
 
Reason has nothing to do with this. Let’s just do it for the hell of it and for the 
love of the world.230 
 
                                                
229 Ibid., p.217 
230 Ibid. 
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Like Braidotti, I have sought to think beyond a melancholic ideology that passively 
laments the lack of radical potentiality in the contemporary climate. However, I find it 
hard to vaporise melancholia entirely; as such, Braidotti’s clarion call, though 
theoretically cogent and certainly persuasive, leaves me cold. Her words do not 
chime, resonate or compel me to embrace her political invitation to dream from our 
“collective imaginings”.231 I understand what she is asking of me, but I do not care to 
join in. Her hope does not feel like a feasible response to the contemporary problem. 
And that is the melancholia in me – the void, the “black sun”232, the moment of 
collapse – that, against all evidence, remains on some level affectively opposed to a 
wholesale embrace of “life itself.”   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
231 Ibid. 
232 Julia Kristeva, Black Sun; Depression and Melancholia (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989) p.3 
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